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Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking 
Ingrid V. Eagly & Joanna C. Schwartz* 
This Article is the first to identify and analyze the growing practice of 
privatized police policymaking. In it, we present our findings from public records 
requests that reveal the central role played by a limited liability corporation—
Lexipol LLC—in the creation of internal regulations for law enforcement 
agencies across the United States. Lexipol was founded in 2003 to provide 
standardized policies and training for law enforcement. Today, more than 3,000 
public safety agencies in thirty-five states contract with Lexipol to author the 
policies that guide their officers on crucial topics such as when to use deadly 
force, how to avoid engaging in racial profiling, and whether to enforce federal 
immigration laws. In California, where Lexipol was founded, as many as 95% of 
law enforcement agencies now rely on Lexipol’s policy manual. 
Lexipol offers a valuable service, particularly for smaller law enforcement 
agencies that are without the resources to draft and update policies on their own. 
However, reliance on this private entity to establish standards for public policing 
also raises several concerns arising from its for-profit business model, focus on 
liability risk management, and lack of transparency or democratic participation. 
We therefore offer several recommendations that address these concerns while 
also recognizing and building upon Lexipol’s successes. 
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from our colleagues at UCLA School of Law, and from Barry Friedman, Emi MacLean, Jon 
Michaels, Eric Miller, John Rappaport, David Sklansky, Samuel Walker, and Adrienna Wong. 
Thanks also to Tim Kensok and the others at Lexipol who shared their insights about the company. 
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Review for their editorial assistance. Finally, we thank Jennifer Mnookin for suggesting that we 
write this Article. 
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Introduction 
The conduct of American police is never far from the front page of the 
news. A wide range of policing issues—such as use of force, racial profiling, 
stop and frisk, roadblocks, Tasers, body cameras, and immigration 
policing—have garnered significant attention from community members, 
courts, advocacy organizations, and law enforcement agencies. Much of the 
discussion about improving police practices has focused on how best to 
regulate police conduct.1 Gaining increasing traction in this discussion is the 
view that comprehensive internal police policies can guide the opaque and 
largely discretionary conduct of the police.2 Those engaged in these 
discussions appear to assume that police departments, local governments, and 
nonprofits will play leading roles in the creation of police policies. However, 
the most significant national player in policing policy today is a private 
limited liability corporation—Lexipol LLC—that has, to date, received 
almost no scholarly attention.3 
 
1. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437 
(describing various police reformers and their strengths and limitations). 
2. See infra notes 175–177 and accompanying text (summarizing scholarship in this area). 
3. To date, the only limited descriptions of Lexipol in academic scholarship occur in our own 
work and that of John Rappaport. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigrant Protective Policies in Criminal 
Justice, 95 TEXAS L. REV. 245, 256 (2016) (discussing the role of Lexipol, “a private service that 
writes and updates policies and procedures for public safety organizations, including police 
departments”); John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
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This Article is the first to examine Lexipol’s role in police 
policymaking. Lexipol explains on its website that it “offers a customizable, 
reliable and regularly updated online policy manual service, daily training 
bulletins on your approved policies, and implementation and management 
services to allow us to manage the administrative side of your policy 
manual.”4 And Lexipol contends that it is “America’s leading provider of 
state-specific policy management resources for law enforcement 
organizations.”5 But beyond the statements Lexipol posts about itself online, 
there is little publicly available information about Lexipol LLC’s products, 
its relationships with local jurisdictions, or the values that its products 
promote. Accordingly, we submitted public records requests to the 200 
largest law enforcement agencies in California, seeking copies of their policy 
manuals as well as any communications or agreements with Lexipol. In 
response, we received thousands of pages of Lexipol-authored policy 
manuals, contracts, promotional materials, and e-mails.6 We supplemented 
these public records responses with court records, newspaper stories, and 
other documentation of Lexipol’s work in California and around the country. 
We found that Lexipol has expanded like wildfire since its founding in 
2003. In only fifteen years, Lexipol has grown from a small company 
servicing forty agencies in California to a leading national police 
policymaker, replacing the homegrown manuals of local police departments 
with off-the-shelf policies emblazoned with the Lexipol LLC copyright 
stamp. Company employees and executives promote the fact that 95% of 
California law enforcement agencies subscribe to Lexipol7—an assertion 
 
1539, 1575 (2017) (noting that “some insurers fund or subsidize subscriptions to a turnkey policy-
writing service from a company called Lexipol”); Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: 
Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1188 (2016) (explaining that some 
risk pools offer discounts on premiums to jurisdictions that subscribe to Lexipol). 
4. Lexipol Products & Services, LEXIPOL, http://www.lexipol.com/law-enforcement/law-
enforcement-products/ [https://perma.cc/TMH9-ZTZX]. 
5. Id. 
6. We discuss our methodology in Part I, infra. Our focus in this Article is on the manuals 
created by Lexipol for police and sheriff’s departments. We note, however, that Lexipol also 
provides policy manuals for fire departments. 
7. See, e.g., SBN Staff, Dan Merkle, Chairman and CEO, Lexipol LLC, SMART BUS. (July 1, 
2012), http://www.sbnonline.com/category/industry-topics/legal-industry-topics/page/2/ [https:// 
perma.cc/27R9-G5GQ] (“Ninety-five percent of the police agencies in California now use Lexipol’s 
online Knowledge Management System, which includes law enforcement standardization and 
training programs, and the company has exceeded 30 percent growth for each of the last five years, 
all without infusions of outside capital.”); Report of Bruce D. Praet at 1, Mitz v. City of Grand 
Rapids, No. 1:09-cv-365, 2009 WL 6849914 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2009) (“Lexipol currently has 
94% of all California law enforcement agencies subscribing to our policy and training systems.”). 
California jurisdictions regularly use the 95% figure in their public communications, suggesting that 
that figure is used in Lexipol’s marketing materials as well. See, e.g., CITY OF LAGUNA BEACH: 
AGENDA BILL NO. 5, at 2 (Sept. 3, 2013), http://lagunabeachcity.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php 
?view_id=3&clip_id=314&meta_id=24551 [https://perma.cc/6FJS-5F6B] (“Lexipol dominates 
with over 95% of the cities [in California] using its services.”); VALLEJO POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
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consistent with agencies’ responses to our public records requests.8 Lexipol’s 
rapid growth has allowed it not only to saturate the market in California but 
also to expand its reach to 3,000 public safety agencies in thirty-five states 
across the country.9 Although Lexipol is not the only private entity to sell 
policies to local police departments in the United States, it appears to sell 
policy manuals and trainings to far more local law enforcement agencies than 
its competitors.10 Indeed, law enforcement agencies in several states describe 
 
2013: THE YEAR IN REVIEW 29 (2014), http://www.ci.vallejo.ca.us/common/pages/ 
DisplayFile.aspx?itemId=74914 [https://perma.cc/Q3RY-F8UW] (“More than 95 percent of 
California law enforcement agencies . . . now utilize Lexipol for their policies and 
procedures . . . .”); Alex Emslie, Vallejo City Manager Responds to Questions About Police 
Shootings, KQED NEWS (May 20, 2014), https://ww2.kqed.org/news/2014/05/20/vallejo-city-
manager-responds-to-questions-about-police-shootings/ [https://perma.cc/L6B3-MGGG] (“More 
than 95 percent of California law enforcement agencies . . . subscribe to the Lexipol Policy 
system.”). Lexipol executives reported to us that 94% of all California public safety agencies use 
Lexipol—a figure which reflects not only police departments and sheriff’s departments, but also 
law enforcement for parks, college campuses, transit systems, and airports. E-mail from Tim 
Kensok, Vice President, Prod. Mgmt., Lexipol, to authors (Sept. 13, 2017, 4:07 PM) (on file with 
authors). 
8. See infra Table 2; Appendix. Our public records requests revealed that 83% of California’s 
200 largest law enforcement agencies were Lexipol customers. Smaller agencies were especially 
likely to use Lexipol: 95% of responding agencies with fewer than 100 officers relied on Lexipol 
policies. 
9. See infra Table 1. Lexipol executives assert that approximately 2,500 of those 3,000 public 
safety agencies are local police and sheriff’s departments. See LEXIPOL: REVIEW OF LEXIPOL: THE 
PRIVATIZATION OF POLICE POLICYMAKING 4 (2017) (on file with authors) [hereinafter SECOND 
LEXIPOL POWERPOINT] (presenting company information in a PowerPoint given to authors by 
Lexipol LLC). The remainder are fire departments, probation departments, and other types of public 
safety agencies. Telephone Interview with Tim Kensok, Vice President, Lexipol, Gordon Graham, 
Vice President, Lexipol, Leslie Stevens, Vice President, Lexipol, Kevin Piper, Vice President, 
Lexipol, and Shannon Piper, Dir. of Mktg. & Commc’ns, Lexipol (Sept. 8, 2017) [hereinafter 
Lexipol September Conference Call]. 
10. Other private entities that provide similar services include: OSS Law Enforcement 
Advisors, http://www.ossrisk.com/consultant/Law-Enforcement/page174.html [https://perma.cc 
/W54Z-P636]; Daigle Law Grp., LLC, http://daiglelawgroup.com [https://perma.cc/J36N-KFBA]; 
Pub. Safety Specialist’s Grp., http://www.pssg.net/liability/liability.shtml [https://perma.cc/68LK-
FPDA]; Legal & Liability Risk Management Institute, http://www.llrmi.com/index.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/8LTE-TWTX]; The Thomas & Means Law Firm, https://www.thomasandmeans 
.com/policy-manual-work [https://perma.cc/YDW3-UFLV]; and Hillard Heintze, http://www 
.hillardheintze.com/law-enforcement-consulting/police-department-assessment/ [https://perma.cc/ 
V8WS-QBA5]. Most of these companies were reluctant to provide us with information about their 
law enforcement clients, but the information we have been able to collect suggests that these 
companies work with fewer law enforcement agencies than does Lexipol. See Telephone Interview 
by David Koller with Eric Daigle, Principal, Daigle Law Group, LLC (Aug. 28, 2017) (reporting 
that his company consults with approximately eighty law enforcement agencies, and confirming 
that Lexipol has only a couple of competitors—including The Daigle Group—because “Lexipol had 
the market cornered for so long”); Telephone Interview by David Koller with Dennis W. Bowman, 
President & Founder, Public Safety Specialist’s Group (Aug. 31, 2017) (reporting that his company 
has worked with forty to fifty law enforcement agencies on their policy manuals since the 
company’s formation in 2001); Telephone Interview by David Koller with David Lee Salmon II, 
Law Enforcement Advisor, OSS Law Enf’t Advisors (Sept. 13, 2017) (reporting that OSS has “well 
over” 2,000 clients but explaining that that figure includes local law enforcement agencies, 
EAGLY.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2018  1:26 AM 
2018] Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking 895 
 
it as the “sole source provider” of standardized, state-specific law 
enforcement policy manuals.11 
The key to Lexipol’s commercial success appears to be its claims to 
reduce legal liability in a cost-effective manner. Lexipol promotes itself as 
providing departments with a “policy that is always up to date” containing 
“legally defensible content” that will “protect your agency today.”12 In fact, 
Lexipol’s promotional materials assert that departments using Lexipol have 
fewer lawsuits filed against them and pay less to resolve the suits that are 
filed.13 Lexipol also argues that its policy manuals are higher-quality, more 
user-friendly, and less expensive than manuals that local jurisdictions could 
create on their own. Lexipol claims its standardized policies reflect court 
opinions, legislation, and what it calls “best practices” in each state.14 Lexipol 
updates its policies, and local jurisdictions can incorporate those updates into 
their policy manuals with a click of a button. And Lexipol’s sliding-fee scale, 
which is based on the number of officers employed by the agency, makes this 
prepackaged deal particularly appealing for smaller departments that would 
not have the resources to develop and update policies on their own.15 
Lexipol’s meteoric rise has significant implications for longstanding 
debates about the role policymaking might play in police reform. Beginning 
in the 1960s,16 Anthony Amsterdam, Kenneth Culp Davis, Herman 
Goldstein, and others argued that comprehensive police policies could guide 
police discretion, improve police decisionmaking, and increase 
transparency.17 These scholars advocated for a rulemaking procedure akin to 
 
municipal groups, insurance companies, state agencies, state associations, and private employers). 
We repeatedly reached out to LLRMI, Thomas & Means, and Hillard Heintze, and did not get 
responses to our inquiries. 
11. See infra notes 311–312 and accompanying text. 
12. About Lexipol, LEXIPOL, http://www.lexipol.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/3W98-
VXF5] (click on video). 
13. See infra notes 144–148 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra Figure 1. 
15. For example, the Calaveras County Sheriff’s Department, with fifty-nine officers, was 
charged less than $9,000 for a one-year contract, while larger agencies were charged more. See infra 
notes 110–120 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lexipol’s cost structure. 
16. For a history of administrative rulemaking in policing, see Samuel Walker, The New 
Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in 
Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 14–17 (2003). 
17. See, e.g., Herman Goldstein, Police Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real, 23 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 140, 146 (1963) (arguing that police should acknowledge the role of discretion in law 
enforcement); Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 588–89 (1960) (suggesting 
that legislatures should create Policy Appraisal and Review Boards to review the nonenforcement 
decisions of police officers and make policy recommendations); Jerome Hall, Police and Law in a 
Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 146 (1953) (advancing the idea that police methods and 
policies should “reflect democratic values”); Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the 
Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 904 (1962) (asserting that “criminal law 
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that which exists for administrative agencies, whereby proposed policies 
would be subject to notice and comment by the public before promulgation, 
so as to invite “community reaction.”18 In recent years, Barry Friedman, 
Christopher Slobogin, Eric Miller, and others have renewed these earlier calls 
for policing policies created by an administrative rulemaking process.19 Yet 
Lexipol does not appear in these ongoing discussions about the types of 
police policies that will best guide police behavior, or the need for 
transparency and community engagement in the development of those 
policies. 
As we reveal in this Article, Lexipol’s approach to police policymaking 
diverges in several significant ways from that long advocated by scholars and 
experts. Commentators have viewed police policies as a tool to constrain 
officer discretion and to improve officer decisionmaking. Lexipol, in 
contrast, promotes its policies as a risk management tool that can reduce legal 
liability. Commentators have long contended that the Supreme Court’s 
policing decisions are wholly inadequate to guide law enforcement discretion 
 
enforcement can often be improved substantially by the imposition of legal procedures and 
standards upon the exercise of discretion”); Wayne R. LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of 
the Law (pt. 1), 1962 WIS. L. REV. 104, 104 (1962) (discussing the reasons why police discretion 
has rarely been recognized in the law); Carl McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. 
REV. 659, 674 (1972) (highlighting the lack of actual police participation in the making of rules 
governing police). Note, however, that the earliest calls for administrative rulemaking for police 
occurred in the early 1900s. See Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. 
REV. 91, 123 (2016) (citing BRUCE WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
GOVERNING THE RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS (1903)). 
18. Gerald M. Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies, 36 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 500, 509 (1971); see also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 423 (1974) (“[I]nformed authorities today agree with rare 
unanimity upon the need to direct and confine police discretion by the same process of rulemaking 
that has worked excellently to hold various other forms of public agencies to accountability under 
standards of lawfulness, fairness and efficiency.”); Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Legal 
Control of the Police, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 703, 725 (1974) (“My central idea is that police practices 
should no longer be exempt from the kind of judicial review that is usual for other administrative 
agencies.”); see also REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 
164–65 (1968) (arguing in favor of formal policymaking pursuant to an administrative-type 
procedure for police departments). 
19. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1827, 1833 n.28 (2015) (observing that, in calling for administrative rulemaking in policing, they 
“stand on the shoulders of giants”); Eric J. Miller, Challenging Police Discretion, 58 HOW. L.J. 521, 
525 (2015) (proposing that police reformers “focus on the departmental level of police policy-
making to give local communities and disadvantaged individuals a more meaningful voice in 
evaluating and checking local police policy”); Slobogin, supra note 17, at 91 (arguing that when 
police create “statute-like policies that are aimed at largely innocent categories of actors . . . they 
should have to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking or a similar democratically oriented 
process and avoid arbitrary and capricious rules”); see also Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: 
Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2050 (2016) 
(identifying a trend calling “for a pivot to law enforcement self-regulation as a primary means of 
constraining state power in the criminal justice arena”). 
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regarding racial profiling, stop and frisk, and other practices.20 Yet Lexipol 
has resisted efforts to craft policies that go beyond the minimum 
requirements of court decisions because such policies might increase legal 
liability exposure.21 
Moreover, the process by which Lexipol develops its policies is not 
consistent with the approach recommended by many policing experts who 
have emphasized the importance of transparent policymaking, with 
opportunities for public input.22 Lexipol does not disclose information about 
who is making Lexipol’s policies and what interests are prioritized in their 
process. And although Lexipol informally receives feedback from 
subscribing jurisdictions about its policies, its policymaking process departs 
considerably from the transparent, quasi-administrative approach 
recommended by scholars and policing experts and adopted by some law 
enforcement agencies.23 Also, Lexipol’s profit-seeking motive influences its 
product design in concerning ways. For example, Lexipol’s policies are 
copyrighted, and the company vigorously defends that copyright as a means 
of maintaining its profitability. Yet police policymaking has long been 
viewed as a collaborative enterprise. Departments across the country have 
traditionally shared their policies as a means of learning from each other and 
have borrowed liberally from each others’ policies. Lexipol’s business model 
impedes this generative process.24 
In this Article, we do not reach any conclusions about how Lexipol’s 
policies compare to those adopted by law enforcement agencies that do not 
purchase Lexipol’s products. Indeed, some of these same critiques have been 
made of local law enforcement agencies that draft their own policies.25 Yet 
 
20. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The 
Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 125 (2017) (criticizing 
Fourth Amendment law as in fact “legaliz[ing] racial profiling,” resulting in ongoing police 
surveillance, social control, and the injury and death of African Americans); see also infra notes 
189–192 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 180–194 and accompanying text for further discussion of these concerns. 
22. See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 19, at 1827 (arguing that police practices 
should be legislatively authorized and “subject to public rulemaking”). 
23. See infra notes 213–226 and accompanying text for further discussion of these concerns. 
24. See infra notes 241–253 and accompanying text for further discussion of these concerns. 
25. For example, although we critique Lexipol’s resistance to model use of force policies 
recommended by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Police Executive 
Research Forum, see infra notes 180-195 and accompanying text, we recognize that there have also 
been powerful critiques of use of force policies promulgated by departments that do not contract 
with Lexipol. See, e.g., Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. 
L. REV. 211, 212 (2017) (arguing that use of force policies of the fifty largest policing agencies in 
the United States are insufficiently specific and lack guidance in key areas); see also POLICE USE 
OF FORCE PROJECT, http://useofforceproject.org/#project [https://perma.cc/57AN-GAWE] 
(reviewing police use of force policies in ninety-one of the one hundred largest law enforcement 
agencies and finding that policies frequently failed to include eight “common-sense limits on police 
use of force”). Critics have also argued that police departments should—but do not—view 
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because Lexipol appears to be the single most influential actor in police 
policymaking, its successes—and failures—have an outsized impact on 
American police policy. As Lexipol goes, so go thousands of law 
enforcement agencies across the country. And Lexipol’s for-profit status 
raises additional concerns that do not apply to government and nonprofit 
police policymakers. 
By identifying Lexipol as a force to be reckoned with in American 
policing, this Article also begins an important conversation about the 
privatization of police policymaking. Privatization scholars tend, in varying 
degrees, to applaud privatization of government functions as cost-effective26 
or to despair that privatization impedes democratic values.27 Our research 
regarding the privatization of police policymaking offers evidence to support 
both views. Lexipol appears to have solved a problem that has proven elusive 
to those advocating for police policymaking—how to promulgate police 
policies in the almost 18,000 highly localized law enforcement agencies 
across the country.28 And agencies that contract with Lexipol may well have 
 
policymaking as a quasi-administrative exercise. See generally Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra 
note 19, at 1833 (summarizing scholarly arguments for using administrative processes to govern 
policing policy). And critics have complained that police policies are often kept secret. See, e.g., 
Garrett & Stoughton, supra, at 277 (finding that only seventeen of the fifty largest police 
departments published their policies and patrol manuals online). 
26. See, e.g., Steven J. Kelman, Achieving Contracting Goals and Recognizing Public Law 
Concerns: A Contracting Management Perspective (arguing that privatization will often be the most 
efficient solution for government and that limitations on privatization can be counterproductive), in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 153, 158–59 (Jody 
Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009); Stan Soloway & Alan Chvotkin, Federal Contracting in 
Context: What Drives It, How to Improve It (arguing that private companies often have better 
resources and research capacity than government entities), in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: 
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra at 192, 221–22; Jody Freeman, Extending 
Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1296 (2003) (“From this 
pragmatic perspective, privatization is a means of improving productive efficiency: obtaining high-
quality services at the lowest possible cost . . . .”). 
27. See, e.g., JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2017) (describing how privatization threatens constitutional principles and 
threatens government health and stability); Sharon Dolovich, How Privatization Thinks: The Case 
of Prisons (arguing that operators of private prisons will promote efficiency over other important 
interests), in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra 
note 26, at 128, 134; Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: Privatizing Military Efforts and the Risks 
to Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy (describing concerns about the process by 
which contracts are awarded for government work and the difficulty of monitoring private 
employees), in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra 
note 26, at 110, 111; David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1277–78 
(1999) (highlighting how the growing private security industry undermines the function of the 
criminal law). 
28. As Monica Bell has noted, “the sheer volume of locally controlled police departments, all 
of which have slightly different policies and issues,” has impeded systemic police reform across 
these different localities. Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal 
Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2138 (2017); see also Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 
19, at 1886 (arguing that “the real challenge” to applying rulemaking to policing “is identifying 
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a more complete and up-to-date policy manual than they would have 
developed on their own—Lexipol subscribers quoted on its website certainly 
make that claim.29 But our research also raises serious questions about the 
values, process, and expertise called upon to create the Lexipol policies that 
regulate the public police. 
Many believe—and we agree—that police departments need 
comprehensive and detailed policies to guide officer discretion and should 
engage with local communities in some manner when shaping those policies. 
We additionally believe that plans to improve law enforcement policymaking 
must recognize the prevalence of Lexipol and take account of the strengths 
and weaknesses of its approach. Accordingly, we recommend that Lexipol 
be more transparent about its policymaking process so that local governments 
can make more informed decisions about the policies that guide their law 
enforcement agencies; that local governments and courts take a more active 
role in police policymaking; and that nonprofits and scholars develop more 
easily accessible alternative model policies that are compatible with 
Lexipol’s user-friendly platform. We believe that these recommendations 
will encourage local jurisdictions to craft their own policies when possible 
and, when contracting with Lexipol, view the company as a first—but not 
final—step in the policymaking process. 
I. The Rise of Lexipol 
In this Part, we share our findings about Lexipol’s founders, its products, 
and its relationships with the local governments it serves. In conducting this 
research, we first gathered information from Lexipol’s website, financial 
filings, press releases, news sources, and court documents. We supplemented 
this research with public records requests to the 200 largest police and 
sheriffs’ departments in California, seeking each department’s policy manual 
and any dealings with Lexipol LLC—including contracts, payments, 
correspondence, and other memoranda.30 We chose to conduct this research 
in California, where Lexipol was founded. Soon thereafter, we were 
contacted by a vice president at Lexipol who had learned about our public 
records requests from Lexipol subscribers. We had several conversations 
with this vice president and other Lexipol executives about the company’s 
business model and process for creating its policy manuals. 
 
methods of public participation that can be scaled to communities and police forces of various 
sizes”). 
29. See infra notes 152–158 and accompanying text. 
30. To identify the 200 largest police and sheriff’s departments in California, we relied on a 
census of local law enforcement agencies conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). See 
Appendix (describing our methodology). 
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In this Part, we provide a descriptive account of Lexipol’s services, 
drawn from the information we gathered. We begin by introducing what we 
know about Lexipol’s founders and employees. We then describe the 
company’s products, cost structure, sales methods, and growth. Later, in 
Part II, we build on our findings to analyze Lexipol’s model of police 
policymaking. 
A. People 
Lexipol LLC was founded in 2003 by Bruce Praet, Gordon Graham, and 
Dan Merkle.31 Praet, an attorney and former law enforcement officer, appears 
to have had the initial vision for the company. While working as a partner at 
the Southern California law firm of Ferguson, Praet and Sherman, Praet 
developed a specialty in “aggressively defending police civil matters such as 
shootings, dog bites and pursuits.”32 In the late 1990s, Praet’s firm assisted 
the California agencies he represented to reduce liability exposure by 
recommending they adopt a policy he authored on vehicular pursuits.33 A 
1959 California law provided that agencies with a written policy for vehicular 
pursuits were immunized from certain forms of civil damages.34 By drafting 
such a policy for his clients, Praet shielded them from civil liability for these 
types of claims. 
Praet’s experience developing a model policy for vehicle pursuits 
inspired him to create a more comprehensive set of policies that local law 
enforcement agencies could purchase. Working with Geoff Spalding, a 
Police Captain with the Fullerton Police Department, Praet created a model 
California law enforcement manual based on Fullerton’s policies.35 Praet 
used this model when the Escalon Police Department retained his firm to 
write its entire policy manual in 1999. By 2002, the firm maintained the 
policy manuals for about forty California-based law enforcement agencies.36 
 
31. Deposition of Bruce D. Praet at 7, Schrock v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. CIVDS-14-8556, 2016 
WL 5656893 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2016) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Praet Deposition]. 
32. Thadeus Greenson, Arraignment Only the First Step in Moore Case, EUREKA TIMES 
STANDARD (Dec. 12, 2007), http://www.times-standard.com/general-news/20071212/arraignment-
only-the-first-step-in-moore-case [https://perma.cc/46Q2-9SCR] (quoting a description of Praet’s 
firm from the Lexipol website); see also Mark I. Pinsky, Former Officer Defends Police in 
Courtroom: Law: Bruce D. Praet Faces What May Be the Challenge of His Legal Career in the 
Newport Police Sexual Harassment Case, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 28, 1992), http://articles.latimes.com 
/1992-12-28/local/me-2115_1_police-officers [https://perma.cc/3GPQ-TAKR] (chronicling Praet’s 
career from police officer to lawyer). 
33. LEXIPOL, LEXIPOL POLICY DEVELOPMENT—HOW WE DO WHAT WE DO 12 (Feb. 10, 
2017) (on file with authors) [hereinafter FIRST LEXIPOL POWERPOINT] (presenting company 
information in a PowerPoint given to authors by Lexipol). 
34. Id. (citing CAL. VEH. CODE § 17004.7 (West 2007)). 
35. Id. at 13. 
36. Id. 
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In 2003, Praet founded Lexipol with Gordon Graham and Dan Merkle, 
and transferred his policy development work from his law firm to the new 
company.37 Graham, also a former law enforcement officer and law school 
graduate, additionally has a master’s degree in Safety and Systems 
Management.38 In the 1980s, while a sergeant in the California Highway 
Patrol, Gordon developed daily trainings for officers that he called the 
“SROVT program: Solid, Realistic, Ongoing, Verifiable, Training.”39 In the 
early 1990s, Graham began adapting his training programs for private sector 
and public safety organizations.40 When Graham joined Lexipol as co-
President, he drew on his expertise in public entity risk management to 
develop training materials to accompany the manuals.41  
Dan Merkle served as Lexipol’s first Chairman and CEO.42 Merkle has 
a background as a corporate executive43 and was recruited to focus on 
building the company’s infrastructure.44 When Merkle left Lexipol in 2013 
to join a media technology company,45 Ron Wilkerson became the new CEO 
of Lexipol.46 As the company has grown beyond its original founders, it has 
hired scores of attorneys, marketing specialists, and account managers.47 
Although Lexipol applauds the “all-star team of public safety 
veterans”48 that drafts its polices and trainings, there is no publicly available 
 
37. Letter from Lexipol to Pat Smith, Chief of Police, Beaumont Police Dep’t (Sept. 4, 2003) 
(on file with authors) (“Lexipol has assumed all functions of the policy manual development work 
formerly performed by the law firm of Ferguson Praet and Sherman.”). 
38. About GRC, Bio: Gordon Graham, GRAHAM RES. CONSULTANTS, http://www 
.gordongraham.com/about.html [https://perma.cc/9Z33-EAAE]. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. See Letter from Lexipol to Pat Smith, supra note 37 (“Gordon is leading a group developing 
a training system based on the content of each agency’s policy manual and his extraordinary 
knowledge base.”); see also GRAHAM RES. CONSULTANTS, supra note 38 (recounting Graham’s 
expertise in police training programs before establishing Lexipol). 
42. SBN Staff, supra note 7. 
43. Dan Merkle, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/dan-merkle/. 
44. See Letter from Lexipol to Pat Smith, supra note 37 (“Dan Merkle has been recruited to 
lead our investment in systems and resources to better serve our subscribing agencies.”). 
45. Merkle, supra note 43. 
46. Ron Wilkerson, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/ron-wilkerson-8a075b8a. In 
2013, Praet and Graham sued Merkle for allegedly attempting to strip Praet of his ownership interest 
in Lexipol. See Praet v. Merkle, No. 30-2013-00622437 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2013); see also 
Veritone Appoints New President of Public Safety, Expanding Cognitive Media Platform to Law 
Enforcement, CISION: PRWEB (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2016/09/ 
prweb13690214.htm [https://perma.cc/9NZU-5EK6] (announcing Dan Merkle as the new CEO of 
Veritone, Inc.). 
47. See Current Career Opportunities, LEXIPOL, http://www.lexipol.com/careers/ [https:// 
perma.cc/S9YF-KXP8] (stating that Lexipol is currently hiring product managers, attorneys, and 
development representatives). 
48. Letter from Lexipol to Roy Davenport, Assistant Chief Deputy, Denton Cty. (Dec. 3, 2012) 
(on file with authors). 
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information about who these public safety veterans are. We found 
information about Praet and Graham, but could find no information about the 
identities or credentials of their 120 employees.49 Indeed, none of the 
marketing materials that we obtained from the California jurisdictions we 
surveyed included information on names or credentials of Lexipol’s 
employees. When we spoke to company executives about this issue, they 
provided us with the photos, names, and titles of ten Lexipol executives, and 
one vice president told us that he would love to include photos and bios of 
staff on Lexipol’s website, but that he had not yet had a chance to do so.50 
Another vice president observed that law enforcement agencies can always 
call Lexipol to learn more about the people who develop policies.51 
Bruce Praet was equally unforthcoming about Lexipol’s employees in a 
recent deposition taken after Lexipol was sued over its Taser policy.52 Praet 
testified that Lexipol identifies best practices by relying on their internal 
subject matter experts and feedback from their subscriber agencies.53 Yet 
when Praet was directly asked whether Lexipol “employ[s] subject matter 
experts on different areas of law enforcement practices who determine what 
best practices are,” he acknowledged that they did not.54 He explained: “We 
don’t have a specific subject matter expert on a specific topic, but a good 
number of our people are law enforcement background, so there’s a wealth 
of information that we draw upon, depending on the subject.”55 Similarly, 
Praet could not (or would not) identify Lexipol employees who had particular 
expertise in Tasers.56 Instead, he said, Lexipol “had a wealth of people who 
 
49. FIRST LEXIPOL POWERPOINT, supra note 33, at 13 (reporting a rapid growth from 61 
employees in 2014 to 120 employees in 2016). 
50. See Lexipol September Conference Call, supra note 9 (statement of Tim Kensok, Vice 
President, Prod. Mgmt., Lexipol); SECOND LEXIPOL POWERPOINT, supra note 9, at 8, 12 
(responding to the authors’ criticisms about a lack of transparency with pictures and brief 
descriptions of ten executives). 
51. Lexipol September Conference Call, supra note 9 (statement of Leslie Stevens, Vice 
President, Legal Dep’t, Lexipol). 
52. In the deposition, Praet was repeatedly asked to identify employees involved in crafting 
Lexipol’s 2008 Taser policy. After several nonresponsive answers, Praet was asked whether he 
could name a single person with whom he consulted about a Taser-related memo. Praet’s response: 
A: [T]he staffing at Lexipol has changed so many times over 15 years, I couldn’t tell 
you. All I can tell you is that whoever was on staff in 2009 at the time of this I probably 
would have consulted with several people. 
Q: Can you name any of those several people? 
A: That’s my problem. I don’t have a roster of who was on staff in 2009 to give you 
names, and I don’t want to give you somebody who came on in January of 2010 or 
somebody who may have left in 2008. So . . . . 
Praet Deposition, supra note 31, at 41. For additional details about the case, see infra note 237. 
53. Praet Deposition, supra note 31, at 12. 
54. Id.. 
55. Id. at 12–13. 
56. Id. at 21. 
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have a significant amount of information about Tasers, but not one person 
who was the go-to person.”57 
B. Products 
On its website and in its promotional materials sent to potential law 
enforcement customers, Lexipol markets three main products: (1) a policy 
manual, (2) Daily Training Bulletins, and (3) implementation services.58 In 
this section, we share what we have learned about each product. 
1. Policy Manual.—Lexipol’s signature product is its copyrighted 
policy manual.59 Lexipol has a “global master” manual that is based on 
federal standards and best practices.60 It has used this global master to create 
“state master” manuals that incorporate state-specific standards.61 
There is limited public information available regarding how Lexipol 
goes about drafting the policies contained in its manuals. We know from 
speaking with executives at Lexipol that they work with a team of company 
attorneys and former law enforcement officials to review court decisions, 
legislation, and other materials applicable to a state.62 Lexipol also considers 
media reports, client feedback, trends in law enforcement, and reports by 
outside groups including the Department of Justice, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), and the National Institute of Justice.63 Anecdotal 
evidence also plays a significant role in Lexipol’s policy development 
 
57. Id. 
58. See Lexipol Products & Services, LEXIPOL, http://www.lexipol.com/law-enforcement/law-
enforcement-products/ [https://perma.cc/LDS6-JGRA] (describing a “customizable, reliable and 
regularly updated online policy manual service, daily training bulletins on your approved policies, 
and implementation and management services to allow [Lexipol] to manage the administrative side 
of [an agency’s] policy manual”). 
59. Lexipol vice presidents made clear that Lexipol offers a “policy manual,” not a “procedure 
manual.” Telephone Interview with Tim Kensok, Vice President, Lexipol, Leslie Stevens, Vice 
President, Lexipol, and Kevin Piper, Vice President, Lexipol (Feb. 10, 2017) [hereinafter Lexipol 
February Conference Call]. In Lexipol’s view, a policy manual “[a]nswers major organizational 
issues,” is “[u]sually expressed in broad terms,” has “[w]idespread application,” and “[c]hanges less 
frequently.” FIRST LEXIPOL POWERPOINT, supra note 33, at 16. In contrast, a procedure manual 
“[d]escribes a process,” is “[o]ften stated in detail,” is “[p]rone to change,” and has “[n]arrow 
application.” Id. 
60. Lexipol February Conference Call, supra note 59. 
61. FIRST LEXIPOL POWERPOINT, supra note 33, at 15; see also Letter from John Fitisemanu, 
Client Servs. Representative, Lexipol, to Tammie Stilinovich, Officer, Long Beach Police Dep’t 
(Feb. 28, 2014) (on file with authors) (stating that “Lexipol provides . . . [c]ustomized content for 
the state of California”). For a copy of Lexipol’s California state master policy document, see 
LEXIPOL, CALIFORNIA STATE MASTER POLICE DEPARTMENT: POLICY MANUAL (n.d.), which the 
authors obtained through their public records request to the Irvine Police Department. 
62. Lexipol February Conference Call, supra note 59. 
63. FIRST LEXIPOL POWERPOINT, supra note 33, at 19, 21; Lexipol September Conference Call, 
supra note 9. 
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process. As Bruce Praet explained in a deposition, “we’re constantly getting 
anecdotal information, and I can’t speak for everybody, but everybody on the 
Lexipol staff, when they become aware of something that may impact 
policy . . . they share that and then that is round-tabled, and if it has a policy 
impact, then that’s incorporated into our content.”64 
The Lexipol vice presidents we interviewed offered little guidance about 
how Lexipol ultimately weighs and balances these various sources of 
information. They simply reported that policies are designed by looking at 
all available evidence and having all relevant employees weigh in on how the 
policies should be crafted.65 As Bruce Praet similarly reported in his 
deposition, “if an issue comes up, typically, among the attorneys and subject 
matter experts that we have, we would, for lack of a better term, turkey shoot 
or brainstorm the issue and see what we could come up with [as] an 
appropriate response.”66 Once Lexipol decides to develop a policy, 
employees determine how the policy should be written. The vice presidents 
with whom we spoke described this process as “a challenge” that often results 
in disagreements between the legal team (which is focused on risk to its 
agency clients in the courtroom) and the content-development team (which 
is focused on risk to law enforcement officers on the street).67 How these 
disagreements resolve “varies based on what the issue is and the timing.”68 
Lexipol does not make public the substance of its deliberative process or the 
justifications for its policy decisions. Indeed, Lexipol appears to keep no 
discoverable records of its decisionmaking process regarding policy 
content.69 
 
64. Praet Deposition, supra note 31, at 107. 
65. Lexipol February Conference Call, supra note 59. 
66. Praet Deposition, supra note 31, at 21. 
67. Lexipol February Conference Call, supra note 59. 
68. Id. 
69. In a deposition about Lexipol’s Taser policy, Bruce Praet was asked about the process by 
which the company wrote the policy and an advisory memorandum to its subscribers. Praet 
answered: 
I’m sure that I had communications with all of our people involved in the development 
of the policy, and we have a collaborative forum in which the attorneys and everybody 
on staff at Lexipol can brainstorm issues, so I’m sure there was a good deal of 
communication between myself as an attorney, other attorneys in the—on Lexipol’s 
staff and those who might have any subject matter interest or expertise. 
Praet Deposition, supra note 31, at 27. The attorney then asked for documentation regarding these 
conversations: 
Q: Do you know whether there are any e-mails regarding these communications? 
A: I doubt it. 
Q: Why is that? I mean, why would there not be? 
A: Because we don’t communicate much by way of e-mail. 
Q: How would those communications take place? 
A: Um, I’d be guessing, and I don’t want to guess, but I would imagine there would 
have been phone calls. 
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Agencies that contract with Lexipol are provided a draft state-specific 
policy manual for review.70 The draft manual is typically accompanied by a 
diagram (reproduced in Figure 1) that captures the framework that Lexipol 
uses for categorizing the policies included in its manuals. According to this 
typology, some policies are required by federal or state law, whereas others 
are considered “best practices” or “discretionary.” Lexipol’s draft policy 
manuals are coded to inform readers of the categorization of each proposed 
policy.71  
Figure 1: The Components of a Lexipol Policy Manual72 
 
Jurisdictions can choose whether to adopt, reject, or modify each 
policy.73 Lexipol advises its users to “fully understand the ramifications and 
 
Id. at 27–28. 
70. See, e.g., LEXIPOL, LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY MANUAL & DAILY TRAINING BULLETINS: 
PRESENTED TO COSTA MESA POLICE DEPARTMENT (2014) (on file with authors) (proposing a Law 
Enforcement Policy Manual to the Costa Mesa Police Department). 
71. See, e.g., Invoice from Lexipol to Alameda Police Dep’t (Sept. 26, 2007) (on file with 
authors) (referring to a “color coded draft”). 
72. Figure 1 was obtained from the Long Beach Police Department in response to our public 
records request. LEXIPOL PROPOSAL PRESENTED TO LONG BEACH POLICE DEP’T, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT POLICY MANUAL & DAILY TRAINING BULLETINS (Feb. 28, 2014) (on file with 
authors) [hereinafter LONG BEACH PROPOSAL]. 
73. See, e.g., E-mail from Chris Hofford, Lieutenant, Baldwin Park Police Dep’t, to authors 
(Nov. 7, 2016, 3:51 PM) (on file with authors) (“Policy changes proposed by Lexipol are addressed 
electronically in Lexipol’s online environment. Proposed changes that we accept in part or whole 
are incorporated into the next released edition of the Policy Manual. Proposed changes that we reject 
are not retained.”). 
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use caution before changing or removing” policies derived from federal and 
state law.74 Policies characterized as “best practices” are reportedly 
“considered the currently accepted best practice in the public safety field,” 
and Lexipol advises adopters that “[t]his content may be changed if 
necessary, with caution.”75 Discretionary policies are described as those “that 
may or may not be important for your agency” and “may be changed or 
removed as needed.”76 Jurisdictions understand this message: as one agency 
representative told us in responding to our public records request, those 
Lexipol policies designated as “best practices” or “discretionary” are 
“optional,” but those that are the “law” are required.77 
In promotional materials, Lexipol describes its manual as “a complete 
regulatory and operational policy manual” that “may be accepted for use 
immediately.”78 Nonetheless, Lexipol does take some steps that enable local 
jurisdictions to customize their manuals. When Lexipol first begins working 
with a department, it asks the department to fill out a questionnaire that is 
used by the company to ensure that the terminology used in the manual (such 
as “officers” or “deputies”) is consistent with that used by the particular 
agency.79 Once Lexipol receives the questionnaire, its staff members spend 
 
74. LEXIPOL, LEXIPOL CITATION FAQS: GUIDANCE FOR AGENCY ADMINISTRATORS ON THE 
USE OF CITATIONS AND EDIT LEVELS IN LEXIPOL POLICY MANUALS 4 (2015) (on file with authors) 
[hereinafter LEXIPOL CITATION FAQS]. 
75. DAN FISH, BILL MCAULIFFE & JEFF WITTENBERGER, SANTA CLARA POLICE 
DEPARTMENT PROJECT MANAGEMENT GUIDE AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 5 (2017) (on 
file with authors) [hereinafter SANTA CLARA POLICE DEPARTMENT POWERPOINT]. 
76. Id. Another Lexipol document describes discretionary content as: 
not necessarily a best practice, doesn’t have a direct impact on risk or may not apply 
to your agency. . . . For example, the Administrative Communications Policy outlines 
specifications for letterhead, memorandum style, fax cover sheets, etc. It is 
appropriately classified [as] Discretionary since it is agency-specific and does not have 
a direct risk management impact. 
LEXIPOL CITATION FAQS, supra note 74, at 5. 
77. See, e.g., Telephone Interview by Ingrid Eagly with Joseph May, Deputy Chief, Simi Valley 
Police Dep’t (Nov. 23, 2016) (explaining which policies are mandatory and which ones are merely 
optional). 
78. Letter from Martha Bereczky, Mktg. Coordinator, Lexipol, to Cliff Baumer, San Joaquin 
Sheriff Office (Aug. 27, 2008) (on file with authors). 
79. See LEXIPOL, LEXIPOL LLC DELAWARE POLICY GUIDE 1 (2016), http://www 
.lexipol.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/DE-LE-Policy-Guide-Sheets-2016-10-10.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/ZMD2-9784] (explaining that the “implementation process begins when you complete the 
agency Questionnaire” and that the responses will be used to replace certain bracketed terms “with 
terminology familiar to your agency”); see also E-mail from Nicole Falconer, Account Manager, 
Lexipol, to Tyson Pogue, Lieutenant, Madera Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Jan. 28, 2016, 2:35 PM) (on file 
with authors) (instructing Lt. Pogue to complete and return a questionnaire that would assist Lexipol 
“to define key titles and terms specific to your agency’s structure and operation so the manual is 
consistent with how you operate”); Letter from John Fitisemanu, Client Servs. Representative, 
Lexipol, to Tammie Stilinovich, Officer, Long Beach Police Dep’t (Feb. 20, 2014) (on file with 
authors) (explaining that Lexipol’s “proprietary software allows efficient and accurate generation 
of a draft version of the manual from an online questionnaire”); Letter from Bruce D. Praet, Attorney 
EAGLY.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2018  1:26 AM 
2018] Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking 907 
 
an average of ten to fifteen hours “to further refine the manual to the specific 
needs of the agency.”80 Agencies may also work with Lexipol to customize 
certain policies or supplement the manual with original policy content.81 For 
those agencies that wish to author some of their own policies, Lexipol issues 
a style guide in which it describes “house rules for spelling, punctuation, 
citations and other style issues.”82  
Lexipol executives informed us that they also make policy “guide 
sheets” available to their subscribers that offer additional information 
agencies can use when deciding whether to customize their manuals.83 But 
when we requested a copy of this policy guide, Lexipol refused to provide us 
with a copy84 and none of the California agencies we queried provided us 
with guide sheets or a policy guide in response to our public records 
requests.85 Indeed, when we asked a detective at the Fontana Police 
Department—a Lexipol subscriber—about Lexipol’s policy guide, he said 
that they had never “heard of” or “seen” such a guide.86 Lexipol executives 
conceded that the guide is a “well-kept secret” because it is difficult for 
subscribers to access online.87 Lexipol marketing material that we obtained 
from the Santa Clara Police Department included a single sample “guide 
sheet” for a policy on Records Release and Security. The sample “guide 
sheet” stressed the necessity of adopting Lexipol’s policy with little or no 
modification: “This is a highly recommended policy that all agencies should 
have as part of their manual. . . . [W]e have provided you with a 
 
at Law, to Pat Smith, Chief, Beaumont Police Dep’t (Jan. 30, 2002) (“If you subscribe, the first 
phase of the manual development requires that you (or your assigned staff member) [] simply 
complete the questionnaire and return it at your earliest convenience.”). 
80. Letter from Dan Merkle, CEO, Lexipol, to Bob Gustafson, Captain, City of Orange Police 
Dep’t (Oct. 20, 2003) (on file with authors). 
81. For example, an official from the Los Angeles Port Police Department explained in 
responding to our public records request that his agency modified the Lexipol policies before 
accepting them so that they would match the agency’s practices. Telephone Interview by Ingrid 
Eagly with Lt. Kevin McCousky, L.A. Port Police Dep’t (Dec. 1, 2016). 
82. LEXIPOL, LEXIPOL STYLE GUIDE 3 (2015), http://www.lexipol.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/10/StyleGuide_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/H59U-W6D7]. 
83. Lexipol September Conference Call, supra note 9. 
84. E-mail from Tim Kensok, Vice President, Prod. Mgmt., Lexipol, to authors (Sept. 13, 2017, 
7:27 AM) (on file with authors) (“We would not be able to give you a copy of the entire policy 
guide.”). Kensok did suggest that we could try to get a policy guide from one of Lexipol’s 
subscribers through our public records requests, but the company reported that it would not provide 
us with a copy of its copyrighted materials. See id. 
85. After Lexipol informed us of the existence of a “policy guide,” we followed up with several 
California agencies to request a copy, but none were provided. 
86. Telephone Interview by Joanna Schwartz with Matthew Roth, Detective, Custodian of 
Records, Fontana Police Dep’t (Oct. 2, 2017). 
87. Lexipol September Conference Call, supra note 9. Lexipol executives told us that they are 
working to make it easier for customers to access the policy guide. Id. 
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comprehensive policy . . . . [I]t is unlikely that you will want to modify it to 
any great extent.”88 
The Lexipol-issued policy manuals we reviewed from California law 
enforcement agencies follow a nearly identical format.89 After an initial page 
concerning the law enforcement code of ethics and a page for a mission 
statement, there is a table of contents that covers the role of law enforcement 
officers, the organizational structure of the department, general operations, 
patrol operations, traffic operations, investigation operations, equipment, 
support services, custody, and personnel.90 Each section has several policies, 
and each policy has an identical numbering system and title. For example, 
Policy 310 concerns “Officer-Involved Shootings and Deaths”; Policy 402 
concerns “Racial- or Bias-Based Profiling”; and Policy 1014 concerns “Sick 
Leave.”  
2. Daily Training Bulletins.—Daily Training Bulletins (DTBs) are the 
second principal component of the Lexipol platform. The company describes 
DTBs as a system of short “training scenarios” that give departments and 
officers the ability to understand their policies and apply them in practice.91 
The concept of short daily trainings is based on founder Gordon 
Graham’s philosophy that “every day is a training day.”92 The approach 
focuses on “high risk, low frequency events” that, according to Lexipol, 
“pose the greatest risk to agencies and their personnel.”93 DTBs are made 
available to agency personnel via any web-enabled device, including a 
mobile phone, in-car computer, or desktop computer.94 Company executives 
informed us that each DTB training is designed to be completed in only two 
 
88. SANTA CLARA POLICE DEPARTMENT POWERPOINT, supra note 75, at 10. 
89. In this project, we do not analyze the California departments’ policy manuals to assess the 
frequency or extent to which departments customize Lexipol’s California state master policies. 
Lexipol has informed us that its subscribers change, on average, 20% of the manual text, but the 
company has not assessed whether or to what extent those changes are substantive. See infra note 
212 and accompanying text. 
90. See, e.g., BREA POLICE DEPARTMENT: POLICY MANUAL 3–6 (2016) (on file with authors). 
91. FIRST LEXIPOL POWERPOINT, supra note 33, at 29. 
92. Rachel Cisto, City Cleaning Up Tax Rules, DAILY NEWS-RECORD (Mar. 7, 2016), 
http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives?p_action=doc&p_docid=15B7618C0ED53208&p 
_docnum=129 [https://perma.cc/C88G-CE6B]. 
93. ROSEMARIE CURRAN, LEXIPOL OVERVIEW FOR BEVERLY HILLS POLICE DEPARTMENT: 
CALIFORNIA LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY MANUAL AND DAILY TRAINING BULLETINS 9 (2016) 
(on file with authors); see also Agreement Between Lexipol and Reedley Police Dep’t for Use of 
Daily Training Bulletins (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.reedley.com/departments/city_clerk/ 
agreements_contracts_and_leases/PDFs/Lexipol%20Addendum%20to%20Online% 
20Subscription%20Agreement%20%20-%20August%202014.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VZA-U3B8] 
(offering a subscription to Lexipol’s DTB online training program and describing its design and 
features). 
94. SECOND LEXIPOL POWERPOINT, supra note 9, at 4. 
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minutes.95 They explained that this is because two minutes of daily training—
which amounts to one hour per month and twelve hours per year—is 
sufficient to satisfy minimum police training requirements set by some states’ 
Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) organizations.96 
 
95. Id. (clarifying that two-minute trainings add up to an hour per month and twelve hours per 
year, the minimum that state-required police officer standards and trainings (POST) require). 
96. Id.; see also Lexipol, Four Ways to Integrate Policy into Police Training, http://www 
.lexipol.com/news/4-ways-to-integrate-policy-into-police-training/ [https://perma.cc/3X6J-LTJ2] 
(asserting that law enforcement agencies in Kansas and Utah have used Lexipol’s DTBs to satisfy 
their states’ POST requirements). California’s POST requires that its law enforcement officers 
complete at least twenty-four hours of training every two years. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 
1005 (2017) (requiring that “[e]very peace officer . . . satisfactorily complete the CPT requirement 
of 24 or more hours of POST-qualifying training during every two-year CPT cycle”). Yet, we 
learned through our public records requests that California’s POST has twice declined to certify 
Lexipol as a provider of state-approved trainings for California law enforcement agencies. See infra 
notes 219–224 and accompanying text for further discussion of the reasons California’s POST 
declined to certify Lexipol DTBs as sufficient to satisfy their training requirements. 
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Figure 2: A Lexipol Daily Training Bulletin97 
 
 
Figure 2 contains a sample DTB taken from Lexipol’s promotional 
materials. According to Lexipol’s founding CEO Dan Merkle, DTBs follow 
“the well-respected ‘IRAC’ (Issue, Rule, Analysis, Conclusion) method of 
 
97. Figure 2 was obtained from the San Joaquin Sheriff’s Office in response to our public 
records request. 
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training commonly used in law schools.”98 Using this standardized IRAC 
format,99 all DTBs begin with a three to four sentence scenario that could 
occur in the field.100 Next, the DTB provides the number of the Lexipol policy 
that guides police decisionmaking in the scenario.101 The officer is asked to 
respond to a multiple choice or true/false question that highlights application 
of the policy to the scenario.102 Finally, the DTB provides a short analysis of 
why the policy applies and summarizes the learning objective for the 
training.103  
For those departments that choose to supplement their Lexipol policy 
manuals with DTBs, officers can receive one of these short trainings each 
day during roll call. As Deputy Chief of the Simi Valley Police Department 
explains in an advertisement on Lexipol’s web page: “It can be challenging 
for the supervisor to come up with relevant topics for roll call training, but 
having the DTBs gives us a pool of topics to choose from.”104 Lexipol keeps 
a record of each officer’s participation in the training exercises.105 
3. Implementation Services.—In addition to the policy manual and 
DTBs, Lexipol offers departments a range of consulting services to assist in 
implementing and managing their Lexipol products.106 For example, agencies 
 
98. Letter from Dan Merkle, CEO, Lexipol, to Paul Cappitelli, Director, California Commission 
on Peace Officer Standards and Training (June 4, 2009) (on file with authors). 
99. See LEXIPOL STYLE GUIDE, supra note 82, at 5–7 (describing the standard style format for 
Lexipol’s DTBs). 
100. Letter from Martha Bereczky, supra note 78. 
101. Id. 
102. Id.; see also MIKE DIMICELI & ALAN DEAL, CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON PEACE 
OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING, REPORT ON APPEAL OF LEXIPOL TO POST COMMISSION 9, 
JULY 7, 2009 (on file with authors) [hereinafter POST LEXIPOL REPORT] (noting that the 
Commission reviewed paper versions of the DTBs and all contained a “single true/false question at 
the end”). 
103. Letter from Martha Bereczky, supra note 78. 
104. Shannon Pieper, Simi Valley Police Department: Q&A with Deputy Chief John McGinty, 
LEXIPOL (May 17, 2016), http://www.lexipol.com/casestudycategory/law-enforcement/page/2/ 
[https://perma.cc/WV2Z-QRVW]. 
105. Lexipol February Conference Call, supra note 59; see also Letter from Dan Merkle, supra 
note 98, at 2 (explaining that “[a]ll DTBs and all training records are retrievable from Lexipol’s 
searchable database”). 
106. Implementation and Management Services, LEXIPOL, http://www.lexipol.com/law-
enforcement/law-enforcement-products/implementation-management-services/ [https://perma.cc/ 
RE9K-HWTY]. In a call with company executives, they explained that implementation services 
have been offered since 2014 and that currently about half of their new customers purchase at least 
some implementation services. For example, for a few thousand dollars, Lexipol will provide the 
agency with a “cross-reference” guide that compares its current manual to the Lexipol guide. Full 
implementation services, which give the agency access to a “team of people over an 18-month 
period,” might cost as much as $200,000. Lexipol executives did not provide us with information 
about the total number of law enforcement clients that have purchased these services. Lexipol 
September Conference Call, supra note 9. 
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can hire Lexipol to draft custom policies based on specific needs, as well as 
to ensure that departments’ DTBs are consistent with any custom policies 
that the departments have modified.107 Agencies can choose between a basic 
“silver plan” that provides a “quick start,” or go with a “platinum” plan that 
will “help with implementation.”108 As a Lexipol executive told the Beverly 
Hills Police Department in 2016, departments can retain a “Project Manager” 
to “facilitate” the “entire project” and “do all the heavy lifting when it comes 
to edits, linking policy to procedure and anything else you would need.”109 
4. Cost.—The cost of a Lexipol subscription varies significantly 
depending on the size of the agency and the services purchased. The initial 
start-up cost for the first year generally includes access to the policy manual, 
policy updates, and DTBs. The cost of a basic subscription to the Lexipol 
service depends upon the size of the agency. For example, Lexipol charged 
the Calaveras County Sheriff’s Office, which has fifty deputies, $8,600 for 
the first year of services;110 Lexipol’s proposal to the Simi Valley Police 
Department for up to 150 full-time sworn officers priced the first year at 
$15,150.111 The larger Long Beach Police Department, which is no longer a 
Lexipol client,112 was quoted $24,950 for up to 820 full-time sworn 
officers.113  
Once an agency adopts the Lexipol manual, it can choose to subscribe 
to Lexipol’s updating service, as well as its Daily Training Bulletins, for an 
additional fee.114 Subscribers to the updating service will periodically receive 
revised policies from Lexipol.115 When departments accept these policy 
 
107. See generally LEXIPOL, LEXIPOL DTB AND POLICY MANUAL UPDATE ADMINISTRATION 
SERVICES (2015) (on file with authors) (provided by the San Leandro Police Department). 
108. E-mail from Bill McAuliffe, Operations Manager, Lexipol, to Tony Lee, Beverly Hills 
Police Dep’t (Nov. 18, 2016, 1:41 PM) (on file with authors). 
109. Id. 
110. Agreement Between Lexipol and Calaveras Cty. Sheriff’s Office for Use of Subscription 
Material (Aug. 1, 2015) (on file with authors). 
111. LEXIPOL, LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY MANUAL & DAILY TRAINING BULLETINS: 
PRESENTED TO SIMI VALLEY POLICE DEPARTMENT 7 (2014) (on file with authors). 
112. E-mail from Tim Kensok, supra note 84 (advising authors that Long Beach Police 
Department is no longer a Lexipol client); Letter from Robert G. Luna, Chief, Long Beach Police 
Dep’t, to Peter Roth, Chief Customer Officer, Lexipol (Jan. 12, 2016) (on file with authors) 
(cancelling Lexipol subscription). 
113. LONG BEACH PROPOSAL, supra note 72, at 7. 
114. Praet Deposition, supra note 31, at 10–11 (explaining that the “updating component” 
Lexipol offers “is something that most agencies don’t have the resources for”). 
115. See, e.g., LEXIPOL, POLICY MANUAL UPDATE: RELEASE NOTES 1 (June 2013) (on file 
with authors) (provided by the Folsom Police Department) [hereinafter FOLSOM UPDATE] 
(describing “a list of recommended changes and updates to your manual”); see also Telephone 
Interview by Joanna Schwartz with Lon Milka, Captain, Rocklin Police Dep’t (Nov. 8, 2016) 
(explaining that when Rocklin began working with Lexipol in 2004, Lexipol would send out an 
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revisions, they are incorporated automatically into the existing policy 
manual.116 Again, prices for these services vary based on the size of the 
department. For example, the Simi Valley Police Department (which has 127 
sworn officers) was quoted $13,250 for ongoing updates and DTBs,117 while 
the Long Beach Police Department (which has 968 sworn officers) was 
quoted $64,500.118 
Beyond these standardized services, jurisdictions can pay additional 
fees for consulting services. For example, the Baltimore (Maryland) Police 
Department paid Lexipol $340,000 in 2013 for “overhauling the manual 
providing the basis for Standard Operating Procedures and providing 
professionally created training bulletins.”119 Similarly, the New Orleans 
Police Department (NOPD) paid Lexipol $295,000 to help develop policies 
required by the Department of Justice following a civil rights investigation 
of the NOPD.120 
Sometimes the costs for Lexipol are partly or wholly covered by 
municipal insurers.121 More often, local jurisdictions pay for Lexipol’s 
 
updated manual every six months, but now Lexipol uses software that sends out individual amended 
policies every few weeks to be accepted or rejected by the jurisdiction). 
116. See FOLSOM UPDATE, supra note 115, at 1 (“Each time you accept an update the new 
content will automatically replace your current content for that section of your manual.”); Telephone 
Interview with Lon Milka, supra note 115. 
117. LEXIPOL, TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR USE OF SUBSCRIPTION MATERIALS (2014) (on 
file with authors) (provided by the Simi Valley Police Department). 
118. E-mail from Tammie Stilinovich, Officer, Long Beach Police Dep’t to Randy Allan 
(Feb. 26, 2014, 10:06 AM) (on file with authors). 
119. Justin Fenton & Doug Donovan, Use of Local Foundation Allowed Baltimore Police 
Surveillance Project to Remain Secret, BALT. SUN (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www 
.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-community-foundation-20160824-
story.html [https://perma.cc/EY7J-YJZA]. 
120. Charles Maldonado, Paying for the Consent Decree, GAMBIT (Aug. 14, 2012), 
https://www.bestofneworleans.com/gambit/reform-at-a-cost/Content?oid=2057022 [https://perma 
.cc/5VYT-V62X]. 
121. See, e.g., E-mail from Cathie Bigger-Smith, Risk Control Consultant, to Steve Pangelinan, 
Commander, Milpitas Police Dep’t (Apr. 22, 2008, 7:12 AM) (on file with authors) (reporting that 
the municipal insurer—the Association of Bay Area Governments—would cover the cost of Lexipol 
for the Milpitas Police Department); Invoice from Lexipol to Porterville Police Dep’t (June 1, 2016) 
(on file with authors) (noting that the DTB subscription service and management service invoice 
was “Paid by CSJVRMA [the Central San Joaquin Valley Risk Management Authority]”); E-mail 
from Brenda Haggard, Assistant City Clerk, City of Elk Grove, to Ingrid Eagly (Feb. 13, 2017, 
9:37 AM) (on file with authors) (“The City does not directly contract with Lexipol; rather, the City 
is a member of the Northern California Cities Self Insurance Fund (NCCSIF), who provides various 
services to the City, including on-line policy services via Lexipol.”); see also John Rappaport, Cops 
Can Ignore Black Lives Matter Protestors. They Can’t Ignore Their Insurers, WASH. POST (May 4, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/cops-can-ignore-black-lives-matter-protesters-
they-cant-ignore-their-insurers/2016/05/04/c823334a-01cb-11e6-9d36-33d198ea26c5_story.html 
?utm_term=.0d4b1e53381c [https://perma.cc/BJ4K-VKQ9] (“Insurers work closely with police 
departments on policies and training. . . . The companies sometimes bring in outside consultants—
usually police veterans—to do this work or send departments off-the-shelf rules from policy-writing 
services such as Lexipol.”). For further discussion of the role insurance plays in police reform—and 
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products directly through their general city or county budgets,122 or through 
the law enforcement agency’s budget.123 One jurisdiction reported using 
forfeiture funds to pay Lexipol.124 
C. Sales Techniques 
Lexipol LLC engages in an aggressive marketing campaign with its 
potential customers. The company hosts booths at government and law 
 
in the proliferation of Lexipol policies—see infra notes 133–134, 149, 179, 266–269 and 
accompanying text. 
122. See, e.g., Lexipol Bill to the City of San Leandro (June 30, 2011) (on file with authors) 
(reflecting that the cost of Lexipol’s online policy manual should be billed to the finance department 
of the City of San Leandro and delivered to the San Leandro Police Department); Purchase Order 
from the City of Oxnard, to Lexipol (Jan. 19, 2016) (on file with authors) (billing the city for the 
police department’s contract with Lexipol); Centralized Purchase Order from the Cty. of Ventura 
Gen. Servs. Agency, to Lexipol (Nov. 20, 2009) (on file with authors) (billing the county for Lexipol 
subscription materials to be shipped to the sheriff’s department); Purchase Order from the City of 
Riverside, Fin. Dep’t—Purchasing Div., to Lexipol (Mar. 16, 2011) (on file with authors) (billing 
the city for a Lexipol subscription service to update the police department manual); Purchase Order 
from the Cty. of San Joaquin, Purchasing & Support Servs., to Lexipol (Sept. 12, 2008) (on file with 
authors) (paying Lexipol invoice for the sheriff’s department from the county budget); Purchase 
Order from the City of Corona, Purchasing Div., to Lexipol (July 1, 2006) (on file with authors) 
(billing the city for a Lexipol subscription for the police department); Purchase Order from the City 
of Richmond, Accounts Payable, Fin. Dep’t, to Lexipol (Jan. 20, 2016) (on file with authors) (listing 
the City of Richmond as the “bill to” addressee for Lexipol’s contract with the Richmond Police 
Department); Purchase Order from the City of El Monte to Lexipol (Mar. 14, 2007) (on file with 
authors) (billing the police department’s Lexipol contract price to the City of El Monte); Check 
from the City of Newport Beach to Lexipol (June 22, 2007) (on file with authors) (paying $4,950 
out of city funds to Lexipol); Purchase Order from the City of Roseville, Purchasing Dep’t, to 
Lexipol (Mar. 14, 2016) (on file with authors) (paying the Lexipol invoice on behalf of the city’s 
police department); Check from the City of Rialto, to Lexipol (Aug. 25, 2006) (on file with authors) 
(making a payment of $8,950 to Lexipol out of city funds). 
123. See, e.g., Cty. of Madera Board Letter Approving Lexipol Contract (Feb. 23, 2016) (on 
file with authors) (seeking authorization to purchase Lexipol’s service, with funds coming from the 
sheriff’s department’s budget); E-mail from Kristie Velasco, Fin. Office Prof’l, Santa Barbara 
Sheriff’s Dep’t, to Craig Bonner, Commander, N. Cty. Operations Div. (July 8, 2016, 11:38 AM) 
(on file with authors) (obtaining approval to have the sheriff’s department pay the invoice for 
Lexipol); Purchase Order from the City of Glendale, to Lexipol (Sept. 5, 2007) (on file with authors) 
(billing the police department for Lexipol’s policy service); E-mail from Suzanne Perez, City of 
Irvine, to Mike Hallinan, Commander, City of Irvine Police Dep’t (Apr. 18, 2016, 12:19 PM) (on 
file with authors) (indicating that Irvine’s “OPD will handle payment” and that police department 
funds have been used “in the past”); E-mail from Deirdre Rockefeller-Ramsey, Police Bus. 
Manager, Fremont Police Dep’t, to John Harnett, Lieutenant, Fremont Police Dep’t (Feb. 8, 2016, 
2:17 PM) (on file with authors) (indicating that the police department will budget $5,750 for Lexipol 
services). 
124. See Memorandum from Lili Hadsell, Chief of Police, City of Baldwin Park, to the Mayor 
and Members of City Council, City of Baldwin Park (June 3, 2010) (on file with authors). 
“Forfeiture funds” are funds collected through civil forfeiture, which are sometimes used by law 
enforcement agencies for various needs. For further discussion of civil forfeiture, see generally Beth 
A. Colgan, Fines, Fees, and Forfeitures, 18 CRIMINOLOGY, CRIM. JUST., L. & SOC’Y 22 (2017). 
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enforcement conventions to promote its wares.125 For example, in 2017, 
Lexipol representatives attended the Kansas Sheriff’s Association Fall 
Conference, the New Jersey Association of Chiefs of Police Annual Mid-
Year Meeting, and the Oregon State Sheriff’s Association Annual 
Conference, among other conferences and events.126 Lexipol clients who 
visited the Lexipol booth at the 2016 conference for the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police could “enter [its] drawing to win a free iPad 
air 2.”127 
Lexipol also attracts clients by sponsoring free webinars on hot policing 
issues such as “Immigration Violations & Law Enforcement” or “How Not 
to Speak to the Media” that may encourage departments to purchase their 
services.128 One e-mail sent to the Madera Police Department explained that 
state law “offers unprecedented protection from liability risks associated with 
police pursuits” but that “[m]any law enforcement agencies fall short in 
meeting these requirements and are exposing their cities and counties to 
much greater financial risk than necessary.”129 The e-mail then invited 
representatives of the department to attend a free thirty-minute educational 
webinar.130 
Some of the solicitation correspondence we collected reveals that 
Lexipol researches the target departments to learn about their particular law 
enforcement challenges. For example, in 2015 Lexipol approached the Chief 
of the San Francisco Police Department, writing: “I recognize the current 
challenges your department is facing. I reviewed your policies and they are 
severely outdated and insufficient. Case in point, you don’t have a 
Department’s Use of Social Media policy and your Use of Force policy hasn’t 
been updated/revised since 1995.”131 Lexipol provided the Chief with sample 
policies and a few ideas for improving his department’s policies, and asked 
for a fifteen-minute call to discuss Lexipol’s services. Similarly, a Lexipol 
 
125. Public records from the San Francisco Sheriff proclaim that Lexipol will be at “booth 
1024” at the 2016 National Sheriffs’ Association Annual Conference and Exhibition. E-mail from 
marketing@lexipol.com, to Carl Koehler, S.F. Sheriff’s Dep’t (June 6, 2016, 12:01 PM) (on file 
with authors); see also E-mail from Nicole Falconer, Account Manager, Lexipol, to Christian 
Lemoss, Lieutenant, City of Santa Cruz Police Dep’t (Oct. 13, 2016, 10:59 PM) (on file with 
authors) (inviting Lemoss to come by Lexipol’s booth at the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police Convention in 2016). 
126. Event Calendar, LEXIPOL, http://www.lexipol.com/event-calendar/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4VZD-GBJZ]. 
127. E-mail from Nicole Falconer, supra note 125. 
128. Lexipol Webinars: Timely, Free Education on Important Issues, LEXIPOL, http://www 
.lexipol.com/webinars/ [https://perma.cc/HDU2-WRV5]. 
129. E-mail from John Fitisemanu, Senior Account Exec., Lexipol, to undisclosed recipients 
(Oct. 5, 2015, 2:40 PM) (on file with authors) (provided by the Madera Police Department). 
130. Id. 
131. E-mail from John Fitisemanu, Senior Account Exec., Lexipol, to Greg Suhr, Chief of 
Police, S.F. Police Dep’t (May 28, 2015, 5:03 PM) (on file with authors). 
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Client Services Representative reached out to the Chief of the Beverly Hills 
Police Department to complement him for “the amazing manner in which” 
his officers “presided over the Trayvon Martin protests recently,” before 
going on to warn that “with recent racial tensions rising, now would be the 
perfect opportunity to re-examine ways Lexipol can help ensure the safety of 
your officers to avoid any potential risks.”132 
Lexipol also appears to have directed its advertising to municipal 
liability insurers that provide liability insurance to small governments. Our 
research has revealed that insurance companies will sometimes reduce their 
annual premium for cities that contract with Lexipol, or even pay outright for 
their insureds’ Lexipol contracts.133 In California, for example, more than 100 
law enforcement agencies are given access to Lexipol as a benefit of their 
insurance agreement with one large insurer, the California Joint Powers 
Insurance Authority.134 
Lexipol has a standard sales pitch that was repeated in communications 
with multiple California jurisdictions. The message describes the high costs 
of “[o]utdated [p]olicy and [l]ack of [t]raining,” measured in “Increased Risk 
and Liability to Deputies, Department and Community,” “Damaged [sic] to 
Reputation, Negative news Headlines and/or Viral Footage,” “Lawsuits,” 
“Legal Fees,” “Settlements,” “Injury and/or Death,” and “Distrust with the 
Community.”135 Lexipol’s solicitation e-mails to department officials include 
catchy taglines such as “Are Outdated Policies Putting Your Agency at 
Risk?,”136 “Is Your Use of Force Policy Properly Protecting You?,”137 and 
 
132. E-mail from John Fitisemanu, Client Servs. Representative, Lexipol, to David L. 
Snowden, Chief of Police, Beverly Hills Police Dep’t (July 29, 2013, 2:09 PM) (on file with 
authors). 
133. See, e.g., Pub. Agency Risk Sharing Auth. of Cal., Training Resources, PARSAC, http:// 
www.parsac.org/services/trainingresources/ [https://perma.cc/F8VW-G64D] (“[Public Agency 
Risk Sharing Authority of California] subsidizes each member’s subscription to Lexipol . . . .”). 
134. See Alex Mellor, Legislative Update: Law Enforcement Must Report Details on Shootings 
and Uses of Force Under New California Law, CAL. JPIA (Jan. 2016), https://cjpia.org 
/news/newsletter/newsletter-article/2016/01/28/january-2016—-issue-47#four [https://perma.cc 
/MP67-4QTL] (reporting that in January 2009, Lexipol and CJPIA entered a “strategic business 
partnership . . . whereby the California JPIA funds the cost of a member’s participation in the Law 
Enforcement Policy Manual Update and Daily Training Bulletin subscriptions”); Cal. Joint Powers 
Ins. Auth., Members, CAL. JPIA, https://www.cjpia.org/join/members [https://perma.cc/X5TD-
JQ67] (listing over 100 member agencies in California). 
135. E-mail from James Quanico, S.F. Sheriff’s Dep’t, to Mark Nicco, S.F. Sheriff’s Dep’t 
(Nov. 21, 2016, 1:02 PM) (forwarding e-mail from Lexipol Senior Account Executive John 
Fitisemanu, with the subject line “The Cost of Policies?”); see also About Lexipol, LEXIPOL, 
http://www.lexipol.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/ALA5-L7WM] (click on video) (promoting 
Lexipol’s service as allowing police, fire, and custody departments to have “up-to-date policies” 
that will “protect your agency today” by offering “legally defensible content”). 
136. E-mail from marketing@lexipol.com, supra note 125. 
137. Id. 
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“What is the Cost of Outdated Policy and Lack of Training?”138 After 
attracting the attention of top officials, Lexipol makes a web-based or in-
person presentation to the department that highlights the Lexipol approach 
and the benefits of entering into a contract with Lexipol.139 Lexipol may also 
make presentations to city council or other government officials who make 
the ultimate decision about whether to purchase Lexipol’s services. 
Although Lexipol describes many different types of risk in its marketing 
materials, liability risk plays the central role. As Lexipol’s CEO Dan Merkle 
stressed in a letter to Captain Bob Gustafson of the Orange Police 
Department, the value in Lexipol’s service is that it provides “[p]olicies that 
are court tested and successful in withstanding the numerous legal challenges 
prevalent today.”140 Lexipol constantly warns its potential customers that 
without Lexipol they are at risk of having their outdated policies turn up 
“downstream in litigation” and make the day for “plaintiff’s lawyers.”141 In a 
document prepared for the Chula Vista Police Department, Lexipol summed 
up why its clients choose Lexipol this way: “Law Enforcement agencies by 
their nature are a high frequency target for litigation. It is the most compelling 
reason why our customers choose our services.”142 
Lexipol does not outline the precise ways in which updated policy 
manuals will reduce liability risk, but it does report that its products have in 
fact “helped public safety agencies across the country reduce risk and avoid 
litigation.”143 In a PowerPoint presentation offered to several departments in 
our study, Lexipol included a slide (reproduced as Figure 3) claiming that 
adoption of Lexipol policies was associated with reduced litigation costs. 
According to the slide, Lexipol’s Oregon clients that “fully adopted” Lexipol 
reportedly had a 45% reduction in the “frequency of litigated claims” and a 
48% reduction in the “severity of claims paid out,” as compared to 
nonparticipating agencies.144 
 
138. E-mail from John Fitisemanu, Senior Account Exec., Lexipol, to James Quanico, S.F. 
Sheriff’s Dep’t (Feb. 24, 2016, 4:28 PM) (on file with authors). 
139. See, e.g., E-mail from Rosemarie Curran, Senior Account Exec., Lexipol, to Rob 
Ransweiler, Admin. Lieutenant, El Cajon Police Dep’t (Oct. 26, 2016, 10:05 AM) (on file with 
authors) (setting up a web-based “go to meeting” regarding Lexipol’s services as part of their 
marketing to the department). 
140. Letter from Dan Merkle, CEO, Lexipol, to Bob Gustafson, Captain, City of Orange Police 
Dep’t (Oct. 20, 2003) (on file with authors). 
141. GORDON GRAHAM, REAL RISK MANAGEMENT: AN EXCLUSIVE ARTICLE SERIES 
BROUGHT TO YOU BY LEXIPOL (pt. 2) 5 (2016), http://www.lexipol.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/06/Lexipol_Real_Risk_Management_Part_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/FY3T-BJ88]. 
142. LEXIPOL, INDEMNIFICATION RATIONALE (n.d.) (on file with authors) (provided by the 
Chula Vista Police Department). 
143. Donna Thompson, Ilion Board OKs Policy Service for Police, TIMES TELEGRAM (Dec. 22, 
2015), http://www.timestelegram.com/news/20151222/ilion-board-oks-policy-service-for-police 
[https://perma.cc/7AU3-WTLH]. 
144. See CURRAN, supra note 93, at 13. 
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Figure 3: Lexipol Risk Management Analysis145 
 
Other Lexipol promotional materials tout similar litigation-cost savings. 
Materials provided to the San Francisco Police Department in 2016 quoted 
one risk management association as saying this about Lexipol: “Two years 
post-Lexipol implementation, perhaps the most positive trend is that Lexipol 
users have 69% fewer litigated claims compared to pre-Lexipol 
implementation. And, the claims that are litigated have, on average, $7k paid 
out instead of $20k pre-Lexipol.”146 A company press release from 2014 
claimed that “a 10-year third-party study demonstrated a 54% decrease in 
litigated claims and a 46% reduction in liability for agencies that adopted 
Lexipol.”147 Lexipol additionally provided us with marketing materials that 
tout “37% fewer claims,” “45% reduced frequency of litigated claims,” “48% 
reduction in severity of claims,” and “67% lower incurred costs.”148 Lexipol’s 
 
145. Figure 3 was obtained from the Beverly Hills Police Department in response to our public 
records request. Id. 
146. LEXIPOL, THE LEXIPOL ADVANTAGE: LAW ENFORCEMENT 2 (n.d.) (emphasis omitted) 
(on file with authors) (provided by the San Francisco Police Department). 
147. Chris Witkowsky, Riverside Company Acquires Lexipol, PE HUB NETWORK (Aug. 22, 
2014), https://www.pehub.com/2014/08/riverside-company-acquires-lexipol/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4JXW-42AP]. 
148. E-mail from Tim Kensok, supra note 84 (attaching a slide reportedly used by Lexipol’s 
marketing staff titled “Proven Customer Results”). 
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promotional materials identify insurance company claims data as the source 
for these findings, but Lexipol provided us with no dataset, study, or other 
evidence to support these assertions by the company.149 
Lexipol’s marketing materials also contain detailed testimonials of 
jurisdictions explaining why they chose to adopt Lexipol. The justifications 
offered repeatedly echo Lexipol’s claims that its products insulate 
jurisdictions from liability. For example, Sheriff Blaine Breshears of the 
Morgan County Sheriff’s Office in Utah explains in an advertisement on 
Lexipol’s website that after attending “a class taught by Lexipol co-founder 
and risk management expert Gordon Graham,” he became concerned that his 
outdated policy manual “could actually be a serious liability.”150 After 
adopting Lexipol, however, Sheriff Breshears successfully defended his 
agency against a use of force lawsuit: “[A]s soon as the attorneys discovered 
that we have Lexipol, they said, ‘We won’t have an issue there.’ Our policies 
were never in question.”151 
In the records we obtained from 200 California jurisdictions, we found 
that several departments justified the cost of Lexipol’s products with claims 
that Lexipol’s policies would protect them from possible lawsuits. The Chief 
of Police of the City of Baldwin Park explained in a memo to the Mayor and 
City Council that “[n]ot having an updated policy manual [from Lexipol] 
could result in litigation against the city.”152 The Riverside Police Department 
similarly told the City’s Purchasing Division that without Lexipol it risked 
“continuing to fall behind as court decisions, laws, and law enforcement 
practices change. This deficiency can potentially expose the City, 
Department, and Officers to unnecessary liability and harm.”153 And the City 
of South San Francisco’s Chief of Police told the Mayor and City Council 
that Lexipol would “assist in mitigating any litigation that is related to the 
policies of the Police Department.”154 
In addition to litigation-risk reduction, Lexipol promotes its products as 
cost effective by saving jurisdictions the time and money of developing their 
own policies. Lexipol repeatedly noted in its promotional materials that 
 
149. Indeed, it is unclear whether any of these data are available. A Lexipol executive reported 
that he “plan[s] to do some additional work with our [Risk Management Association] partners to 
drive toward a more statistically defensible correlation of claims to excellence in policy 
management and training on policy.” Id. 
150. Morgan County (UT) Sheriff’s Office, LEXIPOL, http://www.lexipol.com/casestudytype/ 
morgan-county-ut-sheriffs-office/ [https://perma.cc/MP3V-CLXK]. 
151. Id. 
152. Memorandum from Lill Hadsell, Chief of Police, City of Baldwin Park, to the Mayor and 
Members of City Council, City of Baldwin Park (June 3, 2010) (on file with authors). 
153. CITY OF RIVERSIDE, JUSTIFICATION OF SOLE SOURCE/SOLE BRAND REQUEST 2 (n.d.) (on 
file with authors) [hereinafter RIVERSIDE PD SOLE SOURCE JUSTIFICATION]. 
154. Staff Report from Mark Raffaelli, Chief of Police, City of S. S.F., to the Mayor and City 
Council, City of S. S.F. 2 (Feb. 28, 2007) (on file with authors). 
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agencies would spend far more than Lexipol’s modest subscription cost to 
write and update policing policies on their own.155 As Lexipol warned the 
Long Beach Police Department during contract negotiations: “A fully 
burdened officer can cost an agency upward of $100K in salary and benefits. 
Most small to mid-sized agencies assign one officer to update and maintain 
their policy manual, which can consume 50% to 80% of the officer’s time.”156 
In case studies on Lexipol’s website, chiefs of small agencies explain that 
they did not have the capacity to create and maintain policies on their own 
and applaud Lexipol for providing up-to-date policies in a cost-effective 
manner.157 Several California departments in our study justified their 
adoption of the Lexipol service in similar terms. For instance, the Riverside 
Police Department told city officials charged with approving the Lexipol 
contract that “the salary savings realized over having Department personnel 
research the constantly changing legal requirements and make the needed 
policy changes, would likely far exceed the cost of this service.”158 
D.  Growth 
Lexipol does not publish a list of its clients and refused to provide us 
with a list of its clients.159 However, the company regularly makes public 
statements about the number of law enforcement and other public safety 
agencies that use Lexipol policies and boasts of the growing number of states 
that the company now services. In order to chart the company’s growth, we 
 
155. Lexipol describes the high cost to a department to develop a “Legal[], Defensible Policy 
Manual and an Online Training Program,” and asserts that “Lexipol’s services are offered at a 
fraction of the cost, by way of an annual subscription fee, thus allowing us to pass along savings to 
departments.” E-mail from John Fitisemanu, supra note 138. 
156. LONG BEACH PROPOSAL, supra note 72, at 4. 
157. For example, the Police Chief from Midland, Michigan, says: 
It just makes good sense to me to have experts overseeing our policy manual as 
opposed to relying on myself to track the case law and the legislation. This will make 
the maintenance part very easy. What I see happening in most departments is that the 
manual gets done but then it doesn’t get updated for 10 years. Here, if something 
changes, we get notified, and then we review the updates and add them. And that frees 
up my time. 
Midland (MI) Police Department, LEXIPOL, http://www.lexipol.com/casestudytype/midland-mi-
police-department/ [https://perma.cc/2B67-TRNE]. Similarly, a Lieutenant from Bonners Ferry, 
Idaho observes: 
Small departments like mine don’t have . . . a legal team or a policy/procedure division. 
We have only ourselves—seven people who are responsible for the department. With 
Lexipol, we have a resource we can go to if we have questions, and we know our 
policies stay current. It’s an easy decision to make as far as cost. 
Bonners Ferry (ID) Police Department, LEXIPOL, http://www.lexipol.com/casestudytype/bonners-
ferry-id-police-department/ [https://perma.cc/DM5Z-GWP9]. 
158. RIVERSIDE PD SOLE SOURCE JUSTIFICATION, supra note 153, at 3. 
159. See E-mail from Tim Kensok, supra note 84 (refusing to provide a list of clients in 
California). 
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collected the company’s own statements from press releases, the company’s 
web page, news articles, and marketing materials provided by Lexipol clients 
in response to our public records requests. 
Our research reveals that the company has grown from forty California-
based agencies in 2003 to 3,000 public safety agencies across thirty-five 
states in 2017.160 This astronomical growth has been mainly focused on 
police and sheriff’s departments, but also includes fire departments and other 
public safety agencies.161 Table 1 reports these data in two-year increments. 
Table 1: Lexipol’s Growth, by Agencies and States (2003–2017)162 
Year Agencies States 
2003 40 1 
2005 200 2 
2007 500 4 
2009 1,000 10 
2011 1,100 12 
2013 1,500 15 
2015 2,000 25 
2017 3,000 35 
 
 
160. According to information we obtained from Lexipol, the only states in which its product 
is not yet active are Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, 
and Wyoming. LEXIPOL, LEXIPOL LIVE DATES (Sept. 13, 2017) (on file with authors); see also 
FIRST LEXIPOL POWERPOINT, supra note 33, at 13 (stating that in 2003, Lexipol had about forty 
agency clients). 
161. Lexipol executives informed us that 2,500 of its current 3,000 clients are police 
departments and sheriff’s departments. Lexipol September Conference Call, supra note 9. 
162. The following sources were relied on to compile Table 1: FIRST LEXIPOL POWERPOINT, 
supra note 33, at 13 (stating that in 2003, when Lexipol was founded, it was only in California and 
had about forty agency clients); Lexipol (from Latin: Law Enforcement Policy), LEXIPOL, 
http://plan.abag.ca.gov/rmm/rmm/pobp/Police%20-%20Lexipol%20Service.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5BER-BMMY] (“Over two hundred law enforcement agencies operate from our policy manual 
system . . . .”); Press Release, Lexipol, Lexipol Launches Custody Policy Manual and Daily 
Training Bulletin Service in Idaho (July 15, 2011), https://globenewswire.com/news-
release/2011/07/15/451250/226510/en/Lexipol-Launches-Custody-Policy-Manual-and-Daily-
Training-Bulletin-Service-in-Idaho.html [https://perma.cc/FRX8-QKXZ] (explaining that in 2005, 
Lexipol expanded into Idaho); id. (noting that in 2011, Lexipol served more than 1,100 law 
enforcement agencies in twelve states); Memorandum, Lexipol, Lexipol’s Position on Contractual 
Indemnification (Jan. 2008) (on file with authors) (provided by Rohnert Park Police Department) 
[hereinafter Lexipol’s Position on Contractual Indemnification] (reporting that Lexipol then had 
over 500 clients in four states); Report of Bruce D. Praet at 1, Mitz v. City of Grand Rapids, No. 
1:09-cv-365, 2009 WL 6849914 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2009) (reporting that by 2009, Lexipol was 
used by almost 1,000 agencies in ten states); Letter from Paul Workman, Chief of Police, City of 
Laguna Beach, to the Honorable Thomas J. Borris, Presiding Judge, Orange Cty. Super. Ct. (Sept. 3, 
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Not surprisingly, Lexipol enjoys a strong market presence in California, 
where the company began. Lexipol executives claim that as many as 95% of 
California law enforcement agencies now have their policies written by 
Lexipol.163 Our public records requests to the 200 largest police and sheriff’s 
agencies in California reveal that only twenty-six agencies (13%) are 
independent, meaning that they create their own policy manuals and have no 
relationship with Lexipol. The 174 remaining departments—or 87% of our 
sample—purchase Lexipol’s services or receive them through their insurer. 
Of these 174 agencies, all but eight have adopted a copyrighted Lexipol 
policy manual for their police or sheriff’s department.164 
We also find that the smaller agencies are especially likely to use 
Lexipol’s products. Among agencies with 1,000 or more officers, only 20% 
subscribe to Lexipol. In contrast, among agencies with fewer than 100 
officers, 95% subscribe to Lexipol. The complete results of this size-based 
analysis are displayed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Lexipol Subscriptions Among the 200 Largest Police 
and Sheriff’s Departments in California, by Agency Size (2017)165 
 
Agency Size Number of Agencies Lexipol Subscribers 
1,000+ 10 2 (20%) 
500–999 10 5 (50%) 
200–499 27 23 (85%) 
100–199 57 53 (93%) 
71–99 49 46 (94%) 
48–70 47 45 (96%) 
 
 
2013), http://www.ocgrandjury.org/pdfs/2012_2013_reports/Laguna%20Beach%20Police% 
20Department090313.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZEL3-WZGS] (“Lexipol provides a comprehensive 
policy program for . . . more than 1,500 law enforcement agencies throughout 15 states.”); Praet 
Deposition, supra note 31, at 7–10 (testifying that in 2015, Lexipol was used by approximately 
2,000 agencies across twenty-five states); Proud Partner of the Louisiana Fire Chiefs Association, 
LEXIPOL, http://info.lexipol.com/louisiana-fire-chiefs [https://perma.cc/VWJ2-DPTK] (claiming 
that Lexipol is “[t]rusted by more than 3,000 public safety agencies in 35 states”). 
163. See supra note 7 (collecting sources). 
164. As we develop further, these eight departments have a hybrid arrangement with Lexipol, 
whereby they produce their own manual with no Lexipol copyright stamp but have an agreement to 
consult with Lexipol on policy development. See infra note 253 and accompanying text. 
165. In Table 2, “Agency Size” measures the number of sworn officers in the department. We 
include in Table 2 the eight “hybrid” jurisdictions that subscribe to Lexipol but produce a manual 
without a Lexipol copyright stamp. Additional information about the California law enforcement 
agencies that have adopted Lexipol is provided in the Appendix. 
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In 2010, Lexipol was ranked the twenty-fourth fastest-growing private 
company in Orange County, California.166 In 2012, Lexipol was ranked 387 
on Deloitte’s Technology Fast 500, “a ranking of the 500 fastest growing 
technology, media, telecommunications, life sciences and clean technology 
companies in North America.”167 Lexipol was purchased by The Riverside 
Company in 2014.168 The Riverside Company describes Lexipol as a 
company with “tremendous opportunity for growth due to a largely untapped 
market.”169 Riverside plans to help Lexipol expand into new states and offer 
clients additional risk management services.170 
II.  The Significance of Lexipol 
Although there are other private, nonprofit, and government entities that 
draft police policies, Lexipol is now a dominant force in police policymaking 
across the country. Lexipol has saturated the market in California and 
provides its services to more than 3,000 public safety agencies in thirty-five 
states across the country. There is every reason to expect that Lexipol will 
play a controlling role in police policymaking in more states in the future. 
Lexipol has achieved a goal that has proven elusive—disseminating and 
updating police policies for thousands of law enforcement agencies. 
Lexipol’s business model appears to be the key to its growth. Lexipol has 
successfully marketed its policy and training products as risk management 
tools that can insulate police and sheriff’s departments from liability. The 
company has also promoted its policies and trainings as being of higher 
quality than local jurisdictions could create on their own—the products are 
available online, are state-specific, are updated to reflect changes in 
governing law and best practices, and allow jurisdictions to track when their 
employees have viewed policies and completed trainings. Lexipol’s products 
are therefore viewed as money-savers twice over—they reduce the cost of 
creating comparable policies and trainings, and those policies and trainings 
reduce the cost of litigation. Lexipol’s service has been particularly popular 
 
166. Michael Lyster, Fast-Growing Privates: $12B in Sales, Growth of 23%, ORANGE COUNTY 
BUS. J., Oct. 25, 2010, at 12. 
167. Press Release, Lexipol, Lexipol Is Proud to Be Selected as a Deloitte Technology Fast 
500(TM) Award Winner for 2012 (Nov. 14, 2012), https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2012 
/11/14/505171/10012576/en/Lexipol-is-Proud-to-Be-Selected-as-a-Deloitte-Technology-Fast-500-
TM-Award-Winner-for-2012.html [https://perma.cc/ZPE6-23C6]. 
168. Witkowsky, supra note 147. See generally About, RIVERSIDE, https://www. 
riversidecompany.com/About.aspx [https://perma.cc/T3HV-AS78] (“The Riverside Company is a 
global private equity firm focused on making control and non-control investments in growing 
businesses valued at up to $400 million.”). 
169. Press Release, Riverside Co., Riverside Trains Its Eyes on Lexipol (Aug. 22, 2014), 
http://www.riversideeurope.com/es/News%20and%20Media/Press%20Releases/Lexipol%20-% 
20Acquisition%20News%20Release [https://perma.cc/CF6Y-ZFUK]. 
170. Id. 
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with smaller jurisdictions that lack the personnel or resources to create and 
update their own policies and trainings. Mayors, city councils, and insurers 
have been willing to pay Lexipol’s fees, apparently convinced that they more 
than pay for themselves given the litigation and risk management savings 
associated with Lexipol’s products. 
Yet Lexipol’s approach appears to run contrary to the purposes, values, 
and processes recommended by two generations of advocates for police 
policymaking. In this Part, we consider three main areas of divergence: 
Lexipol’s unwavering focus on liability risk management, its lack of 
transparency, and its privatization of the policymaking role. 
A. Liability Risk Management 
Police policies have long been viewed as a means of regulating officers’ 
vast discretion. When President Lyndon B. Johnson’s National Crime 
Commission studied policing practices in 1967, it found that police did have 
some internal rules.171 However, the few rules that existed were “mostly of a 
housekeeping character—how to wear the uniform, how to carry the gun, 
whether to scribble a report in triplicate or in quadruplicate, and what to do 
with the copies.”172 Police manuals did not address “the hard choices 
policemen must make every day.”173 That is, they did not resolve how officers 
should exercise discretion in high-frequency scenarios, such as “whether or 
not to break up a sidewalk gathering, whether or not to intervene in a 
domestic dispute, whether or not to silence a street-corner speaker, whether 
or not to stop and frisk, whether or not to arrest.”174 The end result was that 
police engaged in policymaking in an ad hoc way as they went about their 
work, rather than answering to a centralized set of rules when making the 
important discretionary decisions inherent to policing. 
Scholars and policing experts in the 1950s and 1960s hoped that 
comprehensive police policies would give an officer “more detailed guidance 
to help him decide upon the action he ought to take in dealing with the wide 
range of situations which he confronts and in exercising the broad authority 
 
171. THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF 
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 103 (1967), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/J2QE-626K] [hereinafter CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY] (“Many police departments have published 
‘general order’ or ‘duty’ or ‘rules, regulations, and procedures’ manuals running to several hundred 
pages.”). 
172. Davis, supra note 18, at 712. 
173. CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 171, at 103. 
174. Id. As Kenneth Culp Davis famously explained in his classic text on the topic: “The 
police . . . make far more discretionary determinations in individual cases than any other class of 
administrators; I know of no close second.” KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 222 
(1975). 
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with which he is invested.”175 Internal policies could also help to achieve 
“uniformity” in police conduct within an agency, including by ensuring that 
when “individual police officers confront similar situations, they will handle 
them in a similar manner.”176 Today, scholars and experts echo concerns from 
half a century ago about the need to guide police discretion and the potential 
for comprehensive police policies to serve that role.177 
Lexipol has a different set of goals and values that guide its approach to 
police policymaking. While scholars and experts have long viewed police 
policies as a means of limiting officer discretion, Lexipol appears to view its 
products primarily as a means of reducing legal liability. Lexipol relentlessly 
markets its products to jurisdictions by arguing that it will decrease the 
number of claims brought against police departments and the amount that 
jurisdictions pay in settlements and judgments in cases that are filed. We do 
not condemn Lexipol for focusing on limiting liability risk—its claim that 
Lexipol policies reduce financial liability appears to be a powerful selling 
point for local jurisdictions and insurers that purchase its services.178 We also 
recognize that efforts to reduce liability risk will sometimes lead to the same 
policy prescriptions as efforts to constrain officer discretion.179 But Lexipol’s 
focus on reducing liability risk is sometimes in tension with longstanding 
efforts to guide and restrict officer discretion through police policies. 
 
175. Herman Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police 
Performance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1128 (1967). 
176. Gerald F. Uelmen, Varieties of Police Policy: A Study of Police Policy Regarding the Use 
of Deadly Force in Los Angeles County, 6 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 4 (1973); see also Caplan, supra 
note 18, at 504 (“At the very least, the promulgation of policy will serve to reduce the uneven 
enforcement that now characterizes so much of street policing.”). 
177. See supra note 19 (collecting citations). 
178. For example, the City of Fresno includes the claim that Lexipol’s policies reduce legal 
liability in its signed agreement with Lexipol. See Agreement Between City of Fresno and Lexipol 
for Consultant Services 1–2 (Dec. 1, 2005) (on file with authors) (agreeing that the policies that 
Lexipol will create for the city “are court tested and successful in withstanding legal challenges”); 
see also supra notes 140–148, and accompanying text (describing claims of liability risk reduction 
made in promotional materials to several agencies). 
179. Research by John Rappaport and Joanna Schwartz underscores that municipal liability 
insurers’ financial incentives to reduce legal liability can sometimes lead them to demand policing 
improvements aimed at reducing misconduct. See Rappaport, supra note 3, at 1543–44 (“[A]n 
insurer writing police liability insurance may profit by reducing police misconduct. Its contractual 
relationship with the municipality gives it the means and influence necessary to do so—to ‘regulate’ 
the municipality it insures.”); Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1207 (“[O]utside insurers have a uniquely 
powerful position from which they can demand improvements in policing.”). Indeed, municipal 
liability insurers’ financial incentives may make them better situated than self-insured 
municipalities to push for these types of policing reforms. See id. at 1203–04 (finding that the costs 
of lawsuits have no financial consequences for the majority of law enforcement agencies in self-
insured jurisdictions); id. at 1205–06 (“Contrary to the assumption that insurance creates moral 
hazard, public entity risk pools may take greater efforts than self-insured jurisdictions to reduce 
liability risk. . . . [P]ublic entity risk pools can place financial pressures on law enforcement 
agencies that self-insured governments may be unwilling or unable to replicate.”). 
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This tension can be seen in recent debates about use of force policies. 
Over the past few years, several groups—including the Fraternal Order of 
Police, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Police Executive 
Research Forum (PERF), academics, and nonprofit advocacy 
organizations—have recommended new policing policies to reduce 
unnecessary and excessive use of force.180 Included in this approach are 
policies requiring that police use de-escalation techniques with suspects, 
refrain from shooting into moving vehicles, and intervene if another officer 
might use excessive force.181 Although Lexipol’s California state master 
policy manual contains some of these concepts,182 Lexipol has issued a series 
of public statements critical of these recently issued model use of force 
policies because language in these policies restricts officers’ discretion in 
ways that could expose them to legal liability. 
Soon after several prominent law enforcement groups issued a National 
Consensus Policy on Use of Force, Lexipol’s founding partner, Bruce Praet, 
posted an article to Lexipol’s website titled National Consensus Policy on 
Use of Force Should Not Trigger Changes to Agency Policies.183 Praet 
cautioned law enforcement agencies against adopting several of the model 
policies because they used the word “shall.” Although the model policies’ 
use of “shall” was presumably geared to constrain officer discretion, Praet 
discouraged agencies from adopting that language because plaintiffs’ 
attorneys would “highlight” that type of language as a way of showing that 
officers had violated policy.184 According to Praet, the need to shield officers 
from liability is “why Lexipol policy clearly defines the difference between 
 
180. See infra note 181. For other efforts by academics and nonprofits to draft model rules, see 
infra notes 305–309 and accompanying text. 
181. See, e.g., NATIONAL CONSENSUS POLICY ON USE OF FORCE 3–4 (2017), http:// 
www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/National_Consensus_Policy_On_Use_Of_Force.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SS9A-QFE3] [hereinafter NATIONAL CONSENSUS] (requiring that officers use de-
escalation when possible, prevent other officers’ use of excessive force, and refrain from shooting 
at moving vehicles); POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 
40–41, 44, 74–75 (2016), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RH4L-D8Y3] [hereinafter PERF GUIDING PRINCIPLES] (same); Limit Use of 
Force, CAMPAIGN ZERO, https://www.joincampaignzero.org/force/ [https://perma.cc/6G82-29JA] 
(advocating for police policies that would ban shooting at moving vehicles and require de-escalation 
before use of force). 
182. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA STATE MASTER POLICE DEPARTMENT: POLICY MANUAL, supra 
note 61, at 44, 48 (Policy 300.2.1 “Duty to Intercede,” Policy 300.4.1 “Shooting at or From Moving 
Vehicles”). Lexipol does not appear to include a policy of de-escalation, though it alludes to the 
concept in its policy manual as a benefit of kinetic energy projectiles, see id. at 61, and one of the 
skills of a Crisis Negotiation Team, see id. at 279. 
183. Bruce D. Praet, National Consensus Policy on Use of Force Should Not Trigger Changes 
to Agency Policies, LEXIPOL (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.lexipol.com/news/use-caution-when-
changing-use-of-force-policy-language/ [https://perma.cc/UR2T-DUH2]. 
184. Id. 
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‘shall’ and ‘should’ and cautions against the unnecessary use of ‘shall.’”185 
Lexipol posted an article by a police chief offering a similar admonition 
against adopting a model use of force policy recommended by PERF that 
prohibited shooting at moving vehicles. His argument against the model 
policy was also based on limiting legal liability: “Policy language that 
definitively prohibits an action will inevitably result in a situation where an 
officer violates the policy under reasonable circumstances, which in turn can 
create issues that must be dealt with if litigation results.”186 
Bruce Praet has additionally criticized PERF for recommending that use 
of force policies “go beyond the legal standard of ‘objective reasonableness’ 
outlined in the 1989 United States Supreme Court decision Graham v. 
Connor.”187 PERF’s recommendation was motivated by an interest in 
limiting officers’ discretion to use lethal force. As PERF explained: 
[The Graham] decision should be seen as “necessary but not 
sufficient,” because it does not provide police with sufficient guidance 
on use of force. . . . Agencies should adopt policies and training to 
hold themselves to a higher standard, based on sound tactics, 
consideration of whether the use of force was proportional to the 
threat, and the sanctity of human life.188 
PERF’s position is consistent with decades of scholarship about the 
limitations of court opinions as a guide for police policymaking. Those who 
advocate for improved police policies are generally skeptical of the ability of 
courts to provide needed guidance to agencies creating police policies.189 
Judicial decisions do play a critically important role in police policies, as they 
create a floor that cannot be violated.190 Because courts are focused on the 
 
185. Id. 
186. Michael D. Ranalli, Counsel’s Corner: Adding Perspective to the PERF Guiding 
Principles on Use of Force: What Police Administrators Should Consider, N.Y. ST. CHIEF’S 
CHRON., June 2016, at 7, 11, as reprinted in Michael Ranalli, Why PERF’s Prohibition on  
Shooting at Vehicles Sells Agencies Short, LEXIPOL (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.lexipol 
.com/news/why-perfs-prohibition-on-shooting-at-vehicles-sells-agencies-short [https://perma.cc/ 
AZQ8-V6U2] [hereinafter Ranalli, Shooting at Vehicles]. 
187. Praet, supra note 183; see POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, 30 GUIDING PRINCIPLES 1 
(2016), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/30guidingprinciples.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZD2-
UNCQ] (discussing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), a seminal Supreme Court opinion that 
defines what force is unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
188. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 187, at 1. 
189. See, e.g., Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 19, at 1832, 1865 (describing courts as 
“completely inadequate” for the task of regulating police behavior). An insightful recent article by 
Anna Lvovsky provides additional historical context for the inadequacies of courts in this arena: the 
longstanding deference to “police expertise” that has made courts presume that police decisions are 
necessarily based on reliable “expert” knowledge. See generally Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial 
Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995 (2017). 
190. For example, the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions, such as Mapp and 
Miranda, arguably “initiated” police rulemaking by addressing “previously unregulated aspects of 
routine police procedures” related to searches and interrogations. Walker, supra note 16, at 12, 15. 
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constitutionality of officer behavior, their decisions will, by definition, 
articulate the bare minimum that officers must do to avoid violating the 
Constitution.191 However, due to their “case-by-case and relatively intuition-
laden” approach, courts are not necessarily well-situated to articulate best 
practices.192 As a result, most experts agree that police policymaking should 
draw from multiple sources, including input from local community members 
regarding their experiences with police, best practices recommended by 
policing experts, research about the impact of various policies, and analyses 
of the costs and benefits of different approaches.193 
In contrast to decades of scholarship on the subject, Praet has criticized 
the notion that police use of force policies should “go beyond” the 
requirements announced by the Supreme Court in Graham. He writes: 
Several years ago, our forefathers decided that there would be nine of 
the finest legal minds in the country who would interpret the law of 
the land. For almost 30 years, law enforcement has learned to function 
under the guidance of the Supreme Court’s “objective reasonableness” 
standard. What would happen if each of the 18,000+ law enforcement 
agencies in the United States formulated their own standard “beyond” 
Graham?194 
To be sure, Lexipol’s policies are not solely guided by court decisions. 
Lexipol makes clear in its promotional materials that some of its policies are 
inspired by what it calls “best practices” that are not mandated by statutes or 
court decisions.195 But use of force policies raise a different question for 
policymakers: When there is a court decision or statute that prohibits certain 
officer behavior, and expert opinion that recommends additional restrictions 
on officer behavior, should the policy conform to the court decision or to the 
higher standard recommended by experts? Statements by Praet and other 
 
191. As administrative law scholar Kenneth Culp Davis asked decades ago: “If the Supreme 
Court has stated the minimum requirements of the Constitution, how can the police change anything 
unless they are willing to go above the minimum?” Davis, supra note 18, at 712. 
192. Slobogin, supra note 17, at 117. 
193. Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko describe the need for additional information to 
supplement judicial decisions in this way: 
[F]ew believe it makes sense for courts to be the primary supervisors of police 
agencies, particularly because judicial review is almost exclusively about 
constitutionality. Governing policing involves a host of prior questions: Are policing 
policies and procedures properly vetted? Are they efficacious? What harms do they 
impose? Do they make sense from a cost-benefit perspective? In short, largely 
neglected by courts and constitutional law are the very questions that concern us most 
with regard to the work of other agencies. 
Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 19, at 1832. 
194. Praet, supra note 183. 
195. See, e.g., Law Enforcement: Custom Policy Content, LEXIPOL, http://www.lexipol 
.com/law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/GQ83-EEAH] (describing Lexipol’s policy content as 
“based on federal and state statutes, case law and law enforcement best practices”). 
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Lexipol spokespeople about use of force suggest that Lexipol’s focus on 
liability risk management may cause it to draft policies that maximize officer 
discretion and hew closely to court decisions when such decisions exist—and 
that those inclinations may conflict with experts’ views on best practices. 
Lexipol’s focus on liability risk management may influence its product 
design in other ways. For example, Lexipol promotes its officer DTB training 
program as focused on “high-risk, low-frequency behaviors” including use 
of force, use of electronic control devices, vehicle and foot pursuits, and crisis 
intervention incidents.196 According to Lexipol, its DTB trainings are 
designed to be “a cost effective training delivery method that serves as a 
substantial safety net” against lawsuits.197 Yet, although low-risk, high-
frequency events—such as traffic stops and searches—are less likely to result 
in litigation,198 such events threaten other risks, including risks to community 
safety and trust in the police. As John Rappaport has observed, a focus on 
reducing liability risk may shortchange other important areas of police 
activity.199 
Lexipol’s focus on liability risk management may also cause it to design 
products that reduce the frequency with which plaintiffs sue or the amount 
they recover without reducing the occurrence of the underlying harms. For 
example, Lexipol has designed its policy and training software so that 
officers can “acknowledge” that they received updated policies and 
participated in Lexipol’s trainings.200 According to the company, this 
acknowledgement protocol can help in litigation, as it provides evidence that 
 
196. See, e.g., Ranalli, Shooting at Vehicles, supra note 186; see also Letter from Dan Merkle, 
supra note 98, at 2 (“The primary focus of the DTBs are those high/risk, low/frequency events that 
can get an agency and/or an officer into trouble.”). 
197. Dan Merkle, CEO, Lexipol Daily Training Bulletins (DTBs): Request for California POST 
Certification 2 (undated) (on file with authors). 
198. In one important exception, the Center for Constitutional Rights brought a federal class 
action lawsuit against the City of New York challenging the New York Police Department’s stop-
and-frisk practices as unconstitutionally relying on racial profiling. See Floyd v. City of New York, 
959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). For additional background on the Floyd litigation, see Sunita 
Patel, Policing the Police: The Potential of Public Law Injunctions (manuscript on file with 
authors). 
199. See John Rappaport, An Insurance-Based Typology of Police Misconduct, 2016 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 369, 375–83, 399–404 (2016) (describing how financial risk prompts municipal liability 
insurers to focus on reducing “high-dollar, short-tail” claims, like excessive force, while 
overlooking “low-dollar” claims—like investigatory stops and racial profiling claims—and “long-
tail” claims—like wrongful convictions). 
200. See, e.g., How It Works, LEXIPOL, http://www.lexipol.com/how-it-works/ [https://perma 
.cc/X6KY-6K5L] (“Lexipol’s Knowledge Management System (KMS) is easy to use and allows 
your agency to customize policy content to fit your needs. Features include easy editing of policies, 
electronic policy acknowledgement, and reports that quickly enable you to document whether 
officers have completed training and reviewed new or updated policies.”). 
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officers were informed and trained on the policies.201 Yet we found no 
corresponding marketing materials suggesting that Lexipol designs its 
trainings to improve officer understanding of harmful practices by drilling 
down on these challenging topics, or that the two-minute training format is 
well-suited to achieve these goals. 
Finally, Lexipol’s focus on risk management appears to influence the 
ways in which the company evaluates the efficacy of its policies. Lexipol 
consistently promotes its policies as reducing the frequency of lawsuits and 
the cost of settlements and judgments. The marketing materials we obtained 
make specific claims about the reduction in such costs enjoyed by 
subscribers.202 But Lexipol does not make any claims about whether its 
products advance other important policing goals, such as enhanced trust 
within communities or fewer deaths of persons stopped by the police.203 Also 
notably absent is any claim about whether Lexipol’s products reduce the 
frequency with which police officers engage in unconstitutional conduct that 
does not frequently result in litigation.204 Lexipol’s decision to focus on 
liability risk management makes sense; it certainly has been an effective 
marketing strategy with local governments. Nevertheless, this focus threatens 
to crowd out other values that can be advanced through police policies. 
Because Lexipol does not publicly disclose information about its 
drafting process, it is impossible to know the extent to which liability risk 
management interests have influenced drafting choices for individual 
policies, decisions about which trainings to develop, or assessments of policy 
efficacy. Nonetheless, the evidence we have collected suggests that Lexipol’s 
policies and trainings may differ in meaningful ways from those proposed by 
policing experts and researchers and that Lexipol’s focus on liability risk 
management may explain at least some of those differences. 
B. Secret Policymaking 
Proponents of police reform have long recommended that police 
policies be created through a transparent, quasi-administrative process. 
 
201. See, e.g., FAQs, LEXIPOL, http://www.lexipol.com/law-enforcement/law-enforcement-
faqs/ [https://perma.cc/APU7-KE7D] (“Lexipol recommends that all personnel take every DTB, as 
it links to the policy manual, encourages continuous training and serves as a record of training for 
potential litigation.”); see also Letter from John Fitisemanu, Client Servs. Representative, Lexipol, 
to Tammie Stilinovich, Officer, Long Beach Police Dep’t (Feb. 28, 2014) (noting that DTB reports 
are archived and that these records can be used for litigation). 
202. See, e.g., supra Figure 3; see also supra notes 144-148 and accompanying text. 
203. For New York City’s efforts to measure community trust in its police department, see Al 
Baker, Updated N.Y.P.D. Anti-Crime System to Ask: ‘How We Doing?’, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/08/nyregion/nypd-compstat-crime-mapping.html 
[https://perma.cc/36XR-2MBS]. 
204. See Rappaport, supra note 199, at 385–91 (observing that insurers can help improve 
policing but will be focused only on those types of behaviors deemed liability risks). 
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Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, commentators advocated for an 
administrative rulemaking process whereby proposed policies would be 
subject to notice and comment by the public.205 As President Johnson’s 1967 
Commission explained, “the people who will be affected by these 
decisions—the public—have a right to be apprised in advance, rather than ex 
post facto, what police policy is.”206 Ideally, policies would also be evaluated 
after enactment by law enforcement officials, researchers, and the public.207 
Today, scholars are again calling for an administrative rulemaking 
process that encourages police to develop detailed policies that are subject to 
notice and comment and some manner of judicial review.208 Contemporary 
commentators have also emphasized—perhaps even more forcefully than 
their predecessors—that any administrative police rulemaking process 
should directly engage community members and that policies should be 
tailored to the particular circumstances and interests of the community.209 
 
205. See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 18, at 509 (supporting “openness” and “public examination” 
of proposed police department policies which “invites publicity and community reaction and insures 
that policy can be easily challenged in the courts,” which will “promote the production of 
sophisticated, balanced policy positions”); see also supra note 18 and sources cited therein. 
206. CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 171, at 104–05. 
207. Id.; Amsterdam, supra note 18, at 423, 427; Caplan, supra note 18, at 509; Davis, supra 
note 18, at 717. 
208. See supra note 19 and sources cited therein. 
209. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT 20 
(2015), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
BC9G-P4VA] (recommending that law enforcement agencies “should collaborate with community 
members to develop policies and strategies in communities and neighborhoods disproportionately 
affected by crime” and emphasizing that community members need to be included in these 
discussions because “what works in one neighborhood might not be equally successful in every 
other one”); Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (contending that when departments provide “inadequate training and 
policy guidance to officers” and fail to incorporate “public feedback,” they facilitate or encourage 
misconduct); Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1120 (2000) (“Empowering 
citizens through access to government information and by giving them a voice in the 
decisionmaking process is not only more democratic, but has the potential to establish a basis for 
trust in otherwise distrusting communities.”); Miller, supra note 19, at 525 (promoting giving “local 
communities and disadvantaged individuals a more meaningful voice in evaluating and checking 
local police policy”); Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community 
Engagement” Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 794, 796, 802 
(2016) (highlighting the benefits of community engagement in police policymaking as a reform 
strategy); Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police 
Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 409 (2010) 
(explaining that community engagement in police policymaking on the front end “may create not 
only better substantive reforms, but may also increase the legitimacy of the ultimate police reforms 
implemented in a particular jurisdiction”); Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 
391, 407 (2016) (revealing how copwatching is a form of civic engagement in which “groups of lay 
people come together to contest police practices through observation, recording, and dialogue”); cf. 
Bell, supra note 28, at 2144 (arguing that administrative rulemaking procedures will not on their 
own “unsettle legal estrangement in the communities that are most affected” by police abuse and 
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Advocates for these more democratic processes contend that they can lead to 
more effective policies and enhance the perceived legitimacy of policing.210 
Increasingly, police departments are incorporating these democratic ideals 
into their policymaking processes: In 2015, several law enforcement leaders 
signed on to a Statement of Democratic Principles, organized by New York 
University (NYU) School of Law’s Policing Project, which included a 
commitment to a rulemaking process that incorporates robust community 
engagement.211 
Lexipol’s policymaking process departs considerably from the 
transparent, quasi-administrative policymaking processes recommended by 
scholars and policing experts and adopted by some law enforcement 
agencies. Instead of policies crafted locally and with community input, 
policies created by Lexipol are based on a uniform state template. Lexipol’s 
standardization of policymaking is one of the reasons that the private service 
has been so commercially successful. But its approach runs contrary to that 
recommended by experts and embraced by some law enforcement agencies. 
Lexipol does not preclude local jurisdictions from seeking out the types 
of community engagement and deliberation that scholars and experts 
recommend, or tailoring Lexipol policies to reflect local values and interests. 
In this Article, we have not examined the extent to which local jurisdictions 
modify Lexipol’s standard policies to reflect local values and interests, or 
whether jurisdictions are engaging community members in the customization 
process.212 But several aspects of Lexipol’s structure make us wary of simply 
assuming that jurisdictions will seek public input or modify policies based on 
their own needs once they have made the decision to give the policymaking 
job to Lexipol. First, Lexipol provides local jurisdictions with little 
information about the reasons for its policy choices, which makes it difficult 
for subscribers to make informed decisions about whether to adopt Lexipol’s 
policies. Lexipol’s statewide master manual does identify whether a policy is 
required by law, a best practice, or discretionary.213 But the manual contains 
no explanation of what evidence Lexipol considers when designing its 
 
that such processes should therefore be combined “with other democracy-enhancing reforms” such 
as providing more transparency on police practices). 
210. See sources cited supra note 209. 
211. POLICING PROJECT: NYU SCH. OF LAW, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON DEMOCRATIC 
POLICING 3 (2015), https://policingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Policing-Principles 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/YLC8-PJ58]. 
212. Lexipol executives provided us with data suggesting that approximately 60% of customers 
change less than 20% of their Lexipol policy manuals. SECOND LEXIPOL POWERPOINT, supra note 
9, at 16. The remaining 40% of customers change 20% or more of Lexipol’s manuals. Id. But 
Lexipol has not examined the extent to which its customers’ modifications are cosmetic—changing 
the name of the law enforcement agency, for example—or more substantive. 
213. See supra Figure 1 and accompanying text. 
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policies, why Lexipol makes particular drafting decisions, or whether there 
are other plausible alternative policies. 
The other materials Lexipol provides to its customers are similarly 
unilluminating. We used the Public Records Act to request all information 
that the California agencies had regarding their relationship with Lexipol. 
What we typically obtained was Lexipol’s standard police manual, a contract, 
and evidence of payment. Many jurisdictions also had marketing information 
that they received from Lexipol, e-mail exchanges, and PowerPoint 
presentations from Lexipol executives. Some had internal memoranda 
justifying local jurisdictions’ decisions to purchase Lexipol’s service rather 
than continue to write their own policy manuals. Some had materials from 
Lexipol that described amended policies and the rationale for the 
amendments (generally a change in the law). But none of the departments 
produced materials from Lexipol that described the evidentiary basis for 
policies, drafting decisions by the company, or the existence of alternative 
approaches. 
The Lexipol executives with whom we spoke reported that, since 2008, 
jurisdictions have also had access to policy guides that offer general 
background information about policies. Yet the fact that no jurisdictions 
provided us with such guides—and a detective from one jurisdiction, when 
asked about the policy guide, said he had never seen or heard of it—confirms 
one Lexipol vice president’s view that these guides are “well-kept secrets” 
and difficult for departments to access online.214 Moreover, we are skeptical 
that these guides—even if widely available—would provide much 
information to agencies about Lexipol’s policy decisions. Lexipol declined 
to provide us with a copy of its policy guide, but it did provide us with a 
single page of the guide regarding body camera video, and that page provided 
little basis by which a Lexipol customer could assess the sensibility of 
Lexipol’s policy choices in this area.215  
Even when local jurisdictions seek out information from Lexipol about 
the bases for its policy-drafting decisions, Lexipol reveals scant information 
about its choices. For example, a sergeant at the Irvine Police Department e-
mailed Lexipol, seeking information about several aspects of Lexipol’s use 
of force policy, including: 
1. Where did the definition of Force come from? Has it changed over 
time? I know there is not one agreed upon definition as it applies 
to UoF policy, but was wondering where your definition came 
from. 
 
214. See supra notes 86–87. 
215. See infra notes 259–261 and accompanying text (describing the substance of the page we 
received). 
EAGLY.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2018  1:26 AM 
934 Texas Law Review [Vol. 96:891 
 
2. Is the lethal force policy verbiage based on federal standards? It 
varies slightly from ours, primarily because it includes the word 
imminent. The definition of imminent is broadly defined to include 
preventing a crime. Was the Lexipol wording derived from case 
law that includes “imminent” as it is defined in your policy?216 
The sergeant explained in his message that the Irvine Police Department has 
its own policy manual but uses Lexipol to “augment” its policies, and that he 
was reviewing Lexipol’s policies to see whether and how they should adjust 
their own manual.217 The Lexipol representative responded quickly to the 
sergeant’s questions but offered no specifics about its use of force policy 
choices, writing only: “The force definitions are based on federal guidelines 
as well as the deadly force section. This policy has changed over time with 
the changes in laws and case decisions. The ‘imminent’ wording again is 
based on the federal guidelines.”218 Although the sergeant took this laudable 
step to discover additional information about Lexipol’s standardized policy, 
the company offered him minimal guidance.  
 Our research uncovered similar concerns regarding the claims that 
Lexipol makes about its DTB trainings. Although Lexipol promises that its 
two-minute trainings and “every day is training day” philosophy will save 
subscribers money and reduce exposure to lawsuits, we found no empirical 
support for these claims. Indeed, citing a litany of concerns, California’s 
Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) twice declined 
to certify Lexipol’s DTBs as sufficient to satisfy their minimum standards for 
state law enforcement training.219 Among other concerns, the Commission 
cited a “[l]ack of evidence or feedback to indicate the information [in 
Lexipol’s DTBs] is understood or can be applied.”220 According to the 
Commission staff, the true/false format of the extremely brief DTBs provides 
no “proof of learning” or “degree of assurance that the information would be 
applied in a unique situation, i.e., beyond the single scenario included in the 
 
216. E-mail from Barry Miller, Sergeant, Irvine Police Dep’t, to Greg Maciha, Lexipol (Aug. 4, 
2015, 11:22 AM) (on file with authors). 
217. Id. 
218. E-mail from Greg Maciha, Lexipol, to Barry Miller, Sergeant, Irvine Police Dep’t (Aug. 4, 
2015, 1:41 PM) (on file with authors). 
219. POST LEXIPOL REPORT, supra note 102, at 2–3 (reviewing the history of Lexipol’s 
unsuccessful attempts to gain state certification from the Commission for its DTBs, beginning 
informally in 2004, and later resulting in two formal denials in 2006 and 2009). Lexipol appealed 
this decision pursuant to Commission Regulation 1058 but lost the appeal. See Letter from Paul A. 
Cappitelli, Executive Director, Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, to Dan 
Merkle, CEO, Lexipol (July 27, 2009) (on file with authors) (“It is the decision of the Commission 
to deny your appeal and affirm the actions of POST staff and the Executive Director to deny 
certification of the Daily Training Bulletin.”). 
220. POST LEXIPOL REPORT, supra note 102, at 3. 
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DTB.”221 Moreover, the DTBs do not include clear “learning objectives,” do 
not ensure that students will actually read the information contained in the 
DTBs, are entirely “stand-alone trainings” not supported by “the assistance 
or guidance of an instructor,” and fail to provide opportunities for “practice 
or feedback.”222 The fact that the DTBs are “part of a wholly proprietary 
subscription service” and distributed by a “private, for-profit company” also 
weighed heavily in the Commission’s decision to decline certification of the 
trainings.223 In particular, the Commission found it troubling that it would 
have no “oversight” over Lexipol’s privatized “content, instructional 
methodology, instructor competence, or effectiveness” and that non-
subscribing agencies would not have access to the proprietary, fee-based 
trainings.224 
In sum, based on the information we have been able to collect, we do 
not believe that Lexipol provides subscribing agencies with sufficient 
information for them to be able to understand what evidence Lexipol has 
consulted when crafting its policies and trainings, the rationale for its drafting 
decisions, or whether there are diverging opinions about best practices in a 
given area. Even if a jurisdiction tries to deviate from the standard-issue 
Lexipol policies or trainings, it must address structural aspects of Lexipol’s 
products that make it burdensome to customize. For example, Lexipol’s 
update service automatically overrides client customization. The Lexipol 
policy manual updates repeatedly caution subscribers that “[e]ach time you 
accept an update the new content will automatically replace your current 
content for that section/subsection of your manual,” meaning that “if you 
have customized the section/subsection being updated you will lose your 
 
221. Letter from Paul A. Cappitelli, Executive Director, Commission on Peace Officer 
Standards and Training, to Steve Peeler, Training Director (Apr. 20, 2009) (on file with authors); 
see also POST LEXIPOL REPORT, supra note 102, at 9 (“The single true/false question at the end of 
each DTB assesses only whether the student is able to read the questions but does not, by itself, 
assess whether the concept is understood or can be applied. Whether or not the student has read the 
DTB, the chance of selecting the correct answer is 50/50. If the incorrect answer is selected online, 
no corrective feedback or remediation is necessary because the correct answer is obvious. True/false 
questions are widely determined to be inherently unsound as a stand-alone assessment.”). 
222. POST LEXIPOL REPORT, supra note 102, at 2–3, 7–9. 
223. Letter from Paul A. Cappitelli, supra note 221. 
224. Letter from Michael C. DiMiceli, Assistant Exec. Dir., Cal. Comm’n on Peace Officer 
Standards and Training, to Steve Foster, Lexipol LLC (May 2006) (on file with authors); POST 
LEXIPOL REPORT, supra note 102, at 10 (“[T]he DTB program is a wholly proprietary, fee-based 
subscription service of Lexipol. It is directly connected to their foundational policy manual service. 
Certification of the DTB limits training credit solely to Lexipol customers and, if certified, the 
training would not be available to non-subscribing officers and agencies. Limiting training and 
credit to subscribers of a proprietary service is a significant departure from long-standing 
Commission policy.”). 
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specific changes.”225 The fact that Lexipol’s DTB trainings are all based on 
the standard policies is another impediment to customization. Jurisdictions 
wishing to deviate from Lexipol’s standard trainings would need to invest in 
creating their own training programs. 
Finally, Lexipol’s subscribers purchase Lexipol’s products in part 
because they do not have the money or time to engage in their own 
rulemaking processes. Lexipol markets its service as a cost-saving tool, 
emphasizing that it costs less to adopt the Lexipol manual than to pay internal 
staff to research and develop policies on their own. And Lexipol subscribers 
applaud the service because it eliminates the need for police chiefs and other 
government officials to develop policies themselves.226 If a subscriber 
wanted to modify Lexipol’s standard policies, it would need to identify 
alternative policy language, consider the strengths and limitations of that 
alternative, and seek community input. Most jurisdictions that contract with 
Lexipol are unlikely to dedicate the time and money necessary to this project, 
particularly given Lexipol’s assurances that its policies reduce litigation and 
litigation costs so dramatically. 
In this Article, we do not examine the substance of Lexipol’s policies or 
compare its policies to those created through the transparent, quasi-
administrative processes recommended by scholars and experts and adopted 
by some progressive agencies. But we defer to their view that there are 
 
225. LEXIPOL, CALIFORNIA LE POLICY MANUAL UPDATES 2 (Nov. 2016) (provided by the 
Modesto Police Department) (on file with authors). These update instructions also inform clients 
that: 
If you wish to preserve your custom content, you should select “Edit ←” to manually 
merge the new content with your modified content. If you select “Reject Update” your 
customized content will not be changed. If the update is to delete an entire 
section/subsection and you choose “Reject Delete” the content will no longer be 
supported by Lexipol and the section/subsection will be shown as agency-authored 
content. 
Id.; see also LEXIPOL, LEXIPOL POLICY MANUAL UPDATE, RELEASE NOTES 1 (June 2013) 
(provided by the Folsom Police Department) (on file with authors) (“Important: Each time you 
accept an update the new content will automatically replace your current content for that section of 
your manual.”) (emphasis in original). 
226. See, e.g., Press Release, Lexipol, Lexipol Launches LE Policy Manual & Daily Training 
Bulletin Service in Missouri (Nov. 28, 2011), reprinted in Lexipol Launches LE Policy Manual & 
Daily Training Bulletin Service in Missouri, LAW OFFICER (Dec. 1, 2011), http://lawofficer.com/ 
archive/lexipol-launches-le-policy-manual-daily-training-bulletin-service-in-missouri/ [https:// 
perma.cc/5PRE-QM8A]. Gregory Mills, Police Chief in Riverside, Missouri, explains Lexipol’s 
benefits: 
Like most chiefs, I do not have the luxury of having a staff that can research policy 
issues from the legal and best practices perspectives and then translate the information 
into an understandable written policy . . . . But with Lexipol I don’t need to, because 
they do it all. Lexipol’s policy manual is complete and its updates are timely. There 
are many things in police management to worry about. Fortunately for me, not having 
up-to-date policies is no longer one of those. 
Id. 
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democratic and perhaps substantive benefits to customization and 
community engagement in police policymaking. We are concerned that 
Lexipol’s lack of transparency about its policy decisions, the difficulty of 
modifying Lexipol’s manual, and the financial pressures faced by agencies 
that decide to purchase Lexipol’s services discourage local agencies from 
evaluating the sensibility of Lexipol’s policy choices, seeking community 
input, or modifying policies to reflect local priorities. 
C. Policymaking for Profit 
Those who have promoted police policymaking over the past several 
decades never considered the possibility that a private, for-profit enterprise 
might play such a dominant role in the creation and dissemination of police 
policies. Yet perhaps the rise of Lexipol should come as no surprise. Private 
entities have long engaged in police functions.227 Private companies have also 
drafted government policies, standards, and regulations.228 And more 
generally, private–public partnerships and hybrids have become the rule, 
rather than the exception.229 The growth of Lexipol and other private agencies 
involved in police policymaking is consistent with the privatization of law 
enforcement functions and the increasing privatization of government 
policies, standards, and regulation more generally. 
Privatization scholars tend, in varying degrees, to applaud privatization 
as more effective and efficient than government action and to despair that 
privatization compromises democratic principles.230 Our study of Lexipol 
offers evidence to support both views. In this Article, we have not compared 
Lexipol’s policies with those drafted by agencies and so cannot reach any 
firm conclusions about whether Lexipol’s policies are more “effective”—by 
 
227. See generally Sklansky, supra note 27. For a discussion of the ways in which private 
business is playing a role in policing technologies, see Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of 
Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 101 (2017). Joh’s 
examination of private surveillance technologies raises similar concerns to those we have raised 
here, including the dominance of one company’s policy choices and secrecy about technology 
decisions. 
228. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, 
Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291, 292–93 (2005) (describing 
copyrighted standards that are incorporated into substantive law); Nina A. Mendelson, Taking 
Public Access to the Law Seriously: The Problem of Private Control over the Availability of Federal 
Standards, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10776, 10776 (2015) (reporting that federal agencies have 
incorporated privately drafted standards into federal regulations); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, 
The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 596 (1995) (describing the 
work of ALI and other private entities that create restatements); Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards 
Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 497, 502 (2013) (describing standards 
created by private standard-setting organizations that are incorporated into public laws). 
229. See generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
543 (2000). 
230. See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
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whatever metric one might use—than policies drafted by local agencies. But 
Lexipol subscribers quoted on Lexipol’s website appear to believe that the 
company’s policies are of higher quality than they could create on their 
own.231 Lexipol’s dramatic expansion over the past fifteen years suggests a 
widespread belief that the company is better situated than local law 
enforcement agencies to perform the police policymaking function and can 
do so at reduced cost. 
Yet our study of Lexipol also offers anecdotal support for common 
criticisms of privatization. As we have argued, Lexipol appears to prioritize 
liability risk management over other interests, and the secrecy with which it 
drafts its policies makes it difficult for law enforcement to understand the 
bases for Lexipol’s policy decisions. These observations echo concerns by 
privatization scholars that private companies overvalue efficiency interests 
and lack transparency.232 In addition, Lexipol’s interest in making a profit 
creates unorthodox relationships between the policymaking company and the 
public police agencies that subscribe to its services. 
For example, Lexipol’s standard contract with subscribers contains an 
indemnification clause providing that the company “shall have no 
responsibility or liability” to any subscriber for its products.233 According to 
Lexipol, an indemnification term is necessitated by its business model: As 
Lexipol explained in a memorandum to customers, removing the 
indemnification clause would mean that subscription prices would increase 
“dramatically” to account for the possibility of litigation.234 Nevertheless, 
Lexipol has also assured its subscribers that “Lexipol’s content has been 
published for agency use for over 10 years,” and “[w]e are unaware of any 
 
231. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
232. See supra note 27. 
233. See, e.g., Lexipol, Contract with the Long Beach Police Dep’t (2013) (on file with 
authors); Lexipol, Contract with the City of Orange Police Dep’t (Feb. 21, 2004) (on file with 
authors); Lexipol, Contract with the Walnut Creek Police Dep’t (Apr. 12, 2011) (on file with 
authors); Lexipol, Contract with the San Ramon Police Dep’t (Aug. 13, 2006) (on file with authors); 
Lexipol, Contract with the Cty. of Napa (approved by Board of Supervisors Apr. 12, 2005) (on file 
with authors). Similarly, Lexipol has required jurisdictions to waive standard provisions in their 
contracts requiring vendors to pay any settlements and judgments arising out of their contract 
performance. See, e.g., Agreement between Lexipol and the City of Chula Vista for Use of 
Subscription Material (July 1, 2015) (on file with authors) (waiving the standard provision in a 
vendor contract for Lexipol, which requires city vendors to indemnify and hold harmless the city). 
Other localities similarly had to request waivers of their normal indemnification terms in order to 
accommodate Lexipol’s refusal to agree to this term. Agenda Item, Office of the Sheriff–Coroner, 
Cty. of Tulare, Approve Agreement Between the County of Tulare and Lexipol (Aug. 23, 2006) (on 
file with authors) (requesting that the Board approve an agreement between the County of Tulare 
and Lexipol, “which includes payment in advance and waiver of [the county’s] indemnification 
provisions”). 
234. Lexipol’s Position on Contractual Indemnification, supra note 162. 
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case in which Lexipol provided content was found faulty by a court. . . . 
Consider that track record against any alternative.”235  
Although Lexipol’s indemnification clause may make business sense 
for the company and for its subscribers, it creates the potential for a liability 
shell game when policies are faulty. A plaintiff can sue a city or county if she 
suffered a constitutional harm that resulted from official police policy.236 
Presumably as a means of avoiding liability under this legal theory, Lexipol 
has repeatedly made clear that “Lexipol will never assume the position as any 
agency’s ‘policy-maker.’”237 In negotiations with one jurisdiction over the 
indemnification issue, Lexipol offered the curious rationale that it only 
“suggests” content and does not actually “control” the policies adopted by 
the agency: 
We only suggest content. The agency has total control of their actual 
policies. The Chief will adopt the Policy Manual before it is deployed 
and certify that he is the Policy Maker as defined by federal 
requirements. Certainly the agency would not ask us to indemnify 
what we do not control.238 
In addition, when Lexipol issues a policy update, it cautions its subscribers 
“to carefully review all content and updates for applicability to your agency, 
and check with your agency’s legal advisor for appropriate legal review 
before changing or adopting any policy.”239 These disclaimers about 
Lexipol’s policymaking role sit in stark contrast with the broader messaging 
by Lexipol to jurisdictions—that its policies are “legally defensible” and 
designed to help jurisdictions avoid litigation that will result from out-of-date 
 
235. Id. 
236. See generally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (allowing municipal 
liability for an unconstitutional policy that causes harm). 
237. Lexipol’s Position on Contractual Indemnification, supra note 162; see also Second 
Addendum to Agreement Between City of Fresno and Lexipol, LLC (July 23, 2015) (on file with 
authors) (containing an acknowledgment by the city that “neither Lexipol nor any of its agents, 
employees or representatives shall be considered ‘policy makers’ in any legal or other sense and 
that the chief executive of City will, for all purposes, be considered the ‘policy maker’ with regard 
to each and every such policy and Daily Training Bulletin”). 
 We could find only one case in which Lexipol was named as a defendant in a civil rights suit 
against a law enforcement agency or officer. That case alleged that Thomas Schrock died after 
Ontario Police, following a Lexipol policy, shot him twice with a Taser. Schrock v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 
No. ED CV 14–02142–AB (DTBx), 2014 WL 7332112 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2014). Lexipol was 
voluntarily dismissed from the case after moving for summary judgment. See Defendant, Lexipol, 
LLC’s Ex Parte Application to Dismiss Lexipol, LLC and for Entry of Judgment at 3, Schrock v. 
Taser Int’l, Inc., No. CIVDS 1408556 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2016) (Bloomberg, Litigation & 
Dockets) (requesting Lexipol be dismissed from the case because it was not named in plaintiffs’ 
amended complaint). In this Article we have repeatedly relied on Bruce Praet’s deposition in that 
case. See supra note 31. 
238. INDEMNIFICATION RATIONALE, supra note 142. 
239. LEXIPOL, POLICY MANUAL UPDATE: RELEASE NOTES 1 (Dec. 2013) (provided by 
Cathedral City) (on file with authors). 
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policies. Indeed Lexipol markets its policies as a cost-savings because 
agencies can adopt them without modification.240  
Lexipol, LLC’s vigorous use of copyright law to protect its business 
interests is another troubling outgrowth of its for-profit status. Under a 
standard term found in all Lexipol contracts, Lexipol, rather than the 
contracting agency, holds the copyright to all policies.241 Even when a law 
enforcement agency that contracts with Lexipol amends Lexipol’s model 
policies, Lexipol regards the resulting amended policy as covered by 
Lexipol’s copyright.242 The manuals used by Lexipol subscribers have the 
Lexipol copyright on each page, even when the subscriber has added original 
content to the page.243 
Lexipol has a sensible business argument for copyrighting its policies 
and preventing its policies from being adopted by other agencies without 
paying Lexipol. As Lexipol’s CEO explained in correspondence to a 
customer in our study, “if we do not correct/defend any and all known 
violations we risk losing the copyright and by extension we risk our ability 
to do business.”244 Yet this copyright position may inhibit improvements to 
Lexipol’s policies and stunt development of policies and best practices more 
generally. 
Police policymaking is often viewed as a collective enterprise among 
advocacy groups, community leaders, and other experts. For example, the 
Immigrant Legal Resource Center (ILRC), a nonprofit organization that 
advocates for the rights of immigrants, has published a guide featuring 
policies from several jurisdictions that protect immigrants from federal 
immigration enforcement.245 As part of this project, ILRC also publishes an 
 
240. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
241. See, e.g., Lexipol, Contract with the Long Beach Police Dep’t (2013) (on file with 
authors). The contract provides that:  
Agency further agrees that any content within an Agency Policy Manual prepared by 
Agency, based in whole or in part on content created by Lexipol, or based on any 
Supplemental Policy Publications and/or Procedure Manuals, and Daily Training 
Bulletins copyrighted by Lexipol shall be derivative works subject to the copyright of 
Lexipol. 
Id.  
242. See, e.g., E-mail from Ron Wilkerson, CEO, Lexipol, to Scott Jordan, Chief, Tustin Police 
Dep’t (Apr. 1, 2013, 9:32 AM) (“Lexipol copyright needs to be added to any content authored by 
Lexipol whether in total or a derivative of content authored by Lexipol.”). 
243. We did find eight jurisdictions that consulted with Lexipol but did not officially adopt 
Lexipol’s policies. Their manuals did not have Lexipol’s copyright stamp on their policies. See infra 
note 253 and accompanying text. 
244. E-mail from Ron Wilkerson, supra note 242. 
245. LENA GRABER, ANGIE JUNCK & NIKKI MARQUEZ, LOCAL OPTIONS FOR PROTECTING 
IMMIGRANTS: A COLLECTION OF CITY & COUNTY POLICIES TO PROTECT IMMIGRANTS FROM 
DISCRIMINATION AND DEPORTATION (2016), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/ 
local_options_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9KP-GFG3]. 
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interactive national map that includes links to local policing policies that 
disentangle local law enforcement from federal deportation efforts.246 
Campaign Zero, a nonprofit organization dedicated to ending police-caused 
deaths, has crafted a model use of force policy from components of policies 
adopted by departments in a number of jurisdictions including Philadelphia, 
Denver, Seattle, Cleveland, New York City, Los Angeles, Las Vegas, and 
Milwaukee, all of which are made available to the public on Campaign Zero’s 
web page.247 
The basic idea behind these efforts is that sharing, evaluating, and 
modifying policies from different jurisdictions will improve police policies 
overall. Groups like ILRC and Campaign Zero can identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of policies from different jurisdictions and analyze the ways in 
which these policies impact discretionary decisionmaking. This information 
can then be used by other jurisdictions to make informed decisions about 
which policies to adopt.  
Lexipol’s copyrighted policies can only play a limited role in this 
evaluative process. Lexipol subscribers can make their policies public and 
sometimes post their policies online.248 But Lexipol’s copyright stamp must 
be included on each page of those policies. And it is Lexipol’s position that 
other jurisdictions cannot adopt language from Lexipol policies—even 
policies that have been modified by their subscribers—without first paying 
Lexipol. When Lexipol learned that the Tustin Police Department—a Lexipol 
subscriber—did not have a Lexipol copyright stamp on its policy manual’s 
pages and had distributed its manual online and shared portions of its manual 
with other agencies, then-CEO Ron Wilkerson contacted the Tustin Police 
Chief with the company’s copyright concerns. Wilkerson explained to the 
chief that “if your manual is posted on any web site or forum such as the 
[International Association of Chiefs of Police] site and others use that content 
not knowing it is copyrighted material a much more serious problem takes 
shape.”249 Wilkerson also asked that the chief identify any agencies that 
might be using the policies so that he could “work to correct the problem.”250 
 
246. National Map of Local Entanglement with ICE, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. 
(Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.ilrc.org/local-enforcement-map [https://perma.cc/F9PW-KBFN]. 
247. Limit Use of Force, CAMPAIGN ZERO, https://www.joincampaignzero.org/force/ 
[https://perma.cc/U4RZ-DQQ7]. 
248. For examples of agencies posting their Lexipol-authored policy manuals online see 
AUSTIN POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL (2015), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/ 
2661319-Austin-Police-Department-Policy-Manual-2015.html [https://perma.cc/RAQ3-QR5N]; 
PALO ALTO POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL (2013), https://www.cityofpaloalto.org/ 
civicax/filebank/documents/38381 [https://perma.cc/Z2VR-VY2L]; RIVERSIDE POLICE DEP’T, 
RIVERSIDE P.D. POLICY MANUAL (2017), https://riversideca.gov/rpd/ChiefOfc/manual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B36R-FW25]. 
249. E-mail from Ron Wilkerson, supra note 242. 
250. Id. 
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Lexipol’s approach allows the company to preserve its copyright and the 
associated financial benefits but is contrary to a collaborative policymaking 
approach. 
One jurisdiction in our study—the City and County of San Francisco 
Sheriff’s Department—concluded that Lexipol’s insistence on a copyright 
provision was a deal breaker. The sheriff had retained Lexipol to consult with 
them on developing a new use of force policy. But Lexipol insisted that the 
resulting policy would belong to Lexipol, not the sheriff. As the San 
Francisco City Attorney’s Office advised Lexipol in a memorandum 
terminating the relationship, “Lexipol’s ownership of copyrighted material 
and related derivative works language was unacceptable.”251 Other 
jurisdictions have also struggled with the copyright issue. For example, the 
City of Orange raised the copyright issue with us in response to our public 
records request, lamenting that although they “have revised many of [their] 
policies without Lexipol input” since the time of their initial Lexipol contract 
in 2004, “[t]he policies maintain the Lexipol trademark stamp as we did not 
wish to fight with them about whether they were still their intellectual 
property.”252 
Eight of the departments in our study have what we call hybrid 
contractual arrangements, whereby they subscribe to Lexipol’s manual 
service to stay updated on policy development but do not adopt the Lexipol 
manual for their department.253 Instead, they have continued using their own 
manual, which carries no Lexipol copyright stamp. 
 
251. Memorandum from Michael Renoux, Dir. Contracts, Lexipol, to Carl Fabbri, Lieutenant, 
S.F. Police Dep’t (Jan. 25, 2016) (on file with authors). 
252. E-mail from Denah Hoard, City of Orange, to Ingrid Eagly (Dec. 14, 2016, 7:43 AM) (on 
file with authors). 
253. The eight hybrid departments are the Oceanside Police Department, the Solano County 
Sheriff’s Office, the Kern County Sheriff’s Office, the Davis Police Department, the Riverside 
County Sheriff’s Department, the Irvine Police Department, the Burbank Police Department, and 
the Butte County Sheriff’s Office. See E-mail from Patti Czaiko, Admin. Sec’y, City of Oceanside, 
to Ingrid Eagly (Sept. 20, 2017, 7:37 AM) (“I confirmed with Oceanside Police Department that the 
Lexipol website is utilized for research when developing language for the OPD internal manual. 
They are not using Lexipol as the Policy and Procedure Manual, it is simply a resource.”); E-mail 
from Kimberley G. Glover, Solano Cty. Counsel, to Ingrid Eagly (Sept. 16, 2017, 4:02 PM) (on file 
with authors) (“[A]lthough the Sheriff’s Office does have a Lexipol contract, I have been advised 
that they do not use it very often and have not adopted the Lexipo[]l ‘policy manual.’”); E-mail 
from Jennifer Moran, Police Records Manager, Burbank Police Dep’t, to Ingrid Eagly (May 11, 
2017, 3:24 PM) (on file with authors) (“We use the Lexipol policies as a reference. We read the 
policies and edit them to fit our needs. Some polic[i]es require very little changes and others are 
heavily edited. We customize the policies so they are in line with the BPD[’]s business practices 
and with our existing procedures. Lexipol assists with the legal mandate verbiage. Once we make 
the edits, the policy becomes ours and it is not a Lexipol policy.”); Letter from Virginia L. Gingery, 
Deputy Cty. Counsel, Butte Cty., Cal., to authors (Dec. 6, 2016) (on file with authors) (“I am 
informed that the Department does not use Lexipol’s policies and procedures verbatim, but rather, 
uses Lexipol as a resource when developing its own policies and departmental orders. The 
contractual relationship with Lexipol is in the form of a yearly subscription.”); Letter from Donny 
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In this Article, we have not examined the practices of all private 
companies engaged in police policymaking. It is certainly possible that the 
practices of other private policymaking groups would not prompt the same 
concerns that we have observed about Lexipol. Yet Lexipol is—and is well-
positioned to remain—the dominant private actor in the police policymaking 
market, and we find that Lexipol’s privatized approach raises significant 
substance and process concerns. More fundamentally, our study raises 
questions as to what role Lexipol can and should play in efforts to improve 
police policymaking more generally. This is the topic to which we turn in 
Part III. 
III.  Moving Forward 
In this Part, we offer several recommendations about how to move 
forward. Our goal with these recommendations is to enable local 
governments to be more fully engaged in the creation of their policies and 
trainings, while recognizing the financial and time constraints that have made 
it difficult for local governments to craft comprehensive policy manuals and 
trainings on their own. First, we recommend that Lexipol be more transparent 
about its policymaking process so that adopting jurisdictions can more easily 
make informed decisions about whether to modify or adopt wholesale 
Lexipol’s proposed policies. Second, we encourage states and local 
jurisdictions to promulgate model policies and foster independent 
policymaking processes. Third, we urge nonprofits and scholars interested in 
improving police policies to take steps to more effectively compete in the 
increasingly privatized police policymaking space and view Lexipol as a 
critically important audience. 
A. Understanding Lexipol 
Lexipol should be more transparent about its policymaking process. 
Currently, Lexipol provides no information to its subscribers about the 
identity of experts who draft their model policies, the evidence upon which 
it relies when crafting policies and trainings, the policy interests that animate 
 
Youngblood, Sheriff–Coroner, Kern Cty., Cal., to Ingrid Eagly (Dec. 2, 2016) (on file with authors) 
(“The Commander in charge of the Human Resources unit believes that the Sheriff’s office has been 
using Lexipol for years but has never used or adopted Lexipol information to formulate any policy 
or procedures. The Commander periodically receives e-mails from Lexipol LLC with the latest 
updates in case law [a]ffecting law enforcement which coincides with notifications received from 
other services about the same issues.”); Letter from David Delaini, Deputy Police Chief, Davis 
Police Dep’t, to authors (Nov. 14, 2016) (reporting that the Davis Police Department is a member 
of the Yolo County Public Agency Risk Management Insurance Company (YCPARMIA), that the 
Department has access to Lexipol’s policies as part of its contract with YCPARMIA, and that, 
“[w]hile the Department has used the Lexipol policies as a guide, the Department has not adopted 
the Lexipol policy manual as its own and does not communicate with Lexipol regarding the 
Department’s policy manual.”); see also Appendix. 
EAGLY.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2018  1:26 AM 
944 Texas Law Review [Vol. 96:891 
 
its drafting choices, the availability of alternative policy formulations, or the 
impact of its policies on local jurisdictions’ practices. 
Lexipol’s lack of transparency about its employees and policymaking 
process threatens local governments’ policymaking efforts in two ways. First, 
local jurisdictions deciding whether to purchase Lexipol’s services have little 
information with which to assess the quality of Lexipol’s products or the 
ways in which those products might influence police practices. Second, 
Lexipol’s lack of transparency makes it difficult for subscribers to decide 
which of Lexipol’s proposed policies to adopt. Lexipol customers are faced 
with an uncomfortable choice—adopt each of Lexipol’s model policies on 
the untested assumption that the policies are sound or spend scarce time and 
money to independently evaluate those policies. 
Lexipol could make this choice less stark by providing its customers 
with additional information about the rationale for its policy choices and 
available policy alternatives. Armed with more knowledge about the 
considerations relevant to Lexipol’s policy rationales, subscribers could 
make better informed decisions about whether and how to modify Lexipol’s 
standard policy language. 
Body camera policies are just one arena in which more transparency by 
Lexipol would benefit its customers. There is a great deal of disagreement 
about whether police officers should be able to review body camera video 
before writing up reports about use of force incidents.254 The United States 
Department of Justice’s Community Oriented Policing Services and the 
Police Executive Research Forum recommend allowing officers to review 
video footage before making a statement about an incident because 
“[r]eviewing footage will help officers remember the incident more clearly, 
which leads to more accurate documentation of events” and “[r]eal-time 
recording of the event is considered best evidence.”255 In contrast, the ACLU 
opposes policies that allow officers to review video before writing up reports, 
arguing that the practice enables lying, undermines the legitimacy of 
investigations, and allows for cross-contamination of evidence.256 Several 
police departments, including Atlanta, Oakland, San Francisco, San Jose, and 
 
254. N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, NYPD RESPONSE TO PUBLIC AND OFFICER INPUT ON THE 
DEPARTMENT’S PROPOSED BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY 16–17 (2017), https://policingproject 
.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/NYPD_BWC-Response-to-Officer-and-Public-Input.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TDM9-XG7D] [hereinafter NYPD BODY CAMERA REPORT]. 
255. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS. & POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH 
FORUM, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS 
LEARNED 45 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/472014912134715246869.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/799X-RM29]. 
256. See Jay Stanley & Peter Bibring, Should Officers Be Permitted to View Body Camera 
Footage Before Writing Their Reports?, ACLU (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-
future/should-officers-be-permitted-view-body-camera-footage-writing-their-reports [https:// 
perma.cc/8FWS-DKBG]. 
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Washington, D.C., prohibit their officers from viewing video footage prior to 
making a statement.257 
Lexipol adopted a model policy that allows officers to review body 
camera footage before making a statement to investigators.258 But Lexipol’s 
policy manual includes no guidance about the rationale supporting its policy 
decision, alternative policies adopted by other jurisdictions, or the reasons it 
rejected those alternative approaches. Lexipol was willing to share with us 
their policy “guide sheet” for this policy,259 but it contained nothing by way 
of guidance for agencies other than to note that the issue is “hotly debated . . . 
when it comes to officer-involved shootings.”260 Moreover, the guide 
“recommends” that agencies adopt the Lexipol policy language without 
providing additional information with which agencies can make their own 
assessment.261 Finally, Lexipol executives who read a draft of this Article 
pointed us to a webinar available on its website about the decision to allow 
officers to view video footage before offering a statement.262 We do not know 
how many agencies review this and other webinars produced by Lexipol, but 
note that the webinar did not include information about alternative policy 
approaches adopted by other agencies or supported by those groups 
advocating for restrictions on video review by officers.263 
Lexipol’s presentation of its body camera policy stands in contrast to 
that of the New York City Police Department, which similarly allows officers 
to review body camera footage before making a statement. When New York 
 
257. NYPD BODY CAMERA REPORT, supra note 254, at 16. A recent report by the Stanford 
Criminal Justice Center (SCJC) recommends that law enforcement agencies should not investigate 
their own cases involving officer shootings. Such an approach, according to SCJC, would help to 
minimize conflicts of interest and enhance the accountability of police. AMARI L. HAMMONDS ET 
AL., STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., AT ARM’S LENGTH: IMPROVING CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS OF POLICE SHOOTINGS 16 (2016), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2016/09/At-Arms-Length-Oct-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/JSC6-L22J]. 
258. See, e.g., ELK GROVE POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL (2017) (adopting Lexipol Policy 
310.8, Audio and Video Recordings, which explains that “[a]ny officer involved in a shooting or 
death may be permitted to review available Mobile Audio/Video (MAV), body-worn video, or other 
video or audio recordings prior to providing a recorded statement or completing reports”). 
259. For a description of policy guide sheets, see supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text. 
As we have discussed, these policy guide sheets do not appear to be used by many Lexipol 
customers. See supra notes 214–215 and accompanying text. 
260. SECOND LEXIPOL POWERPOINT, supra note 9, at 17 (presenting a sample Lexipol policy 
guide sheet for officer-involved shootings in California). 
261. Id. 
262. See Grant Fredericks, Laura Scarry & Ken Wallentine, Point/Counterpoint: The Debate 
over Officer Viewing of BWC Video Footage, LEXIPOL (Dec. 12, 2016), https://register.gotowebinar 
.com/register/277667746234235396 [https://perma.cc/M9M6-SHCA] (Lexipol webinar). 
263. The three participants in the video are two Lexipol employees and an instructor at the FBI 
National Academy who is a forensic video analyst. Id. The webinar identified arguments for and 
against allowing officers to review video before making a statement but ultimately recommended 
that officers be allowed to view video before making a statement. 
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City adopted this policy, it issued a lengthy report describing public and 
police views about various policy options and the rationale supporting its 
decision.264 Were Lexipol to provide agencies with more information about 
the rationale underlying its policy decisions regarding body camera footage 
and other areas of debate and disagreement, subscribing jurisdictions would 
be able to make independent, informed decisions about whether to adopt or 
modify Lexipol’s standard policies. 
Assuming that Lexipol stands by its process and content, it should 
welcome additional transparency. Lexipol makes clear that it should not be 
viewed as police departments’ policymaker and that local jurisdictions 
should assess proposed policies and decide on their own whether to adopt 
them. According to the fine print in Lexipol contracts, the local jurisdictions 
(not Lexipol LLC) are the policymakers, and local law enforcement (not 
Lexipol LLC) will be held liable if those policies are found to be 
constitutionally unsound. It is, therefore, consistent with Lexipol’s 
proclaimed advisory role to provide agencies with background information 
about Lexipol’s policy decisions so that they can be more engaged in the 
creation of their policies. 
B. Regulating Lexipol 
Our second recommendation is that governments become more actively 
engaged with police policymaking as a mechanism to narrow the gap 
between policymaking ideals and current practices. Lexipol’s influence could 
be subject to greater public oversight if states and cities were to take a greater 
interest in both the process by which important policing policies are created 
and the content of the resulting policies. In addition, courts could play a role 
by requiring local governments to engage in transparent policymaking. 
First, state and local policing agencies that subscribe to Lexipol should 
customize Lexipol’s model policies to reflect their particular needs and 
community values.265 When making the decision to purchase a Lexipol 
contract, localities should account for the agency time that is necessary to 
review and customize the policies. Indeed, the agency does remain the 
 
264. See generally NYPD BODY CAMERA REPORT, supra note 254. In another example that 
deviates from the Lexipol model, the City Council in Berkeley, California, recently worked with 
the SCJC to provide detailed advice in a published report regarding the benefits and drawbacks of 
arming the Berkeley Police Department with Electronic Control Weapons. See generally JENA 
NEUSCHELER & AKIVA FREIDLIN, STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., REPORT ON ELECTRONIC 
CONTROL WEAPONS (ECWS) SUBMITTED TO THE CITY OF BERKELEY (2015), https://www-cdn 
.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/ECW-Final-Draft-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VCD-
6CVD]. 
265. While determining the extent to which jurisdictions customize their manuals is beyond the 
scope of this project, the manuals that we did receive in public records requests appear highly 
standardized. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
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“policymaker” under the standard Lexipol contract and must take this 
obligation seriously.  
This is precisely how a major California municipal insurer hopes its 
subscribers will use Lexipol. California Joint Powers Insurance Authority 
(CJPIA), a municipal self-insurance pool with more than 100 members, 
provides Lexipol subscriptions to its insureds.266 However, in a recent 
newsletter, CJPIA encouraged its members to view sample policies from 
Lexipol and other sources as “a [s]tarting [p]oint; [n]ot an [e]nding 
[p]oint.”267 Acknowledging that “[s]uch policies are often well-researched, 
well-written, and legally compliant” and “can provide an excellent starting 
point for drafting,” CJPIA warned readers that “all too often, the drafter 
simply takes the policy, changes the names and titles and voilá—a policy has 
been born! Yet, using another’s policy can be a trap for the unwary.”268 
Among the concerns identified by the CJPIA are that the model policy “does 
not alleviate the agency of the responsibility for the content of the policy” 
and that different public agencies may have different needs and practices.269 
Although this type of localization will take some time and money, it will be 
far less expensive than creating entirely new policies and trainings. And if 
Lexipol is more transparent about its policymaking process, it will be less 
burdensome for local jurisdictions to benefit from—without overly relying 
upon—Lexipol. 
Second, local governments should be encouraged to write their own 
policies, and develop procedures for implementing them, without subscribing 
to Lexipol. At the local level, some jurisdictions have taken steps to create 
their own formalized system for police rulemaking, akin to what has been 
advocated by scholars. The Los Angeles Board of Police Commissioners is 
one such example. This five-member civilian body functions “like a 
corporate board of directors” for the Los Angeles Police Department,270 
taking on roles that include developing and analyzing police policies and 
 
266. Mellor, supra note 134 (reporting that in January 2009, Lexipol and CJPIA entered a 
“strategic business partnership . . . whereby the California JPIA funds the cost of a member’s 
participation in the Law Enforcement Policy Manual Update and Daily Training Bulletin 
subscriptions”). 
267. Kelly A. Trainer, Risk Solutions: One Size Rarely Fits All: Proper Use of Sample Policies, 
CAL. JPIA, Dec. 2016, https://cjpia.org/news/newsletter/newsletter-article/2016/12/15/december-
2016—issue-58#seven [https://perma.cc/TAK4-TC9E]. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. 
270. Police Commission, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lapdonline.org/police_commission 
[https://perma.cc/C7EZ-WPTE]. The Board’s five civilian members are appointed by the Mayor 
and confirmed by the Los Angeles City Council. The Function and Role of the Board of Police 
Commissioners, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.lapdonline.org/police_commission/content_ 
basic_view/900 [https://perma.cc/BP23-3PPJ]. 
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monitoring policy implementation.271 Importantly, all of its meetings are 
open to the public and the group provides opportunities for public 
comment.272  
The Chief of the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department is 
responsible for policymaking,273 with internal institutional support and input 
from outside constituencies. The Chief has a dedicated Policy and Standards 
Branch, which develops and publishes department policy and directives.274 
The Chief also consults with the Citizens Advisory Council, a group of 
community members that provide community feedback on policy issues.275 
To further increase transparency, the D.C. Official Code requires all written 
policy directives to be available to the public online.276 
Other jurisdictions have involved community members in piloting new 
policy initiatives. The Camden County Police Department partnered with 
NYU School of Law’s Policing Project to seek community input on their 
department’s body-worn-camera policy.277 The department posted a draft 
policy on its website and sought feedback through an online questionnaire, 
in two community forums, and from focus groups made up of Camden police 
officers who had been using body cameras as part of a pilot project.278 In 
 
271. The Function and Role of the Board of Police Commissioners, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, http:// 
www.lapdonline.org/police_commission/content_basic_view/900 [https://perma.cc/BP23-3PPJ] 
(including a detailed description of the various arms of the Commission, including the policy group 
that “assists the Board in developing and analyzing policy, monitoring the progress of policy 
implementation, and reviewing proposed Department actions” and “also provides overall research 
and analytical support to the Commission, and facilitates the transfer and coordination of 
information”). 
272. Id. Other major cities have also adopted a Police Commission model similar to that of Los 
Angeles. See, e.g., Police Commission, S.F. POLICE, http://sanfranciscopolice.org/police-
commission [https://perma.cc/9AVN-EKPR]; About the Fire and Police Commission, 
CITY.MILWAUKEE.GOV, http://city.milwaukee.gov/fpc/About#.WXaL39Pytn5 [https://perma.cc/ 
36XN-XUPH]; Police Commissioners History, DETROITMI.GOV, http://www.detroitmi.gov/How-
Do-I/Find-Detroit-Archives/Police-Commissioners-History [https://perma.cc/Q8A6-VNUL]; 
Community Police Commission: About Us, SEATTLE.GOV, https://www.seattle.gov/community-
police-commission/about-us [https://perma.cc/8BM6-QRTJ]; Board of Police Commissioners: 
St. Louis County Police Department, STLOUISCO.COM, http://www.stlouisco.com/ 
LawandPublicSafety/PoliceDepartment/AboutUs/BoardofPoliceCommissioners [https://perma.cc/ 
CUA9-EK7P]. 
273. METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP’T, D.C., GO-OMA-101.00, DIRECTIVES SYSTEM 1 (June 3, 
2016), https://go.mpdconline.com/GO/GO_101_00.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2Z3-K9YL] (“The 
Chief of Police makes ‘orders, rules, and regulations governing conduct and controlling police 
activity.’”). 
274. Policy and Standards Branch, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP’T, D.C., https://mpdc.dc.gov/ 
page/policy-and-standards-branch [https://perma.cc/LQL6-MZTP]. 
275. Citizens Advisory Councils, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP’T, D.C., https://mpdc.dc.gov/ 
page/citizens-advisory-councils-cac [https://perma.cc/8UGE-4KBT]. 
276. D.C. CODE § 2-536 (2012). 
277. Camden, POLICING PROJECT: N.Y.U. SCH. L., https://policingproject.org/our-work/ 
developing-accountability/camden/ [https://perma.cc/T8BP-7S32]. 
278. Id. 
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response to this feedback, the department made several adjustments to its 
draft policy and published a report describing the community feedback the 
department received and the changes to the draft policy inspired by that 
feedback.279 
While not all jurisdictions will have the resources to support a full 
commission process like that in operation in Los Angeles, most larger 
departments could follow Camden’s example and involve community 
members in the ongoing development and revision of police policies. 
Moreover, jurisdictions that create their own policies could do more to 
disseminate their resulting policies to the public free of cost so that other 
agencies, particularly smaller ones, can adopt them. Local engagement in the 
development and revision of police policies is particularly important in 
jurisdictions that have been investigated or sued for civil rights abuses. Public 
rulemaking processes and advisory councils like that adopted in Washington, 
D.C., can be used to address the unique problems faced by departments and 
can strengthen community trust damaged as a result of those problems. 
Instead, several departments in our study appear to have adopted Lexipol 
policies after facing these types of suits and investigations without public 
engagement or input about the content of those policies.280  
Third, state legislatures could more actively shape the content of the 
Lexipol policies that their law enforcement departments adopt. It was, after 
all, a 1959 California law designed to encourage police departments to adopt 
policies governing police pursuits that provided the foundation for starting 
Lexipol.281 Since then, additional state reforms have further shaped the 
 
279. Id. 
280. For example, when the Oakland City Council approved a settlement of a multitude of 
constitutional violations by police officers, the court monitor approved a Lexipol contract rather 
than requiring the city to revise its own policies in collaboration with community members. See 
Oakland City Council, Resolution No. 85356 (Dec. 4, 2014) (on file with authors) (indicating that 
Lexipol was the sole respondent to a request for proposals from outside vendors); E-mail from 
Kristin Burgess to Danielle Cortijo (Mar. 26, 2015, 2:37 PM) (on file with authors) (indicating that 
approval for Lexipol was obtained from the monitor). Similarly, the Bakersfield Police Department 
became a Lexipol subscriber immediately after the Department of Justice recommended a series of 
reforms to their department’s written police policies. Joe Mullins, Sergeant, Bakersfield Police 
Dep’t, Approval of Lexipol’s Subscription Agreement (July 6, 2006) (on file with authors) (laying 
out the terms and conditions of the subscription agreement); Letter from Shanetta Y. Cutlar, Chief, 
Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Virginia Gennaro, City Attorney, City of Bakersfield 
(Apr. 12, 2004), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/04/14/bakersfield_ 
ta_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG2S-R39E] (recommending a series of reforms to the department’s 
written policies at a preliminary stage of investigation). The Inglewood Police Department also 
adopted Lexipol policies after public outcry over repeated shootings of unarmed suspects by the 
department’s officers. See Jack Leonard & Victoria Kim, Inglewood Police Have Repeatedly 
Resorted to Deadly Force, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-
inglewood28-2008dec28-story.html [https://perma.cc/H2KU-DLDU] (detailing the Inglewood 
Police Department’s pattern of using unnecessary force against suspects). 
281. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17004.7 (West 2007) (benefitting jurisdictions that adopt a “written 
policy” on police pursuits that meets a number of “minimum standards” and requires that “all peace 
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content of police pursuit policy in California. For example, in 1993, the state 
required the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training to 
establish further guidelines and training on vehicle pursuits, involving more 
than 120 law enforcement agencies, legal advisors, and public representatives 
in the development of the guidelines.282 Other states around the country have 
similarly passed laws that require departments to adopt policy content. For 
example, a number of states require that police administer lineups with 
safeguards that research has shown reduce the possibility of 
misidentification.283 Wisconsin’s state law on eyewitness identification 
procedures specifically requires that law enforcement agencies “adopt 
written policies” that are “designed to reduce the potential for erroneous 
identifications by eyewitnesses in criminal cases.”284 Moreover, the law 
requires that agencies “consider model policies and policies adopted by other 
jurisdictions” when developing and revising their own eyewitness 
identification policies.285  
States could do more to regulate the content of police policies of public 
import—they could require Lexipol and its law enforcement agency clients 
to be more transparent about their policy choices. States could also require 
that Lexipol and its subscribers seek community input about proposed 
policies. The California legislature recently passed the TRUTH Act, which 
requires law enforcement agencies to hold community forums before 
allowing officials from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to 
interview detainees.286 This legislation requires all jurisdictions that 
cooperate with ICE in the state to solicit community input. Perhaps a similar 
requirement could be legislated for agencies that subscribe to Lexipol or 
other private policymaking entities, requiring them to seek public comment 
on their police policies. 
States and localities could also facilitate public rulemaking by 
establishing a rulemaking body for the police. Since 1953, California’s Ralph 
 
officers of the public agency certify in writing that they have received, read, and understand the 
policy”); see also supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text (discussing the founding of Lexipol). 
282. S.B. 601, 1993–1994 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 1993). This law and other subsequent legal 
amendments are codified in § 13519.8 of California’s Penal Code. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519.8 
(West 2012); see generally CAL. COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING, 
CALIFORNIA LAW ENFORCEMENT VEHICLE PURSUIT GUIDELINES 2006 (rev. ed. 2007), 
http://lib.post.ca.gov/Publications/vp_guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/MP62-XMXQ]. 
283. Mark Hansen, Show Me Your ID: Cops, Courts Re-evaluate Their Use of Eyewitnesses, 
ABA J. (May 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/show_me_your_id_cops_ 
courts_re-evaluate_their_use_of_eyewitnesses/ [https://perma.cc/B46G-M33S]. 
284. WIS. STAT. § 175.50(2) (2017). 
285. Id. § 175.50(4). 
286. See Assemb. B 2792, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016). See generally Ingrid V. 
Eagly, Criminal Justice in an Era of Mass Deportation: Reforms from California, 20 NEW CRIM. 
L. REV. 12 (2017) (discussing California’s adoption of new laws designed to disentangle state law 
enforcement from federal deportation efforts). 
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M. Brown Act (Brown Act) has required that all meetings by the governing 
body of a local agency be open to the public and allow for public 
participation.287 The Brown Act provides a ready-made framework to 
facilitate public participation in police policymaking.288 As far as we are 
aware, California jurisdictions using Lexipol have not followed the Brown 
Act provisions.289 However, they could start doing so by requiring that a 
governmental committee or commission approve local police policies, 
including those written by Lexipol, thereby bringing the process of reviewing 
and customizing Lexipol policies squarely into the purview of the state’s 
open-meeting requirements.290 A simple additional improvement would be to 
require that police departments make copies of their policy manuals and 
training materials available to the public on the Internet. This would be a first, 
modest step toward improving transparency and facilitating public 
engagement on policymaking. 
Finally, courts could assume a more active role in the substance and 
process of police policymaking. Courts will always serve an important 
function in identifying the baseline—a constitutional floor under which 
police conduct may not pass. That alone will continue to inform police policy, 
particularly the type of “legally defensible” policies that Lexipol promotes. 
But courts have often proven themselves ill-suited or unwilling to articulate 
the detailed and comprehensive rules necessary to guide police discretion.291 
Andrew Manuel Crespo has argued that if courts took better advantage of the 
voluminous facts at their disposal about the criminal justice system, they 
would gain a greater “institutional awareness of the criminal justice systems 
 
287. Ralph M. Brown Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 54950–63 (West 2017) (providing that 
meetings of public bodies in California must be “open and public” and that action taken in violation 
of open-meetings laws may be voided). The Act provides details regarding which entities are 
covered and how to properly run public meetings (including requirements for when and how 
agendas are posted, how to broadcast meetings, and how to track the minutes of the meetings). Id.; 
see also Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. L.A. Exp. Terminal, Inc., 69 Cal. App. 
4th 287, 293 (1999) (noting that the Brown Act “serves to facilitate public participation in all phases 
of local government decisionmaking and to curb misuse of the democratic process by secret 
legislation of public bodies”). 
288. Several local jurisdictions in California—including San Francisco, Contra Costa County, 
and Oakland—require even greater public transparency through local “Sunshine” ordinances. E.g., 
S.F., CAL., S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 67.1 (1999), http://sfgov.org/sunshine/provisions-sunshine-
ordinance-section-67 [https://perma.cc/9MYN-E2MB]; CONTRA COSTA CTY., CAL., ORDINANCE 
CODE tit. 2 div. 25 (1995); OAKLAND, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCE tit. 2 ch. 2.20 (1997). 
289. Our research did reveal one unsuccessful suit challenging a Lexipol police policy that 
alleged that meetings between the police chief, his lieutenant, and officials from Lexipol concerning 
proposed police policies were subject to the Brown Act. Jiaqing v. City of Albany, No. 
RG06254229, 2008 WL 7864330 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2008). 
290. Under the Brown Act, “legislative body” includes any “commission, committee, board, or 
other body of a local agency,” including one “that governs a private corporation.” CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 54952 (West 2003). 
291. See supra notes 189–192 and accompanying text (describing these critiques). 
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over which they preside.”292 Doing so, according to Crespo, could bring the 
institutional advantages of courts—including their ability to “safeguard 
minority interests that may be ignored or abused in the political process”—
to bear on the substance of police policy.293 Courts could also, as Barry 
Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko advocate, require localities to adopt 
democratic processes for police policymaking. Courts could require that local 
governments create police policies through an administrative rulemaking 
process and “refuse to defer to policing actions that lack a sufficient 
democratic pedigree.”294  
Indeed, courts have already played an important role in helping to get 
major United States cities to democratize their policymaking process. For 
example, in 2001, the United States Department of Justice entered into a civil 
rights consent decree with the Los Angeles Police Department following a 
corruption scandal in the 1990s.295 The court-enforced consent decree, which 
was ended by the federal court in 2013,296 provided guidelines for creating 
new policies and procedures designed to remedy past abuses297 and, among 
other reforms, resulted in the creation of an Office of Constitutional Policing 
to address issues of police policy.298 These kinds of court-ordered remedies 
through consent decrees are, however, labor intensive and therefore have 
tended to focus on the largest police departments.299  
 
292. Crespo, supra note 19, at 2065. 
293. Id. at 2063. 
294. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra note 19, at 1836; see also BARRY FRIEDMAN, 
UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 113 (2017) (suggesting that courts could refuse 
“to allow the police to act without [democratic] authorization” or “reward the police for obtaining 
public approval” for their policing rules before they are adopted). 
295. For background on the Rampart corruption scandal, see Lou Cannon, One Bad Cop, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (Oct. 1, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/01/magazine/one-bad-cop.html, and 
Anne-Marie O’Connor, Rampart Set Up Latinos to Be Deported, INS Says, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 24, 
2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/feb/24/news/mn-2075 [https://perma.cc/98TP-MFFR]. 
296. Joel Rubin, Federal Judge Lifts LAPD Consent Decree, L.A. TIMES (May 16, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/16/local/la-me-lapd-consent-decree-20130517 [https://perma 
.cc/3PSG-JYG2]. 
297. See generally Quarterly Reports of the Independent Monitor, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, 
http://www.lapdonline.org/office_of_constitutional_policing_and_policy/content_basic_view/901
0 [https://perma.cc/97TX-9848] (containing reports from the Independent Monitor hired to ensure 
effective and timely implementation of the LAPD consent decree). 
298. Office of Constitutional Policing and Policy, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, www.lapdonline 
.org/office_of_constitutional_policing_and_policy [https://perma.cc/3SPQ-FPJR]. See generally 
ALEXANDER A. BUSTAMANTE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., L.A. POLICE COMM’N, REVIEW 
OF NATIONAL BEST PRACTICES (2017), http://www.lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/050217/BPC_17-
0169.pdf [https://perma.cc/PX8E-DAEM] (analyzing the Los Angeles Police Department’s 
implementation of national best practice recommendations). 
299. See generally Bell, supra note 28, at 2130 (arguing that litigation reform strategies risk 
allowing abuses to continue undetected, especially since litigation “is rarely initiated before tragedy 
occurs”); Rachel Harmon, Limited Leverage: Federal Remedies and Policing Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS 
U. PUB. L. REV. 33, 44 (2012) (explaining that “the Department of Justice cannot achieve national 
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Finally, we believe that judges could take a more active role in 
understanding and overseeing Lexipol’s products and people when they 
appear in court. Lexipol employees regularly serve as defense experts in 
constitutional litigation against law enforcement agencies and rely on their 
association with Lexipol as a credential when establishing their expertise.300 
At least one expert has relied on the fact that a policy was written by Lexipol 
as proof that it was constitutionally sound.301 Courts assessing police policies 
have also taken notice when policies are created by Lexipol.302 And when the 
Department of Justice entered into a court-monitored consent decree with the 
New Orleans Police Department, New Orleans and Lexipol entered into a 
 
reform by suing every department with a pattern of widespread constitutional violations”); Patel, 
supra note 209, at 812–14 (describing the “increasing strength” of the DOJ’s use of consent decrees 
under recent administrations and citing the perceived positive outcomes in three major police 
departments but noting the “vulnerab[ility] to bias and political maneuvering” of consent decrees). 
The viability of the Department of Justice in this role is also dependent on the priorities of the 
president. See David A. Graham, Can Trump’s Justice Department Undo Police Reform?, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 4, 2017) (describing efforts by Attorney General Jeff Sessions to reverse police 
reform advances made by the Department of Justice under President Obama). 
300. See, e.g., Rebuttal by James Sida to Jeffrey A. Schwartz at 6, Parenti v. County of 
Monterey, No. 14-CV-05481, 2017 WL 2958801 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2017) (“I have written jail 
policies as a practitioner and division commander of a large jail system. In addition, I was the lead 
consultant in the development of a jail policy manual for Lexipol, Inc., a risk management firm, that 
provides a jail manual throughout the United States.”); Expert Opinion of Use of Force of Robert 
Glen Carpenter, Durden-Bosley v. Shepherd, No. 2:15-CV-00798MJP, 2016 WL 9281044 (W.D. 
Wash. Feb. 23, 2016) (“I was the Use of Force subject matter expert (SME) used to develop and 
implement the present Lexipol policy manual currently used by my department.”); Report of 
Kenneth R. Wallentine at 8, 12, Christiansen v. West Valley City, No. 2:14cv00025, 2015 WL 
11439375 (D. Utah July 15, 2015) (“My qualifications as an expert in this subject matter include 
the following: . . . I am Vice-President and Senior Legal Advisor for Lexipol, Inc., the nations [sic] 
largest provider of policy formulation and revision for public safety agencies and policy-based 
training, responsible for reviewing and editing the work of legal staff in creation of policy manuals 
for law enforcement agencies.”); Interim Report of Expert Witness Jeffrey A. Martin at 1, Jaramillo 
v. City of San Mateo, 76 F. Supp. 3d 905 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. C 13-00441 NC), 2015 WL 
11253330 (“I also worked as an author of ‘Daily Training Bulletins’ for Lexipol, LLC, regarding 
various practices including the use of force, search and seizure, and other police practices.”); 
Defendant’s Expert Witness Report - R. Scot Haug, Towry v. Bonner Cty., No. 10-CV-292, 2011 
WL 11733377 (D. Idaho June 14, 2011) (“I was selected to serve as a representative of the Statewide 
Lexipol Model Policy Board where I assisted ICRMP and Lexipol in developing a statewide model 
policy for the State of Idaho.”); Report of Bruce D. Praet at 1, Mitz v. City of Grand Rapids, No. 
1:09-cv-365, 2009 WL 6849914 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2009) (describing his role in the formation 
of Lexipol as among his expert qualifications). 
301. See, e.g., Interim Report of Expert Witness Jeffrey A. Martin at 1, Jaramillo v. City of San 
Mateo, 76 F. Supp. 3d 905 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. C 13-00441 NC), 2015 WL 11253330, at *1 (“The 
San Mateo Police Department’s policy manual is provided by Lexipol, LLC, a private company. 
Lexipol provides standardized policy manuals for well over 500 law enforcement agencies in 
California and reflects current statutory authorizations and constitutional limitations on the use of 
force by peace officers. This makes the policy very sound.”). 
302. See, e.g., Kong Meng Xiong v. City of Merced, Nos. 1:13–cv–00083–SKO, 1:13–cv–
00111–SKO2015, WL 4598861, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2015) (noting that “[a]t the time of the 
incident, MPD used policies developed by Lexipol”). 
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$295,000 contract to develop those policies.303 Although we do not know 
how courts evaluate experts associated with Lexipol, or policies produced by 
Lexipol, the repeated invocation of the Lexipol brand suggests it may be 
treated as a signal of excellence. Yet, as we have shown, very little is actually 
known about the expertise of Lexipol’s employees or the constitutionality or 
effectiveness of its products. We encourage courts to more rigorously 
evaluate the credentials of Lexipol experts and the constitutionality of 
Lexipol policies and trainings without being influenced by its untested 
marketing claims or its market dominance. The fact that virtually every 
California law enforcement agency has the same use of force policy should 
not be viewed as evidence that that policy language is reasonable—it is 
merely evidence that 95% of California law enforcement agencies subscribe 
to Lexipol. 
C. Competing with Lexipol 
Our third recommendation is that nongovernmental groups interested in 
making their own police policy recommendations adjust their approaches in 
light of Lexipol’s commercial success. Specifically, groups developing 
model policies should make it easier for jurisdictions to adopt those policies. 
And groups advocating for policy changes should view Lexipol as a critically 
important audience. 
Several nonprofits and government groups have developed model police 
policies in recent years.304 For example, NYU School of Law’s Policing 
Project solicits public involvement when crafting policing policies and also 
invites social scientists and other experts to weigh in on best practices.305 The 
American Law Institute’s project on police investigations has drafted 
template policies with detailed commentary that can be considered and 
adopted by law enforcement agencies.306 The Municipal Research and 
Services Center, a nonprofit organization that focuses on helping local 
 
303. Charles Maldonado, Paying for the Consent Decree, GAMBIT (Aug. 14, 2012), https:// 
www.bestofneworleans.com/gambit/reform-at-a-cost/Content?oid=2057022 [https://perma.cc/ 
KUU2-2KRP]. 
304. These initiatives are similar to policy drafting initiatives undertaken in the 1960s. See 
Kenneth Culp Davis, Police Rulemaking on Selective Enforcement: A Reply, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 
1167, 1170 (1977) (describing rulemaking initiatives in the 1960s by the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police and the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and 
Goals). 
305. See generally Our Mission, POLICING PROJECT: N.Y.U. SCH. L., https://policingproject 
.org/about-us/our-mission/ [https://perma.cc/WC4V-X8MC]. 
306. See Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law: Policing, ALI ADVISOR, http://www 
.thealiadviser.org/policing/ [https://perma.cc/V2U5-AG72] (proposing policies related to—among 
other things—search and seizure, the use of force, and evidence gathering); Model Rules and 
Policies, POLICING PROJECT: N.Y.U. SCH. L., https://policingproject.org/our-work/writing-rules/ 
[https://perma.cc/UN4D-ZXWD] (stating that the American Law Institute’s draft policies “can 
serve as a template for legislative bodies, communities, and courts”). 
EAGLY.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2018  1:26 AM 
2018] Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking 955 
 
governments in Washington State with policy issues, publishes information 
about how local jurisdictions should develop their policy manuals and 
provides access to the full policy manuals of four major police departments 
in the state.307 In a similar vein, the ACLU has launched a “Freedom Cities” 
campaign to promote nine model state and local law enforcement policies 
that protect immigrants from the Trump Administration’s deportation 
agenda.308 And the International Association of Chiefs of Police’s Policy 
Center publishes model policies with accompanying explanations for its 
drafting choices, including related studies and other information.309 
Each of these groups makes policies available to the public without 
copyright restrictions—and many are free. Yet our research suggests that 
Lexipol’s model policies are adopted by more jurisdictions than the model 
policies developed by these groups. Lexipol provides policies for almost 
every police department and sheriff’s department in California. Beyond the 
small handful of jurisdictions that choose to create their policies themselves, 
Lexipol is practically the only game in town. 
Why has Lexipol dominated the markets in California and other states 
despite the fact that its policies cost more than those made available by 
nonprofits? We think that part of the answer is that Lexipol has created 
products that allow departments—particularly smaller departments—to 
develop and update police policies and trainings quickly and affordably. 
Lexipol delivers policies and trainings online and makes it easy for 
jurisdictions to update their policies to reflect changes in the law. Lexipol 
also allows its subscribers to track which employees have reviewed manual 
updates and completed trainings. And as Lexipol emphasizes in its marketing 
materials, it charges far less than it would cost local police departments to 
replicate these services on their own. 
Moving forward, advocacy groups and think tanks need to recognize 
Lexipol’s role as their most successful competitor in the marketplace of 
policymaking ideas. Nonprofit groups hoping to convince law enforcement 
 
307. Police and Law Enforcement Services Policy and Procedure Manuals, MUN. RES. & 
SERVS. CTR., http://mrsc.org/Home/Explore-Topics/Public-Safety/Law-Enforcement/Police-and-
Law-Enforcement-Services-Policy-and-Pro.aspx [https://perma.cc/V97Y-KBVS]. 
308. See ACLU, Freedom Cities, PEOPLE POWER, https://peoplepower.org/freedom-cities.html 
[https://perma.cc/U4XX-QZKH] (describing the ACLU’s “Freedom Cities” campaign); see also 
Faiz Shakir & Ronald Newman, How People Power Activists Are Driving Change, ACLU (July 19, 
2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/how-people-power-activists-are-driving-change [https://perma 
.cc/8YCE-2NUP] (summarizing the efforts of People Power Activists to encourage municipalities 
to adopt the ACLU’s nine model policies). 
309. For example, the International Association of Chiefs of Police includes on its web page a 
model body-worn cameras policy as well as a “concepts and issues” paper, videos of presentations 
and workshops related to best practices, and a list of general principles to guide departments in 
developing effective policies regarding use of technology. Body-Worn Cameras, INT’L ASS’N 
CHIEFS POLICE (Apr. 2014), http://www.theiacp.org/MPBodyWornCameras. 
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to favor their policies over Lexipol’s could take steps to make their proposed 
policies easier to integrate into existing policy manuals of both Lexipol and 
independent jurisdictions. In working with Lexipol clients, advocacy 
organizations could stress why Lexipol’s existing master policy on a given 
topic is inadequate and propose alternative policy language that follows 
Lexipol’s basic style guide. Nonprofit competitors could also do more to 
compete with Lexipol by offering policy updates to reflect changes in the law 
and best practices, thereby reassuring jurisdictions that these alternative 
policies would, to borrow Lexipol’s language, remain “up-to-date” and 
“defensible.”310 
Another possible reason that Lexipol has dominated the market, despite 
the availability of free or less expensive alternatives, is that Lexipol makes 
such powerful claims about the excellence of its policies and the ability of its 
services to reduce liability risk. Competitors in the private marketplace often 
question the merits of their rivals’ claims about their products. Groups 
drafting alternative model police policies could similarly examine the bases 
for Lexipol’s claims about its products. 
Our recommendations that other organizations more effectively 
compete with Lexipol’s policymaking approach are not offered solely for 
these organizations’ benefit. Instead, it is our view that Lexipol’s growing 
dominance in the policymaking market has serious drawbacks. With more 
and more departments adopting Lexipol’s policies, there is mass 
standardization of police policies across jurisdictions and less opportunity to 
assess the efficacy of different approaches. Lexipol’s domination of the 
market may also inhibit transparency. Lexipol promotes itself as “the sole 
source provider” of its risk management tools.311 Jurisdictions that agree and 
designate Lexipol as the sole source provider may forego the formal bidding 
process generally associated with city contracts. As a result, Lexipol does not 
have to compete for contracts or explain why its products are better than those 
offered by its competitors.312 One way to counteract this standardization and 
secrecy is by nurturing policymaking competition. 
 
310. Why Partner With Lexipol?, LEXIPOL, http://www.lexipol.com/law-enforcement/law-
enforcement-why-lexipol/ [https://perma.cc/2A2B-A7HK]. 
311. See Lexipol, Contract with the City of Austin (Aug. 23, 2012), http:// 
www.austintexas.gov/edims/document.cfm?id=179747 [https://perma.cc/72NB-BQLL] (Lexipol 
explains the following in Exhibit A of the contract: “The comprehensive Lexipol service is not 
available through any other public or private resources or organizations. There is no other system 
that offers the following integration into one package; therefore we are the sole source provider of 
the following package . . . .”). 
312. See, e.g., City of Fremont, Sole Source Justification (undated) (on file with authors) (“This 
is the only known entity providing this service on the west coast. . . . Since there are no other 
services of this type available they are the sole source for this type of resource.”); Memorandum 
from Lili Hadsell, Chief of Police, City of Baldwin Park, to the Mayor and Members of the City 
Council, City of Baldwin Park (June 3, 2010) (on file with authors) (“Lexipol LLC is a sole source 
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We additionally recommend that groups engaged in advocacy on police 
policymaking focus their efforts more directly on Lexipol. The company’s 
policy decisions have an oversized influence on American policing. As a 
result, changing Lexipol’s policies can influence the practices of thousands 
of law enforcement agencies at once. Lexipol reports that it reviews 
publications from government and nonprofit organizations—including the 
 
vender, as they are the only company that authors a policy manual specific to the agency, but also 
updates and maintains the policy manual as case law or interpretations change.”); Memorandum 
from Greg Hebert, Commander, Oxnard Police Dep’t, to Irma Coughlin, Purchasing, Oxnard Police 
Dep’t (Oct. 3, 2016) (on file with authors) (“LEXIPOL LLC is the only known provider of these 
online policy services and is led by industry leaders in risk management and policy development 
for law enforcement.”); Irvine Police Dep’t, Sole Source Request: Lexipol (undated) (on file with 
authors) (seeking approval of a “sole source request with Lexipol” to maintain the department’s 
policy manual and noting that “Public Safety staff conducted a web-based search and could not 
identify another firm that provides the breadth and expertise of services offered by Lexipol”); 
Interoffice Memorandum from Raymond W. King, Police Captain, San Bernardino Police Dep’t, to 
Deborah Morrow, Purchasing Manager, San Bernardino Police Dep’t (Feb. 28, 2012) (on file with 
authors) (“The service that Lexipol LLC provides is unique and is not available through any other 
public or private resources or organizations.”); City of Long Beach, Purchasing Div., Informal Bid 
Quote Form (Mar. 19, 2014) (on file with authors) (noting that Lexipol’s service is “not available 
through any other public or private resources or organizations”); Memorandum from Margaret 
Mims, Sheriff–Coroner, Cty. of Fresno to Bd. of Supervisors, Cty. of Fresno (Feb. 24, 2015) (on 
file with authors) (“The Department requests your Board waive the competitive bidding process . . . 
[because] Lexipol is the only vendor uniquely qualified to provide these services.”); City of 
Modesto, Justification for Sole Source/Sole Brand (Sept. 26, 2013) (on file with authors) (“Sole 
Source: Item is available from only one vendor.”); Oakland City Council, Resolution No. 85356 
(Jan. 6, 2015) (on file with authors) (referring to Lexipol as “the sole respondent to a competitive 
solicitation process (Request for Proposals/Qualifications)”); Sole Source Request from the City 
Manager, City of Richmond (Mar. 6, 2015) (on file with authors) (“There are competing vendors 
that provide policy manual management services but Lexipol LLC is the sole vendor that will update 
the existing manual.”). We also found sole source purchase requests online from other states. See, 
e.g., Memorandum from Jason Batalden, Internal Servs. Adm’r, to Richard A. Nahrstadt, Vill. 
Manager, Vill. of Northbrook, Ill. (Aug. 8, 2017), northbrookil.iqm2.com/Citizens/ 
FileOpen.aspx?Type=30&ID=8325 [https://perma.cc/23ZX-CDXE] (recommending renewal of the 
sole source contract with Lexipol LLC); Executive/Council Approval Form from Snohomish Cty., 
Wash., Sheriff, to Council Chairperson, Snohomish Cty. Council (Apr. 29, 2008), 
http://snohomish.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=270&meta_id=22726 
[https://perma.cc/JMB9-M3CV] (requesting permission to award “a sole source purchase order to 
Lexipol, LLC for the purchase of Policy Manual Services”); Nathan L., County to Appoint Members 
to Mental Health Committee, BAKER CITY HERALD (Nov. 25, 2008), http://www 
.bakercityherald.com/localnews/4132524-151/county-to-appoint-members-to-mental-health-
committee [https://perma.cc/Q395-BUB8] (describing a request for a sole source contract between 
Lexipol and Baker County, Oregon); Letter from Jimmy Liles, Nixa, Mo., Police Dep’t, to Cindy 
Robbins, City Council, Nixa, Mo., Brian Bingle, City Council, Nixa, Mo., and Mayor Steel, Nixa, 
Mo. (July 16, 2015), http://nixa.com/home/showdocument?id=4429 [https://perma.cc/4HKE-
MWKD] (requesting funds for a subscription agreement with Lexipol and describing Lexipol as a 
sole source provider); Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Moore, Okla., City Council (July 18, 
2016) (requesting sole source approval of Lexipol’s products based on the City Attorney’s 
determination that “it qualified as a sole source purchase due to the unique services offered by 
Lexipol”). 
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Department of Justice and the ACLU—when crafting its model policies.313 
But these groups should also take their message directly to Lexipol. 
There are some recent examples of advocacy groups doing just this: 
engaging Lexipol about its policies. For example, a coalition of community 
advocacy groups in California discovered that police departments in a 
number of cities had adopted “ready-made policies” from Lexipol on 
immigration enforcement that, in their view, are “unconstitutional and 
otherwise illegal, and can lead to improper detentions and erroneous 
arrests.”314 The group shared the policies at issue with the press and sent a 
letter to Lexipol “demanding that it eliminate illegal and unclear directives 
that can lead to racial profiling and harassment of immigrants.”315 Ken 
Wallentine, a senior legal advisor for Lexipol, told the Los Angeles Times 
that departments adopting its policies “should consider their local 
demographics and circumstances before turning those [model Lexipol] 
policies into practice.”316 Nonetheless, he maintained that the Lexipol 
immigration-enforcement policy that came under fire—which allows officers 
to consider a “lack of English proficiency” as a criteria in making a police 
stop—was legally defensible.317 In a private letter sent to attorneys at the 
ACLU, Bruce Praet was even more defensive: “Falsely publicizing that our 
policies are ‘illegal’ and ‘unconstitutional’ appears intended to interfere with 
our ability to conduct business and to generate media attention. . . . Lexipol 
policies are legally sound and do not advocate any illegal or unconstitutional 
conduct by law enforcement officers.”318 However, we have since learned 
that after the public advocacy around the policy, at least one California 
department repealed the problematic Lexipol policy.319 Following this 
example, groups focused on changing policies on use of force, racial 
 
313. Lexipol February Conference Call, supra note 59. 
314. ACLU Demands Change to Unlawful Pre-Packaged Police Policies, ACLU N. CAL. 
(Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.aclunc.org/news/aclu-demands-change-unlawful-pre-packaged-
police-policies. 
315. Id.; see also Letter from Representatives of the ACLU, Nat’l Day Laborer Org. Network, 
All. San Diego, Advancing Justice—Asian Law Caucus, Cal. Immigrant Policy Ctr., and Immigrant 
Legal Res. Ctr. to Bruce Praet, Chairman, Lexipol (Apr. 12, 2017) (on file with authors) (“We 
strongly urge you to revise the Policy so that it comports with current law, and to promptly rescind 
and replace the products you have already provided to law enforcement agencies in this state.”). 
316. James Queally, Police Departments Say They Don’t Enforce Immigration Laws. But Their 
Manuals Say Something Different, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/ 
lanow/la-me-ln-california-police-immigration-enforcement-20170412-story.html (quoting Lexipol 
senior legal advisor Ken Wallentine). 
317. Id. 
318. Letter from Bruce D. Praet, Attorney at Law, to Adrienna Wong, Attorney at Law, ACLU, 
and Jennie Pasquarella, Attorney at Law, ACLU (Apr. 13, 2017) (on file with authors). 
319. Letter from Pamela Healy, Records Manager, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, City of Sunnyvale, to 
authors (July 11, 2017) (on file with authors) (noting that Policy Section 415 on “Immigration 
Violations” was redacted from their policy manual “as the policy is currently under revision and the 
available material no longer reflective of current practice”). 
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profiling, body cameras, and other aspects of law enforcement practice 
should view Lexipol, as well as Lexipol’s clients, as a crucial audience. 
Each of these suggestions is aimed at encouraging local jurisdictions to 
play a greater role in deciding what policies should guide their law 
enforcement agencies. Standardized policies, like those offered by Lexipol, 
are one possible source of information for jurisdictions creating or updating 
their police policies. Yet Lexipol needs to provide its subscribers with more 
information about its policymaking process so that governments can make 
more informed decisions about whether to subscribe to the service and, if 
they do, whether to customize Lexipol’s policy language. Moreover, Lexipol 
should not be the only resource consulted during local governments’ police 
policy development. Local governments should also seek out sources that are 
not as focused on liability risk reduction, tailor policies to fit the particular 
needs of their jurisdictions, and engage community members about their 
policies. State governments, advocacy groups, courts, and policing 
organizations also have important roles to play in drafting and regulating 
policing policy. 
Conclusion 
This Article is the first to identify and analyze the significance of 
Lexipol to American policing. We have documented the quiet emergence of 
Lexipol as a corporate answer to the challenge of creating internal police 
policies that guide officer discretion. Surprisingly, this growing practice of 
privatizing the police policymaking function has gone unnoticed in the 
academic literature. 
As we have shown, Lexipol’s policies are reshaping both the process by 
which police policies are created and the content of the resulting policies. 
This, in turn, has enormous impact on the institution of policing, particularly 
in a state like California where nearly every law enforcement agency has 
adopted Lexipol’s policies. 
Our goal in this project is to begin an important conversation about some 
of the concerns raised by this new era of reliance on a corporate legal entity 
to establish national standards for local policing. These concerns include a 
focus on liability risk management as the baseline standard for law 
enforcement behavior, a rulemaking process that proceeds in private with no 
public participation, and a profit-making model that reduces accountability 
and disrupts norms of sharing across agencies. We have also begun to sketch 
a way forward—a path that recognizes possible causes for the increasing 
privatization of police policymaking while encouraging greater transparency, 
oversight, and competition. 
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Appendix 
This Appendix describes our methodology for collecting public records 
of police and sheriff policymaking practices in California. In October and 
November of 2016, we submitted public records requests to the 200 largest 
police and sheriff’s departments in California, requesting their policy 
manuals as well as any records reflecting their negotiations and contractual 
relationships with Lexipol LLC. We completed our collection of records 
from all 200 departments in October of 2017. 
We identified the 200 largest police and sheriff’s departments in 
California by consulting a census of law enforcement agencies published by 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS).320 The BJS census reports on the 
number of sworn officers in state and local law enforcement agencies as of 
2008. Because our focus is on police and sheriff policies, we first removed 
state law enforcement agencies, university- and school-based law 
enforcement agencies, and airport, public transportation, and park police 
from the list of California agencies. In total, the BJS data included 406 police 
and sheriff’s departments in California. Of these, we selected the 200 
agencies with the most full-time sworn officers for our public records 
requests. Our study therefore captures the policymaking practices of almost 
half of police and sheriff’s departments in the state.  
The table that follows summarizes the agencies we surveyed and their 
policy type. It contains the name of the department (column two), the number 
of sworn officers employed in the department, as reported by the BJS 
(column three), the city and county in which the department is located 
(columns four and five), and the policy type, as revealed by their responses 
to our public records requests (column six). If a jurisdiction authored its own 
policy manual and had no current relationship with Lexipol, we designated 
the policy type as “independent.” If a jurisdiction adopted the Lexipol policy 
manual, we designated the policy type as “Lexipol.” Finally, if a jurisdiction 
subscribed to the Lexipol service but continued to publish its own policy 
manual (without a Lexipol copyright stamp), we designated the department’s 
policy type as “hybrid.” Overall, we found that 26 agencies were 
independent, 166 adopted Lexipol, and 8 had hybrid policy manuals. 
  
 
320. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies 
(CSLLEA), NAT’L ARCHIVE CRIM. JUST. DATA (2008), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ 
NACJD/studies/27681 [http://perma.cc/2XJZ-M92U]. 
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Agency 
Sworn 
Officers City County 
Policy 
Type 
1 Los Angeles 
Police 
Department 
9,727 Los Angeles Los Angeles Independent 
2 Los Angeles 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
9,461 Los Angeles Los Angeles Independent 
3 Riverside 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
2,147 Riverside Riverside Hybrid 
4 San Diego 
Police 
Department 
1,951 San Diego San Diego Independent 
5 San Francisco 
Police 
Department 
1,940 San 
Francisco 
San 
Francisco 
Independent 
6 San 
Bernardino 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
1,797 San 
Bernardino 
San 
Bernardino 
Independent 
7 Orange 
County 
Sheriff-
Coroner 
Department 
1,794 Santa Ana Orange Lexipol 
8 Sacramento 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
1,409 Sacramento Sacramento Independent 
9 San Jose 
Police 
Department 
1,382 San Jose Santa Clara Independent 
10 San Diego 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
1,322 San Diego San Diego Independent 
11 Long Beach 
Police 
Department 
968 Long Beach Los Angeles Lexipol 
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Agency 
Sworn 
Officers City County 
Policy 
Type 
12 Alameda 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
928 Oakland Alameda Independent 
13 San Francisco 
Sheriff’s 
Department 
838 San 
Francisco 
San 
Francisco 
Independent 
14 Fresno Police 
Department 
828 Fresno Fresno Lexipol 
15 Oakland 
Police 
Department 
773 Oakland Alameda Lexipol 
16 Ventura 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
755 Ventura Ventura Lexipol 
17 Sacramento 
Police 
Department 
701 Sacramento Sacramento Independent 
18 Contra Costa 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
679 Martinez Contra Costa Independent 
19 Tulare County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
513 Visalia Tulare Lexipol 
20 Kern County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
512 Bakersfield Kern Hybrid 
21 Fresno 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
461 Fresno Fresno Hybrid 
22 Santa Clara 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
450 San Jose Santa Clara Independent 
23 Stockton 
Police 
Department 
415 Stockton San Joaquin Independent 
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Agency 
Sworn 
Officers City County 
Policy 
Type 
24 Anaheim 
Police 
Department 
398 Anaheim Orange Lexipol 
25 Riverside 
Police 
Department 
385 Riverside Riverside Lexipol 
26 Santa Ana 
Police 
Department 
369 Santa Ana Orange Lexipol 
27 Bakersfield 
Police 
Department 
348 Bakersfield Kern Lexipol 
28 San 
Bernardino 
Police 
Department 
345 San 
Bernardino 
San 
Bernardino 
Lexipol 
29 San Mateo 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
334 Redwood 
City 
San Mateo Lexipol 
30 Monterey 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
315 Salinas Monterey Lexipol 
31 Santa Barbara 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
294 Santa 
Barbara 
Santa 
Barbara 
Lexipol 
32 San Joaquin 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
280 French 
Camp 
San Joaquin Lexipol 
33 Glendale 
Police 
Department 
264 Glendale Los Angeles Lexipol 
34 Modesto 
Police 
Department 
262 Modesto Stanislaus Lexipol 
35 Sonoma 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
251 Santa Rosa Sonoma Lexipol 
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Agency 
Sworn 
Officers City County 
Policy 
Type 
36 Pasadena 
Police 
Department 
246 Pasadena Los Angeles Lexipol 
37 Chula Vista 
Police 
Department 
244 Chula Vista San Diego Lexipol 
38 Torrance 
Police 
Department 
235 Torrance Los Angeles Independent 
39 Stanislaus 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
230 Modesto Stanislaus Lexipol 
40 Ontario Police 
Department 
230 Ontario San 
Bernardino 
Lexipol 
41 Oxnard Police 
Department 
228 Oxnard Ventura Lexipol 
42 Placer County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
228 Auburn Placer Independent 
43 Huntington 
Beach Police 
Department 
223 Huntington 
Beach 
Orange Lexipol 
44 Sunnyvale 
Department of 
Public Safety 
210 Sunnyvale Santa Clara Lexipol 
45 Oceanside 
Police 
Department 
210 Oceanside San Diego Hybrid 
46 Santa Monica 
Police 
Department 
205 Santa 
Monica 
Los Angeles Lexipol 
47 Marin County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
202 San Rafael Marin Independent 
48 Irvine Police 
Department 
197 Irvine Orange Hybrid 
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Agency 
Sworn 
Officers City County 
Policy 
Type 
49 Inglewood 
Police 
Department 
187 Inglewood Los Angeles Lexipol321 
50 Berkeley 
Police 
Department 
186 Berkeley Alameda Lexipol 
51 Hayward 
Police 
Department 
185 Hayward Alameda Lexipol 
52 Fontana 
Police 
Department 
184 Fontana San 
Bernardino 
Lexipol 
53 Pomona 
Police 
Department 
182 Pomona Los Angeles Lexipol 
54 Fremont 
Police 
Department 
182 Fremont Alameda Lexipol 
55 El Dorado 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
179 Placerville El Dorado Lexipol 
56 Corona Police 
Department 
179 Corona Riverside Lexipol 
57 Santa Rosa 
Police 
Department 
179 Santa Rosa Sonoma Lexipol 
58 Salinas Police 
Department 
177 Salinas Monterey Lexipol 
59 Orange Police 
Department 
167 Orange Orange Lexipol 
60 Garden Grove 
Police 
Department 
166 Garden 
Grove 
Orange Independent 
61 Richmond 
Police 
Department 
165 Richmond Contra Costa Lexipol 
 
321. The Inglewood Police Department never responded to our public records request. 
However, officials at Lexipol informed us that Inglewood is one of their clients. Email from Tim 
Kensok to Ingrid Eagly & Joanna Schwartz (Sept. 13, 2013) (on file with authors). 
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62 Burbank 
Police 
Department 
164 Burbank Los Angeles Hybrid 
63 Escondido 
Police 
Department 
163 Escondido San Diego Independent 
64 Concord 
Police 
Department 
161 Concord Contra Costa Independent 
65 Fullerton 
Police 
Department 
159 Fullerton Orange Lexipol 
66 Costa Mesa 
Police 
Department 
158 Costa Mesa Orange Lexipol 
67 San Luis 
Obispo 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
156 San Luis 
Obispo 
San Luis 
Obispo 
Lexipol 
68 Shasta County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
154 Redding Shasta Lexipol 
69 Santa Cruz 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
149 Santa Cruz Santa Cruz Lexipol 
70 El Monte 
Police 
Department 
145 El Monte Los Angeles Lexipol 
71 Santa Clara 
Police 
Department 
141 Santa Clara Santa Clara Independent 
72 Newport 
Beach Police 
Department 
140 Newport 
Beach 
Orange Lexipol 
73 San Diego 
Harbor Police 
139 San Diego San Diego Lexipol 
74 Beverly Hills 
Police 
Department 
137 Beverly 
Hills 
Los Angeles Independent 
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75 Visalia 
Department of 
Public Safety 
136 Visalia Tulare Lexipol 
76 Santa Barbara 
Police 
Department 
136 Santa 
Barbara 
Santa 
Barbara 
Lexipol 
77 Ventura 
Police 
Department 
134 Ventura Ventura Lexipol 
78 Port of Los 
Angeles 
Police 
133 San Pedro Los Angeles Lexipol 
79 Whittier 
Police 
Department 
127 Whittier Los Angeles Lexipol 
80 Simi Valley 
Police 
Department 
127 Simi Valley Ventura Lexipol 
81 Roseville 
Police 
Department 
126 Roseville Placer Lexipol 
82 Elk Grove 
Police 
Department 
126 Elk Grove Sacramento Lexipol 
83 Fairfield 
Police 
Department 
124 Fairfield Solano Lexipol 
84 El Cajon 
Police 
Department 
120 El Cajon San Diego Independent 
85 Antioch 
Police 
Department 
120 Antioch Contra Costa Lexipol 
86 West Covina 
Police 
Department 
119 West Covina Los Angeles Lexipol 
87 Vallejo Police 
Department 
116 Vallejo Solano Lexipol 
88 Carlsbad 
Police 
Department 
114 Carlsbad San Diego Lexipol 
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89 Solano 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
113 Fairfield Solano Hybrid 
90 Daly City 
Police 
Department 
113 Daly City San Mateo Lexipol 
91 Merced 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
112 Merced Merced Lexipol 
92 Vacaville 
Police 
Department 
111 Vacaville Solano Lexipol 
93 Butte County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
110 Oroville Butte Hybrid 
94 Rialto Police 
Department 
109 Rialto San 
Bernardino 
Lexipol 
95 Downey 
Police 
Department 
109 Downey Los Angeles Lexipol 
96 Imperial 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
109 El Centro Imperial Lexipol 
97 Santa Maria 
Police 
Department 
108 Santa Maria Santa 
Barbara 
Lexipol 
98 San Mateo 
Police 
Department 
108 San Mateo San Mateo Lexipol 
99 Culver City 
Police 
Department 
106 Culver City Los Angeles Lexipol 
100 Sutter County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
105 Yuba City Sutter Independent 
101 Merced Police 
Department 
105 Merced Merced Lexipol 
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102 Clovis Police 
Department 
105 Clovis Fresno Lexipol 
103 Brea Police 
Department 
103 Brea Orange Lexipol 
104 Westminster 
Police 
Department 
100 Westminster Orange Lexipol 
105 South Gate 
Police 
Department 
99 South Gate Los Angeles Lexipol 
106 Redondo 
Beach Police 
Department 
99 Redondo 
Beach 
Los Angeles Lexipol 
107 Napa County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
98 Napa Napa Lexipol 
108 Mountain 
View Police 
Department 
97 Mountain 
View 
Santa Clara Lexipol 
109 Redwood City 
Police 
Department 
96 Redwood 
City 
San Mateo Lexipol 
110 Hawthorne 
Police 
Department 
96 Hawthorne Los Angeles Lexipol 
111 Chino Police 
Department 
96 Chino San 
Bernardino 
Lexipol 
112 San Leandro 
Police 
Department 
95 San Leandro Alameda Lexipol 
113 Santa Cruz 
Police 
Department 
95 Santa Cruz Santa Cruz Lexipol 
114 Tustin Police 
Department 
95 Tustin Orange Lexipol 
115 Alameda 
Police 
Department 
94 Alameda Alameda Lexipol 
116 Buena Park 
Police 
Department 
94 Buena Park Orange Lexipol 
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117 Livermore 
Police 
Department 
94 Livermore Alameda Lexipol 
118 Palm Springs 
Police 
Department 
93 Palm 
Springs 
Riverside Lexipol 
119 Palo Alto 
Police 
Department 
93 Palo Alto Santa Clara Lexipol 
120 Gardena 
Police 
Department 
91 Gardena Los Angeles Lexipol 
121 Humboldt 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
91 Eureka Humboldt Lexipol 
122 Tracy Police 
Department 
90 Tracy San Joaquin Lexipol 
123 National City 
Police 
Department 
90 National 
City 
San Diego Lexipol 
124 Murrieta 
Police 
Department 
90 Murrieta Riverside Lexipol 
125 Chico Police 
Department 
88 Chico Butte Lexipol 
126 Folsom Police 
Department 
88 Folsom Sacramento Lexipol 
127 Milpitas 
Police 
Department 
86 Milpitas Santa Clara Lexipol 
128 Pleasanton 
Police 
Department 
85 Pleasanton Alameda Lexipol 
129 Redlands 
Police 
Department 
84 Redlands San 
Bernardino 
Lexipol 
130 Citrus Heights 
Police 
Department 
83 Citrus 
Heights 
Sacramento Lexipol 
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131 Alhambra 
Police 
Department 
83 Alhambra Los Angeles Lexipol 
132 Yolo County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
82 Woodland Yolo Lexipol 
133 Hemet Police 
Department 
82 Hemet Riverside Lexipol 
134 Upland Police 
Department 
81 Upland San 
Bernardino 
Independent  
135 Union City 
Police 
Department 
81 Union City Alameda Lexipol 
136 Montebello 
Police 
Department 
81 Montebello Los Angeles Lexipol 
137 Turlock 
Police 
Department 
80 Turlock Stanislaus Lexipol 
138 Kings County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
79 Hanford Kings Independent 
139 South San 
Francisco 
Police 
Department 
79 San 
Francisco 
San 
Francisco 
Lexipol 
140 Rohnert Park 
Department of 
Public Safety 
78 Rohnert 
Park 
Sonoma Lexipol 
141 Madera 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
78 Madera Madera Lexipol 
142 Mendocino 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
77 Ukiah Mendocino Lexipol 
143 Lodi Police 
Department 
76 Lodi San Joaquin Lexipol 
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144 Manteca 
Police 
Department 
76 Manteca San Joaquin Lexipol 
145 Pittsburg 
Police 
Department 
76 Pittsburg Contra Costa Lexipol 
146 Monterey 
Park Police 
Department 
75 Monterey 
Park 
Los Angeles Lexipol 
147 Nevada 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
74 Nevada City Nevada Lexipol 
148 San Rafael 
Police 
Department 
74 San Rafael Marin Lexipol 
149 Walnut Creek 
Police 
Department 
73 Walnut 
Creek 
Contra Costa Lexipol 
150 Indio Police 
Department 
73 Indio Riverside Independent 
151 Napa Police 
Department 
72 Napa Napa Lexipol 
152 Tulare Police 
Department 
71 Tulare Tulare Lexipol 
153 Colton Police 
Department 
71 Colton San 
Bernardino 
Lexipol 
154 West 
Sacramento 
Police 
Department 
70 West 
Sacramento 
Yolo Lexipol 
155 Baldwin Park 
Police 
Department 
69 Baldwin 
Park 
Los Angeles Lexipol 
156 Petaluma 
Police 
Department 
68 Petaluma Sonoma Lexipol 
157 El Segundo 
Police 
Department 
68 El Segundo Los Angeles Independent 
EAGLY.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/5/2018  1:26 AM 
2018] Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking 973 
 
 
Agency 
Sworn 
Officers City County 
Policy 
Type 
158 Huntington 
Park Police 
Department 
68 Huntington 
Park 
Los Angeles Lexipol 
159 La Habra 
Police 
Department 
68 La Habra Orange Lexipol 
160 Yuba County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
66 Marysville Yuba Lexipol 
161 Yuba City 
Police 
Department 
65 Yuba City Sutter Lexipol 
162 Woodland 
Police 
Department 
65 Woodland Yolo Lexipol 
163 Arcadia Police 
Department 
65 Arcadia Los Angeles Lexipol 
164 San Luis 
Obispo Police 
Department 
64 San Luis 
Obispo 
San Luis 
Obispo 
Lexipol 
165 Watsonville 
Police 
Department 
64 Watsonville Santa Cruz Lexipol 
166 Manhattan 
Beach Police 
Department 
64 Manhattan 
Beach 
Los Angeles Lexipol 
167 Azusa Police 
Department 
63 Azusa Los Angeles Lexipol 
168 La Mesa 
Police 
Department 
63 La Mesa San Diego Independent 
169 Siskiyou 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
62 Yreka Siskiyou Lexipol 
170 Tuolumne 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
61 Sonora Tuolumne Lexipol 
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171 Fountain 
Valley Police 
Department 
61 Fountain 
Valley 
Orange Lexipol 
172 Lake County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
61 Lakeport Lake Lexipol 
173 Porterville 
Police 
Department 
60 Porterville Tulare Lexipol 
174 Covina Police 
Department 
60 Covina Los Angeles Lexipol 
175 Madera Police 
Department 
60 Madera Madera Lexipol 
176 Brentwood 
Police 
Department 
60 Brentwood Contra Costa Lexipol 
177 Gilroy Police 
Department 
60 Gilroy Santa Clara Lexipol 
178 Calaveras 
County 
Sheriff’s 
Office 
59 San Andreas Calaveras Lexipol 
179 Novato Police 
Department 
59 Novato Marin Lexipol 
180 Davis Police 
Department 
59 Davis Yolo Hybrid 
181 Montclair 
Police 
Department 
58 Montclair San 
Bernardino 
Lexipol 
182 San Pablo 
Police 
Department 
57 San Pablo Contra Costa Lexipol 
183 Cypress 
Police 
Department 
56 Cypress Orange Lexipol 
184 Cathedral City 
Police 
Department 
56 Cathedral 
City 
Riverside Lexipol 
185 San Ramon 
Police 
Department 
56 San Ramon Contra Costa Lexipol 
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186 Monrovia 
Police 
Department 
55 Monrovia Los Angeles Lexipol 
187 Monterey 
Police 
Department 
54 Monterey Monterey Lexipol 
188 Rocklin 
Police 
Department 
54 Rocklin Placer Lexipol 
189 El Centro 
Police 
Department 
54 El Centro Imperial Lexipol 
190 Beaumont 
Police 
Department 
54 Beaumont Riverside Lexipol 
191 San Gabriel 
Police 
Department 
54 San Gabriel Los Angeles Lexipol 
192 Newark Police 
Department 
54 Newark Alameda Lexipol 
193 Glendora 
Police 
Department 
53 Glendora Los Angeles Lexipol 
194 Vernon Police 
Department 
53 Vernon Los Angeles Lexipol 
195 Bell Gardens 
Police 
Department 
51 Bell Gardens Los Angeles Lexipol 
196 Menlo Park 
Police 
Department 
50 Menlo Park San Mateo Lexipol 
197 Hanford 
Police 
Department 
50 Hanford Kings Lexipol 
198 Lompoc 
Police 
Department 
49 Lompoc Santa 
Barbara 
Lexipol 
199 Seaside Police 
Department 
48 Seaside Monterey Lexipol 
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200 Los Banos 
Police 
Department 
48 Los Banos Merced Lexipol 
 
